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ART. I. — *Admonitions to Protestants.* No. II. *Obligation to worship God. — Insufficiency of Reason.*

I. You know, my brethren, that God is ; for the invisible things of him, even his eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen from creation, being understood by the things that are made. You cannot, then, doubt that you are under an obligation to worship him, and an obligation from which neither you can withdraw yourselves, nor even he himself dispense you.

Is not this the common sense of mankind ? In every age and nation, savage, barbarous, or civilized, do you not find the fact of our obligation to worship God acknowledged and asserted ? Have not even those of your philosophers, who maintain that religion is a law or principle of human nature, universal, permanent, and indestructible, triumphantly proved, that religious worship, of some sort, is coeval and coextensive with the race ? Assuredly, what is approved by all men, in all ages of the world, is a dictate of reason, and we cannot deny it without divesting ourselves of that which constitutes the peculiar dignity and glory of our nature, and, as far as in our power, placing ourselves out of the category of men, and in that of irrational beings.

Moreover, the obligation of all men to worship God is not only certain from the common sense of mankind, from what Immanuel Kant calls the practical reason, but it is a truth of the pure reason itself, and as demonstrably certain as any truth of philosophy or mathematics. Certainly, the creator has the sovereign right of property to the creature, — the maker, to

the thing made. Is not this what you assert, when you say, a man has a right to the produce of his own hands, or the laborer is worthy of his hire? Is not God our creator? Has he not made us and bestowed upon us all our original endowments? You cannot deny it; for we could not act before we were, or bestow what we had not. Then he has the sovereign right of property to us; then we are his, not our own; and then we are bound to render ourselves, with all our original endowments, unto him, for justice requires us, as is undeniable, to render unto every one his own.

To render ourselves, that is, the tribute of our whole being, unto God as his due is, in general terms, what is to be understood by worshipping him. If, then, justice, as it undeniably does, requires us to render unto every one his due, and if we are due to God, are his and not our own, assuredly we are bound to worship him. This you cannot deny.

Can we ever withdraw ourselves from this obligation, or can it, by any act of ours, ever become true that we are not bound to worship God? Certainly not, unless we are able to destroy the relation which we hold to God as his creatures. We are bound to worship him because we are his; and we are his because he has made us. We are bound to render unto him the tribute of our being because he is its author, and of our whole being because he is the author of the whole. So long, then, as it remains true that he is the author of the whole, we must be bound to worship him. Can we ever make it true that he is not the author of our whole being, that he has not made us and bestowed upon us all our faculties? If not, — and we cannot, for it is metaphysically impossible, — we can never withdraw ourselves from the obligation to worship God, or be released from it by any act of ours.

But cannot God, if he chooses, dispense us from this obligation? The obligation to render unto every one his due, and therefore ourselves unto God, is an obligation of eternal justice. To deny it would be to deny justice itself, that which is essential to the very conception of justice. To dispense from it would, then, be to dispense from the obligations of eternal justice, and to authorize injustice. God cannot do this, or choose to do it; for he is essentially just, and it would be to contradict his own essential, eternal, and immutable nature. Then it must follow, that, as long as we exist, we are bound to render unto him, and he must exact, the tribute of our whole being. Then are we under obligation to worship God,

and an obligation from which neither we can withdraw ourselves nor he himself dispense us.

You must concede this, my brethren, or deny all morals. A moral action is not merely one which it is agreeable, convenient, or useful to perform, but a debt which we owe and are obliged in justice to pay. All morality rests on the idea of duty, and all duty on the principle, that we are bound in justice to give unto every one his own. If, then, you assert moral obligation at all, you must concede that we are bound to worship God ; for, evidently, we cannot be less bound to render unto God what is his than unto others what is theirs. Then, if you deny the obligation to worship God, you must deny that we are bound to render unto every one his own, and then moral obligation itself, and with it all morals.

But the obligation to worship God, if conceded, includes all our obligations, and is the only obligation which can be asserted. It is obvious to every one, that we can owe only on condition, that, to the extent of our indebtedness, we are not our own ; and equally obvious, that we can owe only him whose we are. We owe God, because we are his, — our whole being, because our whole being is his. If we owe our whole being to him, we can owe only him ; for we evidently cannot be indebted beyond our whole being. Owing our whole being to God, we are incompetent to contract debts to or from another. The earnings of property are the proprietor's. If God owns our whole being, as he must if the author of the whole, he owns our faculties, and then all that we can do or acquire by their exercise. We are, then, in the condition of the son under age, who is incompetent to acquire property or to contract debts. What is due to the services of the son is due to the father ; what is due to services rendered by others to the son is due from him only in and through the father. So with us, we can bind or be bound only in and through God, whose we are. If we can bind only in and through him, others can be bound to us or owe us any thing only as they owe, and for the reason that they owe, it to him ; and if we can be bound only in and through him, we can owe others but as we owe, and for the reason that we owe, him. Is it not undeniable, then, that our duty to God is our only duty, and that our obligation to worship him includes all our obligations ?

Unquestionably, we are bound to take proper care of ourselves, and to do ourselves no harm. But to whom are we

bound? To ourselves? That is absurd, for it implies that the binder and the bound are identical, and also that we are our own; but so far as our own, it is evident that we are not and cannot be bound at all. If our own, we are free to dispose of ourselves as we please. May I not do as I will with mine own? If our own, whose business is it, if we waste our strength and activity, destroy our health of mind or body, and kill ourselves, body and soul? But we are not our own; we belong, in our whole being, to God, who has the sovereign right to all that we are and have; therefore we are bound, not to ourselves, but to him;—and bound to him to take proper care of ourselves and to do ourselves no harm, because justice requires us to take proper care of what is intrusted to us, and to refrain from all injury to the property of another.

Unquestionably, again, we are bound to do as much for our neighbour, to love him as we love ourselves. But to whom are we bound? Not to him; for he is no more his own than we are our own. Not being his own, he cannot bind us; having nothing of his own, he cannot bring us in debt to him. The obligation, therefore, is not to him, but to God, whose he is, and whose is all that he has, or that we receive from him. He being the property of God, who is our owner, our master, as well as his, and being also our equal, we are bound to treat him as ourselves; for we must needs be as much bound to protect and not to injure the property of our master in another as in ourselves.

If this be so, it is evident that we cannot worship God, if we refuse to love and serve our neighbour. The claim of God extends to our whole being, and covers every sphere of our activity. God is the author of our whole being, and of all our relations, whether relations of family, of neighbourhood, of country, or of humanity; and therefore whatever is due to these is due to him, and must be paid, or we fail to discharge the debt we owe him. The duties growing out of these several relations are as integral in the worship of God as any other duties we do or can owe. He who would love God must love his brother also; and he who would worship God must serve his neighbour. There is no such thing as being faithful Godward, and faithless manward.

But because the worship of God includes integrally all our duties, you must not suppose that this worship is resolvable into the love and service of humanity, as do your Socialists and Humanityists. The debt is due to God, and to him alone.

As sovereign proprietor of it, he may transfer it, and make it payable to whom he pleases ; but it must be paid to him, or his order, or it is not paid at all. It may be payable to our neighbour, but only because God appoints him his agent to receive it. The error of your Socialists and Humanityists is not in asserting our duty to love and serve our neighbour, nor in identifying this love and service with the worship of God ; but in asserting that they are due to our neighbour in his own right, and that we pay it to God because we pay it to man. We are assuredly to love and serve humanity, but not for humanity's sake. We love and serve our neighbour for God, and when we do so we worship God. But we cannot reverse it, and love and serve God for our neighbour ; for our neighbour, not being the owner of God, cannot be the owner of the debt. The debt is not due to our neighbour, and to make it due to him is to deny it to be due to God, — is to put man in the place of God, — the very essence of idolatry, forbidden alike by reason and revelation, and which threatens, unless checked, to assume ere long an avowed and public form, as is not obscurely indicated in the “soul-worship” and “Hero-worship” of your Transcendentalists.

Nevertheless, my brethren, do not start at the assertion of your obligation to render unto God the tribute of your whole being. Undoubtedly, it implies your absolute subjection, soul and body, to God, — but this is not, as some of you have alleged, slavery ; for slavery is not in subjection, but in *unjust* subjection. The slave is not more subjected to his master than the wife to her husband, or the son, while he serves, to his father, and if equally due, his subjection would be no more a grievance, or slavery, than theirs. Absolute subjection to God, if just, — and it is just, if his due, — is, then, no slavery, no grievance, no infringement of man's natural right or freedom.

All men do and must concede their absolute subjection to God, for they all do and must concede their absolute subjection to justice. No man can pretend that he has the right to be unjust, the right to do wrong ; for it is a contradiction in terms. Rights are founded in justice, or they are wrongs, not rights. The denial of justice is the denial of right, and the denial of right is the denial of rights ; for *rights* are only by participation of *right*. The ground of all complaints is the real or supposed injustice of the matter complained of ; and whatever men demand they demand it on the ground of its

real or pretended justice. The highest conception of freedom is in absolute subjection to justice, and to justice alone; and authority, civil or ecclesiastical, is held to be tyrannical or oppressive only because it is held to be unjust in its origin or exactions. What is just all men feel they may exact, and are bound to give. It is clear, then, that they acknowledge the absolute sovereignty of justice. But justice is God, who in himself is eternally and essentially just. Absolute subjection to God is, then, simply absolute subjection to justice. All men, therefore, in admitting their absolute subjection to justice, admit their absolute subjection to God; and since no one ever regards it as a hardship to be subjected to justice, no one can feel it a hardship to be subjected to God.

The repugnance manifested by your Liberals to the doctrine which requires every man to render unto God the tribute of his whole being results either from their hatred of justice, or their supposition that justice and God are separable. If the former, they are clearly condemned; for no man hates justice, unless conscious that his deeds are unjust. The latter cannot be entertained. We are not permitted to suppose that justice may stand on one side, and God on the other; for that would be to suppose God without and opposed to justice. Reason is declarative, not legislative. In teaching that justice requires us to render unto every one his due, it declares the precept of justice, but does not create it. Justice itself must, then, be prior to and independent of reason. Prior to and independent of reason, it must be something or nothing. It cannot be nothing; for that would deny both reason and justice. Then it must be something; and if something, since reason declares it to be universal, eternal, and supreme, it must be God. Then God is essentially just, and we cannot suppose him distinguished from justice without supposing his non-existence. But his non-existence is not supposable; for he is a necessary existence, — *ens necessarium*. His existence, then, must be supposed always and everywhere; and then, always and everywhere, must he be supposed as essentially, infinitely, immutably, and eternally just, — justice itself. It is, then, absurd, as well as impious and atheistical, to suppose him ever otherwise than just, or that we, in surrendering ourselves unreservedly to him, can possibly run any risk of losing our rights, or of being oppressed. Our rights have thus the guaranty of infinite justice.

Moreover, my brethren, you must not fall into the error

common to many of your number, that, though we are bound to worship God, we are nevertheless not bound to render him any outward or external service. The worship of God, exacted by eternal justice, is the tribute of our whole being. Our being consists of body and soul, and is at once external and internal. Consequently, we must be bound to render unto God both soul and body, and therefore both internal and external worship.

This much you must concede, or deny human reason itself. But human reason itself you cannot deny ; for you have nothing but it on which to deny it, and to deny it on its own authority is to affirm it. That you are bound to worship God is as certain as any moral or even mathematical truth is or can be ; for it combines in its favor both the practical reason, or common sense of mankind, as is historically provable, and the speculative or demonstrative reason, as you have just seen, — the only two kinds of certainty which natural reason ever furnishes or demands. Let it be assumed, then, that we are under an obligation to worship God, from which neither we can withdraw ourselves, nor even he himself dispense us. This is, and must — let the consequences be what they may — be conceded to be, certain and undeniable.

II. But, my brethren, though natural reason suffices to teach us that we are bound to worship God, to render unto him the tribute of our whole being, is it certain that she also suffices to prescribe, practically, the worship we are to render ? It is not enough to know what is the worship of God in the abstract, if we know not also what it is in the concrete, — what it is in general, if we are ignorant of what it is in particular ; because the abstract has no actual existence, and because all actual knowledge is restricted to the knowledge of actual existences. There is no knowledge of things in general, if none of things in particular ; for we know the general only in the particular. We know man only as we know men, in which man in general is rendered special and individual. This principle holds universally true with regard to human life. Every act of life is individual, particular. We may know in general that we are bound to render our whole being unto God as his due ; but we know not what it is to worship him, unless we also know our being, what is rendering it to God, and what is the way or manner in which he requires it to be rendered.

To render ourselves to God implies on our part an act ; to

worship God is to do something, and is in all cases, in thought, word, and deed, to do that which God commands. But this act, this doing, must be *our* act, and therefore a voluntary act; for an act done from necessity is not our act, but the act of that which necessitates. No act is properly a voluntary act, if not done from intellectual apprehension of the end for which it is done. No act, then, is an act of worship, unless we know that God commands it, and do it because he commands it. The obligation to worship God is, indeed, our only obligation, but it extends, as has been said, to our whole being, and covers every sphere of our activity, and therefore requires every act we perform to be an act of worship. Evidently, we cannot fulfil this obligation, unless in every sphere of life, in every department of human activity, we know the particular acts God commands. Now is natural reason able to give this extensive and minute knowledge, and not only to the highly gifted few, but to every individual of our race who is bound by the obligation to worship God? Or, in other words, is natural reason sufficient to prescribe, practically, the worship of God?

Do not conclude, in your haste, that this question impeaches or is intended to cast suspicion on the veracity of reason. The veracity, the infallibility, of reason is conceded, and must be held, or nothing can be concluded or affirmed on any subject whatever. This is settled, for the obligation to worship God is itself asserted on her authority, and we cannot without inconsistency recognize it in one case and deny it in another. But may not reason be infallible, and yet not be sufficient? May there not be things necessary for us to know, to which her light does not extend? Is it not possible for her to be able to declare that we are in all things subject to law, and yet not be able to declare in all cases what is the law, — that we are, always and everywhere, bound to do right, and yet not able, always and everywhere, to declare what is right? However infallible reason may be where her light shines, she is undeniably limited. All men find themselves confronted with the unknown, and, by natural means, the unknowable. Who knows not that reason asks more questions than she answers? Who pretends that human beings have the attribute of omniscience, as they would have if reason were unlimited? To assert that reason is limited is no impeachment of her veracity; for this she herself asserts, and never does she assert the contrary. She declares her

own limitations, and they are asserted on her own authority. She must be as competent to declare that she does not know, where she does not, as that she does know, where she does ; and to confide in her in the former case is to affirm her veracity as much as it is to confide in her in the latter.

Do not, again, conclude that the question must needs relate to the sufficiency of reason to prescribe a worship of God satisfactory to the Christian believer. The Christian professes to have a supernatural revelation. To require reason, on pain of being condemned as insufficient, to prescribe a worship satisfactory to him, would be to begin with the assumption of what is in question, to assume the truth of Christianity, and erect it into a standard for reason ; which were not to reason, but to dogmatize. No standard outside of reason can be set up, till it is authorized by grounds of credibility satisfactory to reason herself. Till then, reason is her own standard. All that can be asked of her is that she prescribe a worship with which she herself is satisfied. If she can prescribe such a worship in the concrete as well as the abstract, she must be pronounced sufficient, unless Almighty God in a supernatural manner informs us of her insufficiency. But if she be unable to do it, then, on her own authority, we must pronounce her insufficient. The question, therefore, simply asks, Is reason able to prescribe a worship which meets the demands of reason ? or, Does reason suffice for reason ?

This question is evidently a question of fact, not of speculation, and is to be answered by an appeal to experience, not to reasoning. Our powers of knowing are innate, but our knowledge itself is by experience, whether of ourselves or of any thing else. We know ourselves only as we see ourselves manifested in our acts, in like manner as we see our faces only as they are reflected in a mirror. We ascertain what faculties we possess, and what is their reach, only in their operations. We know sight by seeing, taste by tasting, touch by touching, love by loving, fear by fearing, joy by joying, reason by reasoning, or by detecting it in its operations in ourselves and in others. All men know and concede this ; for no man pretends that he can stand face to face with himself, and look into his own eyes. The measure of our experience — using this term in its proper sense, not in the narrow sense of some modern philosophers — must be the measure of our knowledge ; and, consequently, we can claim for ourselves no power which transcends the limits of experience,

or which goes beyond what we have actually manifested in our operations.

The question, then, becomes simply this,—Has reason ever proved herself able to prescribe a worship satisfactory to herself? It is well known that she has not. Aside from the Christian religion, which must for the present be placed out of the account, the history of the race for six thousand years presents no instance of a worship or religion acceptable to reason. The religions of ancient heathendom stand, every one of them, convicted at the bar of reason herself of gross error, immorality, and absurdity. Nations the most renowned, enlightened, and civilized, practised religions from which reason and humanity recoil with horror. One hardly dares relate the ceremonies of the “immortal gods” and their impure mysteries. “The amours of these gods,” as remarks the illustrious Bossuet, “their cruelties, jealousies, and other excesses, were the subjects of their festivals, of the hymns which were chanted to them, and of the pictures consecrated in their temples. Crime was adored, and recognized as necessary to their worship. Plato, the gravest of philosophers, justifies drinking to excess, if at the feasts of Bacchus and in honor of that god. Aristotle, after blaming severely indecent images, excepts those of the gods, who, he says, will to be honored by such infamies. We cannot read without astonishment the honors which it was necessary to pay to Venus, and the prostitutions consecrated to her worship. Greece, all polished and wise as she was, received these abominable mysteries. Individuals and cities, in the pressure of affairs, vowed harlots to Venus, and Greece herself did not blush to ascribe her salvation to their prayers to their goddess. After the defeat of Xerxes and of his formidable hosts, a tablet was placed in the temple, on which were represented their vows and processions, with this inscription from a famous poet, Simonides :— ‘ These prayed to their goddess Venus, who for love of them saved Greece.’ ” *

Nor to Greece alone were these abominations confined. “Roman gravity treated religion with no greater seriousness. It consecrated to the honor of the gods the impurities of the theatre and the bloody spectacles of the gladiators ; that is to say, all that can be imagined of the most corrupt and the most barbarous.” † At Babylon every woman was required

* *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle.*

† *Ibid.*

to prostitute herself to the first comer on the festival of Venus ; marriageable virgins, at Byblus and other places, were sent forth on one of the festivals of Astaroth to collect from prostitution their marriage dower. It needs not to speak of the impurities of the worship of Venus in the island of Cyprus and at Corinth, or of the worship of the Phallus — the Lingam of modern India — in Egypt, Greece, or Rome, the orgies of Bacchus, or the abominations of Isis. In all pagan nations the gods were worshipped by the sacrifice of reason, chastity, and humanity ; and among them all there was not one that did not seek to appease the anger or to propitiate the favor of the gods by offering human victims upon their altars.

These vices, crimes, and abominations were not exceptional, were not excesses forbidden, and breaking out in spite of the public religion. They were warranted by the examples of the gods adored, were integral portions of their worship, erected into sacred rites, and prescribed by the recognized religious authorities. It would be an insult to your understandings, my brethren, to suppose, for a moment, that reason ever was or ever could be satisfied with any one of the ancient mythologies or abominable idolatries. She finds in them, undoubtedly, the recognition of the fact of man's obligation to worship God ; but that is all that she finds, from which she does not turn away with horror and disgust. She sees clearly enough that God was not worshipped in them, and that the worship offered, if it had been offered to him, was not such as he would or could accept. She knows that God is the only true object of worship, and that the elements, sun and moon and stars, wood and stone, silver and gold, lizards and crocodiles, leeks and onions, fishes of the sea and fowls of the air, four-footed beasts and creeping things, men and women living or dead, works of men's hands and creatures of the imagination, are not God, the Supreme Being who made heaven and earth and all things therein, and whose existence and attributes are manifest from the works of creation. She knows that all these religions were idolatries ; and idolatry, in any and every form or degree, she does and must utterly condemn ; for, as you have seen, she demonstrates with ease that we are bound to worship God, and him alone, — to render unto him the tribute of our whole being. When we give ourselves up to idols, or to any thing, real or imaginary, other than God himself, we do not render to him the tribute

of our whole being, nor indeed any tribute at all. We do not render to him his own, and justice does and must condemn us. Yet, excepting, perhaps, Mahometanism, the religion, in ancient or modern times, of every nation confessedly abandoned to natural reason, has been and is nothing but an abominable idolatry. How, then, say that reason is sufficient to prescribe a worship satisfactory to herself?

So evident is it that these ancient religions do not satisfy reason, that she cannot hold these indecencies, these licentious and filthy rites, these horrid cruelties, these human victims smoking upon the altars, to be the worship acceptable to God, that many heathen philosophers and poets themselves inveighed against them, and in Greece and Rome, perhaps in other nations, the more enlightened classes, as in China and most Protestant countries now, inwardly contemned them, and lapsed into the opposite and no less deplorable error of complete irreligion, and contented themselves with occasional outward conformity, from social or political reasons.

Indeed, the insufficiency of reason to prescribe the worship of God is clearly evinced by the conduct of those enlightened gentlemen and ladies who in modern times reject the Christian revelation, and profess to take the simple light of nature for their guide. They are far from being agreed as to what is the religion nature teaches, and their sects and varieties are almost innumerable. They find, avowedly, nowhere in history a religion ready made to their hands. They are unable to satisfy themselves with Greek and Roman polytheism, or even with African fetichism. The religions of ancient Egypt, Syria, Phœnicia, Chaldea, Persia, Greece, Rome, Gaul and Britain, modern India, China, Africa, America, alike fail to meet their wants; and whatever secret affection they may have for the Cyprian goddess and the orgies of Bacchus, they are far from being prepared to reconstruct the altar of Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, Baal, Dagon, Astaroth, Apis, Kneph, Vichnou, Schiven, Buddha, Fo, Woden, Thor, Freya, Manitou, Viztli-Putzli, or even Mumbo-Jumbo. The deism of Lord Herbert of Cherbury, like the Theophilanthropy of Revellière-Lepaux, has no prototype among the various religions of mankind, and is utterly unable to command the suffrages of those who, leaving the Church, profess to follow reason.

Your modern Eclectics, indeed, assert the sufficiency of reason and the infallibility of the human race. They patron-

ize, to a certain extent, all ancient and all modern religions, and hold that each symbolizes a great truth ; but they confess that the religion satisfactory to reason has never yet had a concrete existence. Such a religion remains to be instituted. It may, they allege, be attained by resolving all past and present religions into their original elements, and selecting from each the portion of truth it now conceals, and moulding the separate truths, thus collected, into a new, complete, and harmonious whole. But this avails them nothing ; for this new religion, in its satisfactory form, has had no historical existence, and the task of forming it from the old religions is hardly, if at all, less difficult than that of original invention. Moreover, the Eclectics are far from being agreed as to what elements to take and what to leave. They tell you also, that however successfully they may accomplish their task, it will be only for a brief moment. The new religion will no sooner be organized than it will be found too small for humanity, become a galling chain to the free soul, and a barrier to progress. They confess that reason will disown their work as soon as they have done it, and begin forthwith to undo it. Alas ! what satisfied reason yesterday will not satisfy it to-day, far less to-morrow. The truest and holiest forms of faith and worship are as short-lived as the summer flower, as transient as the morning dew. All things change their forms, and nothing remains but the abstract obligation to be good and do good ; while the answer to the question, What is it to be good and do good ? varies ever from one age of the world to another, from nation to nation, and even from individual to individual. What is all this, granting all that is claimed, but an unequivocal confession of reason's inability to suffice for reason ?

Indeed, the more prudent and philosophical of the recent rejecters of supernatural revelation seek to make out their case by claiming Christianity herself as a product of natural reason. They even censure those who openly array themselves against her, call themselves her especial friends, and profess to be more Christian than Christians themselves ; they patronize our Blessed Lord, lavish on him their caresses, and enroll him as one of their company. All this has a fair seeming, but it avails them nothing ; since, unhappily for them, Christianity has always professed, and has always been held, to be a supernatural religion. If they embrace her as such, they condemn themselves ; if they deny her to be such, they condemn her, — for she has then made a false profession, and

reason can tolerate no false profession, — approve no religion which is not what it professes to be. Christianity, if conceded to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of reason, can be an argument for the sufficiency of reason only when taken in her historical character, as she has been hitherto received, and in the sense in which she claims to be accepted; but, if so taken, she is a plain, unequivocal denial, on Divine authority, of the sufficiency of reason. This the gentlemen referred to appear to understand, and hence you find them modifying Christianity in all directions, and seeking to give her a sense essentially different from that in which she has hitherto been received by both friends and enemies, — a sense which they, indeed, say is the one in which she ought to have been taken, but in which they must confess she has not been. But so taken, she ceases to be the Christianity of history, and becomes, as some of them expressly call her, a new Christianity, and therefore unable to afford any argument from experience in favor of the sufficiency of reason to prescribe the worship of God; for experience has not yet demonstrated that in this new sense Christianity is able to meet all the demands of reason.

If a man, my brethren, were to start in pursuit of a religion outside of the Church, satisfactory to reason, where can you imagine him to find it? Not with any of the ancient or modern pagan mythologies, it is certain. Not with any of the forms of dogmatic Protestantism, it is equally certain; for they all arraign one another, and there is not one of them that is not either too much or too little for reason, — that reason does not convict of inconsistency in being so much and no more, or so little and no less. Not with Mahometanism assuredly, for reason is offended with its heaven and its sensual paradise, and above all with its absolute fatalism, which denies free will, and with it all moral obligation, and therefore the very obligation itself to worship God. Will he find it with the ancient philosophers? Which of them? With Socrates, reputed the wisest of them all? Can reason approve the *Socratic love*, that sin against nature, which brought down destruction upon “the cities of the plain,” and which Socrates in Plato not obscurely avows, and apparently defends? Can it approve the order to sacrifice a cock to *Æsculapius*, which Socrates gave just before his death to his disciple Crito? Did he hold *Æsculapius* to be a god, and the cock to be his due? Then he was a gross idolater. Did he not so hold? Then he was a base hypocrite, or a miserable conformist to

popular superstition. Will he find it with the "divine Plato"? What! and hold it a dictate of reason to deny marriage, to assert the lawfulness of universal fornication, and maintain that it is every one's duty to conform to the religion of the state under which he is born, however gross, filthy, or abominable? Will he find it with Cicero? that is, hold it right to be one of the ministers of a pagan idolatry, to conform outwardly to a popular superstition which he inwardly despises, to profess a philosophy of Doubt, and to live for Fame or Glory, not for God?

Or suppose he comes down to modern times, with which of your modern philosophers will he find it? With Locke? He is obsolete. With Reid and Stewart? They are forgotten. With Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Cousin? They were great names yesterday, but they have already dwindled into insignificance, and their systems, if pushed to their last consequences, leave no God to adore. Will he find it with the Scandinavian prophet, the founder of the New Church, the famous Swedenborg? What! with one who makes God *essential* man, and whose system finds its strongest evidence in Mesmerism, and paves the way for the Demonism of Davis's Wonderful Revelations, just published, — a system which confounds God and man, the natural and supernatural, making man a mere receptacle, and therefore denying him all real substantive existence? Will he find it with Saint-Simon, the Parisian count, debauchee, beggar, would-be self-murderer, and inventor of *Nouveau Christianisme*? Alas! his disciples were never able to agree as to what he taught; and they have separated and disappeared. Will he find it with Fourier? What! with one whose god is Mammon, whose rule of life is inclination, not duty, passion, not reason, and who places worship in selfish indulgence?

Alas! my brethren, the poor man would be like Noah's dove let loose from the ark, before the waters were dried up; he would find no resting-place for the sole of his foot. He would be obliged either to reject all religion, or to attempt, with Chevalier Bunsen, to construct "the Church of the Future," — to have no religion, or to fabricate one for himself. To this conclusion come all your philosophers, and hence you everywhere see them either plunging into absolute irreligion, or heaving at the bellows and hammering at the anvil, in the endeavour to forge out a religion for themselves, — and throwing away their work in disgust, as soon as completed.

Certain it is, my brethren, that reason has never yet succeeded in prescribing a worship which meets her own demands. Equally certain is it, if she has not done it, that she never will and never can do it. It is idle to expect her to do what she has never been able to do. She is no new power, no recent gift or acquisition. She is a natural endowment, and as old as mankind. Men possessed her in the beginning, and have had from the first all the reason that belongs to human nature. The heathen nations fell not into their gross superstitions prior to receiving the gift of reason, but afterwards; and they practised those abominations, which it is a shame even to name, with all the light of reason, and all the protection to truth, justice, and purity which she affords. If she is sufficient, whence those foul and abominable superstitions? If, notwithstanding all she does or gives, men, whenever abandoned to her alone, invariably fall into them, how can you say that she suffices to prescribe the worship of God?

It will not do to say that reason has not had fair play; that she has been impeded in her operations, and has never been able to put forth her whole strength. She has had six thousand years for her experiment; and she has found no impediments but such as grow out of human nature, and therefore such as she must always and everywhere find. No doubt, appetite and passion, the workings of concupiscence, have prevented her from doing as well as otherwise she might; but this is a proof of her insufficiency, not her apology. No doubt, these have often drowned her voice and rendered her instructions unavailing; but this was one of the contingencies to be provided for, — one of the practical obstacles to be surmounted. No doubt, she saw clearly enough that the superstitions and abominations into which these dragged individuals and nations were not the worship of God; no doubt, she protested against them; but what availed it, as long as she had no executive force either to prevent or to arrest them? What availed it, that she knew what was *not* the worship of God, if she knew not what *was* his worship; or if in some degree knowing it, she could not assert it with sufficient distinctness, energy, and authority, to make herself heard and obeyed? If she had sufficiently known and asserted it, the nations could not have fallen into their abominable superstitions; and the fact that they have so fallen is a proof that she did not and could not sufficiently know and assert it. If she could not in the past, she cannot now or ever hereafter; for her natural strength is

always the same, and so are the obstacles presented by human nature for her to overcome ; since human nature does not change, and could not change and remain human nature.

Nor is this conclusion to be set aside by any of your modern theories of progress. No progress of nature can be asserted, and progress by natural causes in relation to reason and concupiscence is contradicted by all experience. In Christian nations, where the influence of Christianity has been felt, there has been progress ; but these nations, in a question as to the sufficiency of reason, are not to be taken into the account ; for it remains to be proved that their progress has been the result of natural causes. Our observations must be restricted to nations confessedly abandoned to the light of nature, and from them alone we must collect the facts which are to warrant the induction of natural progress ; otherwise we shall fall into the sophism of assuming what is in question. The conclusion obtained can be set aside only by establishing in the history of these nations the fact of progress, and of progress in the knowledge and worship of God. Simple material progress effected by industry or force of arms, or scientific and artistic progress effected by reason serving appetite or passion, is nothing to the purpose ; for such progress does not necessarily imply any progress in the knowledge and discharge of our duty. If in these nations we find a gradual moral improvement, — if we find them, as time flows on, ameliorating their manners, attaining to less and less unworthy conceptions of God, abandoning their idols, and purifying their worship of its abominations, we may regard it as a presumptive proof of progress by natural causes ; but if we find nothing of all this, if we find the nations sinking deeper and deeper in moral corruption, and adopting grosser and grosser superstitions, we must conclude, with all the certainty of experience and of fact, against natural progress.

It is historically certain that no progress of the kind needed by the argument can be traced in the history of a single nation, ancient or modern, confessedly abandoned to the simple light of nature. Under the moral and religious point of view, the progress of all heathen nations is a progress in corruption. The period of their history least offensive to reason is invariably the earliest. There may have been degrees of error and abomination in the heathen superstitions, and the less degraded and debased may have done something, for a time, to elevate relatively the more degraded and debased ; but taking

each nation by itself, its abominations invariably grew with its growth and strengthened with its strength, and were the greatest when the nation was at the acme of its civilization and in the zenith of its glory. Never is reason, in a single heathen nation, seen gradually recovering its empire, but always losing it more and more, and becoming less and less able to withstand the tide of corruption, which sets in, and continues to rise higher and higher till it deluges the land and extinguishes the national life. The renowned nations of antiquity have passed away. Egypt, Assyria, Phœnicia, Carthage, pagan Greece and Rome, are extant only in their mouldering ruins. Thebes with her hundred gates lies entombed in her own catacombs. Tyre sits desolate on her island, and the poor fisherman dries his nets where her "merchant princes" did congregate. The owl calls to his fellow in the solitude of Babylon; the rank grass grows in the once thronged mart, and silence succeeds to the hum of industry. All these nations have expired in their own corruption, of their own rottenness; and in their fate the philosopher reads the impotence of reason, and the falsity of your modern theories of progress.

Nowhere, except in countries under Christian influences, do you ever see any signs of real progress. History records no instance of spontaneous civilization. Ages on ages roll over the savages of Asia, Africa, and America, and bring no change for the better. The tribes east from the Persian Gulf, along the coasts of the Indian Ocean, are to-day precisely what they were found by the companions of the Macedonian conqueror. The glory of Persia and Arabia is in their dim and fading recollections,—of India, in a remote and unchronicled past, in which, all her monuments attest, she possessed a worship far less degrading than her present abominable superstitions. The vast populations of China and Japan sink, each generation, into a lower deep of ignorance and infamy. The Turkish hordes have shown no sign of improvement during the five hundred years they have been encamped in Europe, and Moslem life, universally, appears to be burning out, and ready to flicker and expire in its socket. The nations of the New World, when discovered by the Europeans, which approached nearest to civilized life, as Mexico and Peru, were the most corrupt, and precisely those whose religious practices were the most revolting to reason and humanity.

Indeed, the philosophers of the Progressist school are themselves so well satisfied that heathen nations afford no ex-

ample of the progress they contend for, that they appeal exclusively to Christian nations for the facts on which they attempt to build their theory. They assume, without proof and against evidence, that the Christian religion is the result of the natural growth and expansion of intellect, and has been attained to by mankind in the order of their natural progress through the ages. So assuming, and finding it superior to the religion of the Gentiles, and that there has been a marked progress in the nations subjected to its influence, they gravely take it and the progress effected under it as conclusive evidence of their theory of progress by natural causes. It is bad logic ; for before they have or can have a right to appeal to Christianity in support of their theory, they must prove that Christianity is a natural development. But, unhappily for them, this they cannot prove. The facts are against them. They cannot, as they should, trace a continuous progress of mankind from heathenism to Christianity. The worship of heathen nations least remote from the Christian is their earliest, not their latest. The question is evidently an historical question ; but history, as is well known, presents us the worship of God before it introduces us to fetichism and polytheism. At the very dawn of history, you find the worship of one God known and practised. If we are to rely on history, as the advocates of natural progress must, the worship of God, as held by Christians, has not been a development of heathen superstitions, but preceded them, and they are corruptions of it. Truth is older than falsehood, and history proves it, by proving that religion was anterior to superstition. The heathen philosophers themselves, who, from time to time, inveighed against popular superstitions, and whose doctrines are sometimes appealed to in proof of the progressiveness of heathenism, profess always to speak according to the wisdom of the ancients, and propose simply to recall their contemporaries to the worship observed by a remote antiquity. So far as they recognized the unity of God at all, they recognized it as an ancient doctrine, long since lost sight of and forgotten in consequence of the corruptions of later ages.

These philosophers themselves, undoubtedly, had some just conceptions of the Supreme Being ; but they cannot be appealed to in favor of progress ; because they professed to derive these from the ancients ; because they had, most of them at least, travelled in Egypt, Syria, or Phœnicia, and might have learned, and not improbably did learn, much from the

people who, during all the darkness of heathendom, had preserved the worship of the true God ; and because they changed nothing in the manners or morals of their countrymen. With scarcely an exception, they, while despising, conformed, and recommended their disciples to conform, to the superstitions of the vulgar. Never did Greece and Rome decline more rapidly in virtue than under and after the teaching of their renowned philosophers ; never was the heathen world generally, so far as it had not fallen into absolute irreligion, sunk in grosser immoralities, or in more abominable superstitions, than at the advent of our Blessed Lord ; and never, to human judgment, was it less prepared for the Gospel, than when the Fisherman of Galilee transferred the seat of Christian empire from Antioch to Rome. Preparation there certainly was, but not from the Gentiles themselves. It was in the providential settlement and influence of the Jews in the chief places of the Roman Empire, who, when the heralds of the cross went forth from Jerusalem, formed in each the nucleus of a Christian congregation, as do the Irish now in every part of the Protestant world in which the English is the mother tongue of its rulers.

All this belies the hypothesis that Christianity is a natural development. If it had been, you would see in the heathen nations themselves a gradual approximation to its faith and worship. Some might have reached it sooner than others, but all would have been looking and advancing towards it. But you see nothing of all this, and you know from history the violent opposition Christianity encountered on its first promulgation, and that it did not fully extirpate paganism from the Roman Empire till after an obstinate struggle of nearly six hundred years. Your philosophers, then, cannot appeal to the phenomena of Christian nations to sustain their theory. Those phenomena are peculiar, singular, exceptional to the general rule, and authorize no conclusions beyond the nations in which they are exhibited.

Nor is this all. If Christianity were a natural development, the nation once professing it, on ceasing to do so, would necessarily appear in advance of the nations adhering to it, and in advance also of what it was itself before ; for it could reject Christianity only by outgrowing it and attaining to something superior to it. How happens it, then, that this is not the fact ? How happens it, that the reverse is what you always see, and that the nation which throws off Christianity

invariably falls below the nations which remain faithful, and below what it was itself when Christian? The fact is undeniable. A great part of Asia was once Christian; but what is that part of Asia now in comparison with what it was then? Compare the Alexandria of Clemens, Origen, St. Athanasius, and St. Cyril with the Alexandria of to-day; or the Northern Africa of the present with the Northern Africa of Tertullian, St. Cyprian, and St. Augustine! The Eastern or Greek Empire, long after the introduction of Christianity, surpassed the Western in wealth, refinement, learning, talent, and genius. What is it now? Do you say that barbarians overran and conquered it? So did barbarians overrun and conquer the Western; but the Church was there; it arrested them, converted them, and has made them the leading nations of the globe. The Eastern broke the unity of faith, separated itself from the centre of Christian life, fell beneath the power of the barbarians, was unable to civilize them, and has ceased to exist. It has passed away, and its conquerors, unconverted, remain barbarians, as they were at the epoch of conquest. The Protestant nations have visibly declined since Luther and Calvin, in all save mere material greatness, and even that has evidently culminated. England, in moral, social, and political well-being, is far below what she was at the accession of the first of the Tudors. Even Catholic nations themselves, when for a moment they seek to subject the spiritual to the temporal, or lose sight of their faith, decline with fearful rapidity, as Austria, France, Spain, Portugal, and Spanish America conclusively prove. Paris, under the reign of the Terrorists, the pupils of your philosophers, recalled all too vividly the abominations of pagan Athens and Rome. In every country, as the Church retires, you may behold the seeds of the old national superstitions sprouting anew. Germany tends undeniably to revive her old Nature-worship; and Scandinavia threatens to rehabilitate Woden and Thor, and to rejoice again in the prospect of quaffing nectar from the skulls of her enemies in the halls of Valhalla.*

* This is not a mere rhetorical flourish, as any one deeply read in modern Teutonic and Scandinavian literature must acknowledge. Let any one read, understandingly, the Lectures on "Heroes and Hero-worship," by Thomas Carlyle, especially the Lecture on "The Hero as Divinity," and he can hardly fail to perceive that the assertion in the text is far from being gratuitous. The undeniable tendency of all modern thought and philosophy is pantheistic, and he has studied the various heathen

Moreover, my brethren, you must not forget that the nations which adopted and practised all the abominations of heathenism were the mightiest and most renowned nations of the earth, — nations which astonish us even in their ruins. In general science, arts, literature, and refined civilization, they remain even to this day unapproached. No poet rivals Homer ; and Plato and Aristotle continue to teach us philosophy. We still study the classics as our models. In purely intellectual and artistic culture, not even Italy comes up to what Athens was ; and in statesmanship and the conduct of

mythologies to little purpose who has yet to learn that they all originate in pantheism. The human race has a method in its madness, and never loses all trace of its rational nature. It has always a reason, of some sort, for its wildest errors, and connects them by some logical tie to a great fundamental principle, in itself, and in its place, not unsound. It evidently began with the worship of one God, and all the superstitions it has adopted are only corruptions of that worship. Its first downward step was in confounding the Creator with creation, and its second, in identifying the two. They are identical ; then God is the universe, and the universe is God, — pure pantheism. But God is one, absolute unity. Then each element, each part, each object, of the universe, whatever the appearance to the senses, is identically God, and may rightfully receive divine honors. Then individuals and nations may select any portion or object of the universe they please, as the peculiar object of their worship. Hence fetichism, polytheism, and the foundation of all the mythologies which have been or are. Analyze them, and pantheism — the corruption of the doctrine of the unity of God — will be found at the bottom. Like causes produce like effects. Revive pantheism, as you are reviving it, and you reproduce all the abominations of heathenism. The human race repeats its old errors ; it has long since been unable to invent a new one. Christianity restored the worship of one God, which was in the beginning, and which the Gentiles, through their corruptions, had lost. They who break away from it take the very starting-point of these Gentile corruptions, and in process of time must, if not recalled to the Church, run through the whole cycle of Gentile error and superstition. These defences of the heathen mythologies, these efforts to place them and Christianity in the same category, so common in our day, — linked as they invariably are to pantheistic speculations, — are profoundly significant, and deserve a more serious consideration than they appear to have received from the friends of Christian truth ; for when we have once revived pantheism, we shall not be able to stop there. We shall be obliged, in view of the mixture of good and evil in the world, to go farther, and reassert the old Oriental Dualism, and thus pave the way for the revival of Demonism and Demon-worship. Be assured, that it was not from a narrow-minded bigotry, not from a persecuting spirit, not from a vain and shallow thought, or without solid reasons in human nature itself, as well as in revelation, that the Church so energetically opposed the Gnostic, Arian, and Manichæan heresies, so dear to modern sectarians, and which contain in germ the whole of heathenism.

armies, the ancients have never been surpassed. In vigor of intellect, in depth and acuteness of thought, in logical force and subtilty, the old heathen philosophers far transcend their modern successors. Reason was more assiduously cultivated, and received, as natural reason, a fuller development, a greater expansion, with them than with us. We can raise no question in intellectual or moral philosophy which they did not raise, and we can wring out from reason, unenlightened by the Gospel, no answer they did not obtain. In whatever point of view we choose to contemplate them, these ancient heathen nations had every advantage that nature and natural cultivation can give. No nations can be conceived more richly endowed or more kindly favored by nature than they were. We can conceive no natural advantage which they had not. They were in the condition to give, and they did give, to natural reason a fair trial, and have shown us its limits. We surpass them in nothing, except in what we owe to Christianity; nay, except in that, we evidently fall far below them. Yet with all their advantages, with all their intellectual and artistic culture and greatness, which continue to excite the wonder of the world, they were sunk in the grossest superstitions and the most abominable idolatries, made no advance towards the Christian religion, and continued ever to recede farther and farther from it. How idle, then, to pretend that Christianity has been attained to by the natural development and growth of human reason! Be Christianity true, or be it false, you can never regard it as following in the order of natural development, and simply marking, as your philosophers would persuade you, a stage in the continuous progress of humanity.

That man himself is progressive in the sense of your philosophers, or that the race goes on through the ages, in obedience to a natural law of progress, towards a more and more perfect state, is contradicted by all the monuments of the past. Nations, outside of Christendom, may modify their institutions, and advance by industry, arts, and arms, as did Rome, as did Carthage, from the petty burgh, or the feeble colony, to mighty and renowned empires; but progress of this sort is not to be counted; for it may be, and usually is, effected by reason as the minister of appetite, passion, or lawless will, — by national and individual unscrupulousness, or forgetfulness of duty. The history of the renowned states and empires of antiquity is the history of an almost unbroken series of wrongs and outrages, of violence and rapine, of tyranny and oppression.

Athens in her best days contained in her bosom four hundred thousand slaves to twenty thousand freemen. These states and empires were founded in injustice and cemented by crime, — and hence their fall; for iniquity never prospers, — except for a time. The same may be said of Russia, of Great Britain, and, perhaps, hereafter, of the Republic of North America. Who knows not that our national sense of justice is far from keeping pace with our industrial and commercial prosperity, and that we grow corrupt and rotten within, in proportion as the world is attracted by our phosphorescent splendor without? Progress of this sort is not denied; but it is not to be counted, for it is not progress in the knowledge and worship of God.

Nevertheless, your more recent philosophers, those to whom you listen with the most reverence and enthusiasm, tell you that the doctrine, that man, even human nature itself, is progressive, is the Evangile of the nineteenth century. Whoever denies or doubts it they brand as a social delinquent, as a traitor to humanity, and hold up to derision and scorn as one “whose face is on the back side of his head,” dwelling, like the possessed Gadarene, only among tombs. Some of them go even so far as to assert the progressiveness of all natures, of the entire universe, nay, of God himself! But to assert that God is progressive is to deny his perfection, — for progress is not predicable of that which is already perfect; — and to deny his perfection is to deny his existence; and therefore to assert his progressiveness is nothing less than a plain contradiction in terms. The progress of the universe must be the progress of the natures of which it is composed; but a progress of these natures is metaphysically impossible, and it is no mean refutation of the doctrine itself, that there are men in the nineteenth century who assert it, and are looked up to as the lights of the age because they assert it. What is not cannot act; what is cannot make itself more than it is; for no one can transcend as cause what he is as being, and for a being to make itself more than it is differs in no sense from nothing making something out of nothing.

It is absurd to assert the progressiveness of human nature. Man has received from his Creator a determinate nature, by virtue of which he is man. His nature is that with which he is born, and with which he must be born, or he ceases to be man. Change it, make it more or make it less, and he passes to another order in the universe, and is no longer a *human*

being. If he is to remain man, his nature must remain ever the same. Every one to be born a man must be born with the same nature. This is true of every individual of every generation, from the first to the last. Then all must be born with the same essential faculties, and these faculties must be essentially the same in all. Then no progress of nature ; then none of reason. Then, if reason has uniformly proved herself, by her own light, insufficient to prescribe the worship of God satisfactory to herself, she must always prove insufficient.

But even allowing your philosophers to appeal to the history of Christian nations since they became Christian, they can obtain no argument in favor of their doctrine of progress. The progress observed in these nations is extrinsic, not intrinsic. The Christian worship was as perfect in the first moment of its institution as it is now. Indeed, your ministers tell you it was much more so ; for they contend that the Church has corrupted it. Even those among you, who are the most extravagant in their views of progress, pretend that hardly had Christianity gained a footing in the world, when men despoiled it of its truth and beauty, and perverted it into a degrading superstition. Your early Reformers professed to proceed on the hypothesis, that in their day the Christian religion was buried beneath a mass of rubbish, and was to be disinterred, and restored to its former simple and majestic proportions. But be all this as it may, it is evident that there has been no progress of Christianity, save in its diffusion, in the more extended belief and practice of what it taught and commanded from the first, and in the more perfect realization of its doctrines and precepts in the life and institutions of the nations professing it. The saint of the nineteenth century does not surpass the saint of the first ; and the Christians of the martyr age, in faith, charity, piety, fervor, did not fall below the Christians of our own times. The early Doctors and Fathers are still studied and revered, and the Justins, the Origenes, the Gregories, the Leos, the Hilaries, the Basils, the Chrysostoms, the Ambroses, the Jeromes, the Augustines, remain without rivals. Study St. Thomas, and you will find that he only clothes in a scholastic dress the teachings of St. Augustine and St. Gregory the Great. The ablest scholars and divines of our day only adapt to modern tastes and controversies the doctrines learned from the early Fathers. In Christianity itself, regarded as a religion, as an answer to the question, What is the worship due to God ? or as affording

the necessary assistance in rendering to God what is his due, there evidently has been no progress, and, what is more to the purpose, none is allowed.

The progress in other respects observable in Christendom has been a progress in obedience to Christianity, in removing impediments to its operation, or in matters not necessarily involving any moral or religious amelioration. The moderns may have extended the field of observation; they may have pushed farther than the ancients their investigations into matter; surpassed them in chemical analysis, and in numbering and measuring the stars. The boasted superiority of the moderns over the ancients in the purely physical sciences may be conceded; but progress in these throws no light on the great questions of duty, and has in our times been usually accompanied by a progress in irreligion. It is evident to reason, that a man does not extend even his knowledge of what he owes to God, far less does he strengthen himself to render unto him an acceptable worship, by becoming acquainted with the number, names, and magnitudes of the stars, with oxygen, hydrogen, and chlorine, electricity and magnetism, the powers of the screw and lever, with mica, quartz, and grauwacke, or even the modern systems of stocks and banks; and it is hard to believe that one cannot perform his whole duty as well without as with spinning-jennies, power-looms, steam-engines, railroads, balloons, and lightning-telegraphs. These things may or may not be useful to us as a superior sort of animals, but they evidently, in themselves considered, lie outside of our moral relations, and knowledge of them throws no light on our obligations as human beings. What reason can say of these relations and obligations she had said before the dawn of authentic history; for we find, at the dawn of authentic history, the human race already in possession of all that reason has since said, and all that she now says; and if we possess any thing more, it is historically traceable to a Christian source, and was as fully possessed by the earliest Christians as it is by us.

Here, then, you are, my brethren. You are forced to admit of reason what universal experience proves to be true of nature, namely, that it never suffices for itself; and this you might have known from the first; for reason is included in nature, and if nature cannot suffice for nature, it is evident that reason cannot suffice for reason. Doubtless, Almighty God could, if he had chosen, have made reason sufficient for

herself; but the fact that she has universally and invariably, when left to her own resources, proved insufficient, is ample evidence that he has not. Nor would it be of any avail, if you should succeed in showing, that, taken abstractly, reason can suffice for herself; because the question relates not to her power in the abstract, but in the concrete. Man does not live in the abstract, and the abstract, as abstract, has no actual existence. Reason must be able to prescribe, under all the various actual circumstances of our concrete life, the worship which satisfies her demands, or she is undeniably insufficient. This it is clear from experience she is not able to do.

Nor, finally, will it answer any purpose to show that the insufficiency of reason is extrinsic, rather than intrinsic. Man is to be taken as he actually exists in space and time. No doubt, the chief obstacles to reason are created by our inferior nature, by concupiscence, appetite, and passion; but these obstacles are thrown in its way by a cause as permanent and universal in us as itself,—a cause which is more or less active in all men; often the most active, and the most powerful too, in men of the most striking genius and enlarged and cultivated reason. Hence the proverbial infirmities of genius, and the fact that intellectual greatness is rarely accompanied by a corresponding moral greatness. Nothing is sufficient for us that is not able to overcome concupiscence,—that does not rule it, instead of being ruled by it. As reason is evidently not able to overcome it, it is as much insufficient as it would be in case its insufficiency were wholly intrinsic.

But, my brethren, if reason is insufficient, as it undeniably is, either you must be unable to render to God a worship satisfactory to reason, or there must be provided something above reason, prescribing a worship which will satisfy her. One or the other must be true; which is it? Do not slight the question.

ART. II. — *The Influence of Catholicity on Political Liberty.*

It is not the province of religion to exert any immediate influence on political institutions. Its object is not to prepare man for this world, but for the world to come; to free him, not from temporal bondage, but from the servitude of sin. It

addresses itself immediately to the mind and heart of men, striving to enlighten and to purify them, and, by making the individual himself good, to make him, at the same time, a good son, a good father, a good citizen, or a good king. Without, therefore, acting directly on any institution, civil or social, or any state of life, it is evident that religion must act indirectly on them all ; for the stamp which it impresses on a man will accompany him everywhere, and will be seen more or less in every thing he undertakes. Now it is said, that this general influence of Catholicity has been to favor despotism ; nay, more, that the Catholic Church has directly, both by its principles and its institutions, exerted a disastrous influence on civil liberty.

This charge is a very grave one ; for it is evident that the religion of Christ can never be opposed to *true* liberty. Either, therefore, this accusation is false, or Catholicity is not the religion of Christ. We, who are Catholics, *know* that it is false ; we know that Christ founded the Catholic Church, and that no other body has a just title to this glorious origin. We know, therefore, even without reading a word of history, that the Catholic Church, as such, never favored tyranny, and that if any of those belonging to her have in the lapse of ages done so, it was not in accordance with, but in direct opposition to, her teachings. Nevertheless, this faith, though abundantly sufficient for ourselves, will not suffice for those who are out of the Church ; and who, however inexcusable their ignorance, really are ignorant that the Catholic Church is the Church of Christ. To remove their objections, therefore, as well as for the instruction and consolation of the faithful, we shall, with the help of God, undertake to refute this charge, and to show that the Catholic Church, in addition to her regular and direct object of inculcating and promoting religion, has constantly, by the principles she has taught, and by her own institutions, exerted a most powerful influence in favor of civil liberty.

I. We begin by examining the Catholic principles with regard to Civil Governments.

The first charge made against the Church is, that she teaches the divine right of government. This charge is most true ; and the doctrine of divine right is founded immediately on the Holy Scripture. For St. Paul writes, — “ Let every soul be subject to the higher powers ; for there is no power except from God, and those which are are ordained of God.

Therefore he that resisteth power resisteth the ordination of God. And they that resist acquire for themselves damnation. Therefore of necessity be ye subject, not only on account of wrath, but also for conscience' sake."* And similar passages occur frequently in Scripture. It is evident, therefore, that governments are, in some sense or other, of divine right, and that we are by the same right bound to obey them. "The powers which are are ordained of God, and he that resisteth them resisteth the ordination of God."

But how do Catholic theologians understand this doctrine of divine right? Does it mean that God has established any particular form of government, — monarchy, for example, — and has made that authoritative on all men? or that he has established a particular family on the throne, and given it a special and inalienable right to rule mankind? God forbid! for this would indeed favor tyranny. Catholic theologians understand no such thing, but merely that government in general, some government or other, is necessary by the ordination of God for the preservation and well-being of society, and therefore that we are by the same authority bound to obey it. But in order that our readers may understand clearly what we mean, we will give them a condensed view of the doctrine, as St. Thomas of Aquin † and Cardinal Bellarmin ‡ explain it.

The very nature of man, says St. Thomas, evidently requires that he should live in the society of others, because neither his physical wants can be supplied, nor his moral and intellectual faculties developed, except in society. But it is evident that if every one in society were to act solely for his own interests, without regard to the rights and interests of his neighbour, the continual conflicts and shocks of individual interests would soon dissolve society altogether. The social body, therefore, requires organization as much as the physical body; as well might you expect to keep up a healthy circulation in the veins of the human body, if the central impulse of the heart were wanting, as to expect health and unity in the social body in all its complicated civil and political relations, without a strong central head to direct it, and a strong arm to uphold it. In other words, society cannot exist without order, — order without justice, — justice without law, — nor law without some one to make, expound and enforce it; that is,

* Rom. xiii. 1-5.

† *De Regim. Prin.* l. 1, c. 1, and *Sum.* 2, 2, Q. 104, aa. 1, 2, 6.

‡ *De Lâicis*, l. 3, c. 6.

without government. The very nature of man, therefore, which makes society necessary for him, makes government necessary for society ; and as it is God who created this necessity, it is evident that to him government must be referred, and that its rights and the obligations of society toward it are according to the ordination of God.

Such is the Catholic doctrine as to the origin of civil government, so simple, so clear, that to state it is to prove it. Our limits will not allow us to enlarge upon it, and to show how it alone of all the theories proposed can satisfactorily account, not only for the origin of government, but for some of the rights which government is universally acknowledged to possess, and which could not have been transmitted by individuals, because individuals never possessed them. But we will simply remark that it can never be distorted to favor tyranny ; — 1. Because it does not make the rights of government an especial and extraordinary grant, distinct from creation, but merely something immediately resulting from the nature of man. 2. Because it establishes no particular form of government, but relates only to a governing power in general. And lastly, because while it makes it obligatory on the conscience of the people to obey all just commands, it makes it equally obligatory on the conscience of the rulers to command justly. It does not favor any particular form of government, nor the government itself more than the people, but it settles the rights both of the government and of the people on a solid basis. The government is amenable to God for its enactments ; and the people are amenable to God for their obedience.

But, it may be asked, if this doctrine relates only to government in general, how does any particular government receive its powers ? Does it receive them directly from God, or mediately, through the people ? The Catholic *faith* does not enter into particular questions of this nature, but contents itself with establishing the general principle. There is, therefore, no dogma of *faith* on this point ; nevertheless, theologians have written much about it. We will give the opinion of Cardinal Bellarmin,* not only because of his personal authority, but because the other authors we have consulted on the subject generally agree with him.

After establishing from reason and Scripture the doctrine we have already explained, that the governing power of so-

* *De Lâicis*, l. 3, c. 6.

ciety is from God, he goes on to say, that, nevertheless, as prior to positive law, there is no reason why this power should exist in one man more than in another; it is evident that the power of government does not rest primarily, by nature and the gift of God, in any particular individual or individuals, but in the whole body of society at large, which, constituting a moral whole, a moral body, has the right of governing itself; because government is necessary to its preservation. Primarily, therefore, and immediately, the right of government rests in the whole community. But, by the same law of nature by which it is necessary that society be *actually* governed, it is necessary that society should transfer this power to some individual or individuals, because the *exercise* of it, which is absolutely necessary, is impossible to the community at large. If, then, society transfer this power to a single man, the government is a monarchy; if to a few nobles, an aristocracy; if to delegates from all classes, a democracy. So that particular governments are of divine right only through the intermediate tacit or express consent of the community; immediately they are only of human law. That is to say, the *form* of government in any country depends on the particular constitution of that country, and not on the immediate ordination of God; all that is of immediate divine ordination is the duty of the government to legislate for the welfare of society, and the duty of the people to obey the laws.

Certainly, nothing can be more just and excellent than this theory; nothing farther removed from favoring tyranny, or from granting to any man or any hereditary line of men a natural superiority or right to command their brethren. This theory is not only defended by Cardinal Bellarmin, but by Suarez, Concina, Billuart, Busembaum, Liguori, and others. It has never been impugned by the Church, and Bellarmin, not only an Italian cardinal, but a most strenuous defender of the Papal rights, residing and writing in Rome itself, is not to be suspected of publishing or holding any thing not perfectly conformable to the Catholic doctrine.

Nevertheless, he was most fiercely attacked on account of this very theory, — and by whom, think you? Why, by no less a personage than James I., the Protestant king of England. This Protestant king maintained, as Hobbes, another English Protestant, maintained, that the power of individual kings is immediately and directly from God, and most absolute and unlimited. And James, not content with theorizing on the

subject, dared even declare to his English Parliament, that God had made him absolute master, and that all their privileges and pretended rights were only gracious concessions of the royal will. And this he did without opposition, whether from the lay lords of Parliament, or from the Anglican bishops who sat with them. How different from the conduct of those noble *Catholic* bishops who in former days had stood so firmly against the usurpations of the English monarchs !

But, though this despotic assertion of the English king, to whom his courtiers with vile adulation gave the title of the modern Solomon, met no rebuke in Protestant England, it was not left without a stern rebuke in *Catholic* Spain. For the Spanish Jesuit, Suarez, in his masterly work, called a "Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith against the Errors of the Anglican Sect,"* expressly refutes this opinion of King James, and proves it to be "*new and singular*"; while that of Bellarmine is "*ancient, received, true, and necessary*." So that it was left to a Spanish Jesuit and an Italian cardinal to rebuke the despotic arrogance of an English king !

But it may be thought, that, though the Catholic doctrine is just and beautiful with regard to the *origin* of government, it may, nevertheless, favor tyranny, by granting to governments unlimited attributes, an arbitrary *extent* of authority. Let us, then, examine the doctrine of St. Thomas on this point, and see whether it favors oppression and injustice.

We select St. Thomas, not only because his works for the last six centuries have had such authority in all theological questions, that to quote him alone is to quote a host, but because we wish to show how clear and just were the notions of those scholastic works of the Middle Ages, long before the boasted light of modern times appeared, on the great questions which most deeply affect the welfare of humanity.

Let us, then, examine what he holds with regard to *law*, for it is by law that government acts upon the people.

"Law," says St. Thomas, in his *Summa Theologica*,† "is a regulation founded on reason, directed to the common good, and promulgated by him who has the care of the community." Scarcely a dozen words, yet embracing all that can be said on the subject. "A regulation founded on *reason*"; why, this at the very outset destroys the idea of any thing arbitrary, of

* *De Prim. Summi Pont.* l. 3, c. 2.

† *Summa*, 1. 2, Q. 90, a. 4.

any thing despotic, and founded on the mere *will* of princes ; for tyranny consists in the domination of the will, to the exclusion of reason. Nor did St. Thomas use this expression by chance ; for he goes on to say that it is evident that the *will* of a ruler must also intervene in a law, because otherwise it would be a mere act of the intellect, not a command ; but it is its foundation in reason which makes it obligatory, for, without such foundation, the will of a ruler would “ be rather an *iniquity* than a law.” *

But it is not enough that a regulation be founded in reason in order to have the character of law ; for many things may be in themselves conformable to reason, which nevertheless are not useful to the community. A law, therefore, says St. Thomas, must not only be reasonable, but it must be expressly “ directed to the *common good*.” This is the object of law, the *public good*. Does this savor of arbitrariness ? Does this favor tyranny ? Can any thing be devised more entirely opposed to tyranny and injustice ?

And, finally, it must be promulgated “ by him who hath the care of the community.” Can any thing be more admirable than this ? He does not say, by the emperor, by the king, by the senate, by the president ; he does not prejudice or predetermine any particular form of government, but, admitting all, he calls the head of the government “ him who hath the *care of the community*.” Showing, on the one hand, that, whatever the form of government, its object is always the same, namely, to take charge of the interests of the community, and not of itself ; and on the other hand, that, whatever the form of government, law is the same, namely, to be regulated by reason, and to be directed to the public good.

Here you have in a nutshell, as it were, the nature of law, the object of governments, their rights, and their limits. The public good is their object, to legislate for this their right, reason and justice their limit.

Now this was the Catholic doctrine in the Middle Ages, and by them taken from the Fathers of the Church who preceded them. It has been the Catholic doctrine ever since ; and not without the deepest influence on the progress of society. It was the doctrine taught in the great Catholic Universities at Paris, Oxford, Bologna, Rome ; it was thrilled by confessors into the ears of their royal penitents ; it was sought to be carried

* *Summa*, 1, 2, Q. 90, a. 1, ad 3.

out in practice on every occasion; and was by the Church carried out in all her own institutions. "The kingdom," says St. Thomas in another place,* "is not for the king, but the king for the kingdom; the end of governments is that they may preserve every one in his rights; and if they do otherwise, turning things to their private advantage, they are not kings, but tyrants." In a similar spirit the Spanish Counsellor of the Crown, Saavedra, says, in his *Idea of a Christian Prince*: — "It is the centre of justice whence is drawn the circumference of the crown, and the crown would not be necessary if we could live without justice, . . . and justice failing, the order of the republic fails, and the office of king ceases."

But the most remarkable instance of the correctness of principles in Catholic countries, and of the determination not to see these principles violated, is found in an act of the Spanish Inquisition, during the reign of Philip II. A certain preacher, wishing to ingratiate himself with the king, declared, in a discourse delivered in the royal presence, that "sovereigns have absolute power over the person as well as property of their subjects." A declaration not very dissimilar from that which we have seen the English King James make to his Parliament. But mark the difference, — the Protestant Parliament listened in silence, if not with applause; the Catholic people denounced the man to the Inquisition. And the Inquisition, after due investigation as to what the man had really said, declared his assertion contrary to sound doctrine, and not only imposed a salutary penance on him, but obliged him to make a public recantation in the same pulpit, and to declare that "kings have over their subjects no authority but what has been granted them by *divine and human law*, they have *none* which proceeds from their free and absolute *will*."† Such was the justness and liberty of speech and theory in Catholic Spain and Italy, where the people were solidly religious and government was profoundly respected.

But, it may be said, these principles are indeed most excellent, and governments undoubtedly *ought* to rule according to truth and justice; but suppose they do not; suppose they abuse their powers, as they so frequently have abused them; what then is to be done? Must we obey every command,

* *De Regim. Prin.* l. 3, c. 11.

† D. Antonio Perez, *Relaciones*. V. Balmez.

whether just or not? Must we sit with folded hands, and tell them they ought to have done better? The answer is ready; for the theologians of whom we speak were not men to forget or to shrink from any part of a question, however delicate. "Laws," says St. Thomas,* "may be unjust in two ways, — by opposing the divine good, or by opposing human good. When they oppose the divine good, that is, command any thing bad in itself, they must not be obeyed on any consideration whatsoever. Human good they may oppose in three ways: either by being contrary to the true end of a law, which is the common good; or by their form, as when burdens are imposed unequally; or from their author, as when he makes a law beyond the power committed to him. And such laws as these are rather *violences* than *laws*; for, as St. Augustine says, 'that does not appear to be a law which is not just.' Therefore such laws do not oblige in conscience, and no man is bound to obey them, if he can resist them without giving scandal or causing greater injury; for to avoid this a man should forego even his own rights, in accordance with the teaching of the Gospel."† This is the constant doctrine of St. Thomas, — a law not for the common good, not equally distributed, not made by a legitimate legislator, has no force to bind a man, and he may resist it lawfully, because it is not in accordance with the eternal law of God, which alone can induce an obligation on the human conscience. Nevertheless, if resistance would cause scandal, or would produce greater evil than complying with the law, it will be necessary to obey, not because of the law itself, which has no force at all, but because of Christian charity, which forbids us to press our own rights to the injury of our neighbour.

But there is a wide difference between refusing to obey a law and resisting its execution by force of arms; and as nothing is said here as to the kind of resistance which may be made, the question may still arise, whether Catholic principles will under any circumstances allow that a nation may be absolved from its allegiance, so as to make war upon the tyrant. We answer, that undoubtedly there are circumstances under which Catholic principles allow this; and we found this answer, not only on the reason of the thing, and on the arguments of St.

* *Summa*, 1, 2, Q. 96, a. 4 & *Id. art.* ad 3.

† Consult also *Ib.* 2, 2, Q. 104, a. 6, ad 3.

Thomas, Suarez, and Bellarmin, as above cited,* but on the practice of the Holy See itself, which in the "Ages of Faith," when all Christendom acknowledged the Pope as the divinely constituted umpire between monarchs and people, never hesitated, when appealed to by an outraged nation, to declare them, if due cause were shown, absolved from their allegiance to the tyrant. Nevertheless, it is certain that such a claim should be the very *last* resort, that the tyranny must be really excessive, that every peaceful mode of representation, entreaty, prayer, should have been made in vain, and that there should be a reasonable hope of success in establishing a legitimate and just government; for otherwise to rise in arms would be but a senseless vengeance, which is never lawful. And it is more in conformity with the spirit of Christ to suffer oppression, as long as oppression, morally speaking, can be endured, than to resist it. And a nation thoroughly impressed with the Christian spirit will find it *easy* to suffer, as the early Christians suffered under the persecutions of the Roman emperors. Read the lives, or rather the deaths, of the martyrs. There was no cringing, no fear; but a courage above human courage, a courage altogether supernatural, which struck wonder and terror into the hearts of their persecutors, and made thousands acknowledge the hand of the Almighty. So that Tertullian could gloriously say, in the second century:—"We have strength enough to fight, but we have learned of Christ to suffer all things. For what war were we not ready, even with unequal forces,—we who are led to slaughter so willingly,—were it not that we have learned from Him that it is better to be slain than to slay?" And such has ever been the sentiment of Catholic nations; penetrated by Christian faith, by Christian hope, and Christian charity, they have firmly believed those words of Christ, that "blessed are they who suffer persecution for conscience' sake," as every man does who for the love of Christ suffers any persecution whatsoever; they have hoped with a constant hope to inherit the kingdom of heaven promised to such; and they have loved their neighbour too well to bring destruction on him in vindicating themselves from oppression. If, then, you see anywhere a Catholic people suffering patiently when they have power sufficient to throw off the yoke, consider that it is not from apathy, not from fear;

* St. Thos. *Summa*, 2, 2, Q. 42, a. 2, ad 3, and *De Regim. Prin.* l. 1, c. 6 & 10; Suarez, D. 13, Sect. 3; Bellarm. *De Rom. Cont.* l. 5, c. 7.

but it is because the words of Christ have sunk deep into their hearts, and they have a hope in store laid up for them, which makes temporal sufferings seem light in the balance. Wonder not, on the other hand, when you see a nation without faith uneasy under the slightest shadow of oppression ; for this temporal welfare is all that has charms for them ; it is all that they believe in ; all that they love ; all, alas ! that they may hope for. But the Catholic has a higher good, a good to which all else is trifling ; he knows that “ what is light and momentary of this present tribulation worketh in us above measure in sublimity an eternal weight of glory.”

We have now explained the Catholic doctrine with regard to civil governments, — their origin, their object, their rights, their limits, and the means of redress against them. Nothing could be more perfect and complete ; nothing is forgotten, no interest unattended to, no right unfulfilled. It is truly Catholic. Order is assured on the one hand, and on the other liberty. The rights of government are protected ; so are the rights of the people ; and above all, the rights of God, the Author and Ruler of both.

Protestant theologians and philosophers have in vain attempted to improve upon this theory ; they have departed from it only to wander from the truth, to the right hand or to the left, — by excess or by defect. When they have sought to establish order, they have done it at the expense of liberty, as in the theory of Hobbes, the Antinomians, James I. When they have sought to defend liberty, they have done it at the expense of order, as in the “ Social Contract ” of Rousseau, which makes the obligation of law depend on the general *will* ; as though the will, whether of one man or of many, could ever found a legitimate obligation, or be any thing else *as such* but the grossest tyranny, unworthy the character of a rational being. Nor are even they exact, who place the obligation of law on the *general reason* of the community ; for even human reason *as such* gives no authority ; it may counsel, advise, enlighten, it can never command. This it has only in so far as it is in conformity with the eternal law of God, and because it is the application of this, by one having authority, to the particular case. Without this, you can found no obligation on the conscience, no right to command, no duty to obey. But not only have the Protestant systems invariably favored one party at the expense of the other, — government at the expense of the people, or the people at the

expense of government, — but they have generally left the most important party out of the question altogether. They have formed their theories as though God had no share in them; they have excluded the Creator from the noblest of his works.

Such being the Catholic teaching with regard to civil governments, it is evident, that, if in the course of ages we see individuals departing from it and favoring tyranny, this is not from the influence of the Catholic Church, but in direct opposition to it, directly in spite of it, and therefore, of course, cannot be laid to its charge. The first part of the accusation, therefore, is refuted. The doctrines of Catholicity are not favorable to despotism, but are directly opposed to it.

II. Let us come, then, to the second part of the charge, and examine whether the *action* of the Catholic Church has been in accordance with its principles, whether the institutions of the Church have been conducive to political liberty.

It will not be necessary to enter into any historical detail of what the Church accomplished during the fifteen hundred years of Christianity which preceded the introduction of Protestantism; for that has often been done in works accessible to most of our readers. It will be sufficient to recall to their minds a few leading points. When St. Peter established his see in Rome, the whole, so-called, civilized world was subject to the Roman empire, — a tyranny reigned in Rome horrible as that of the Oriental despots, and the whole world was sunk in idolatry, cruelty, lust, and rapine. It was in this world that the Church began her work, and by the lives and teachings of her saints, the writings of her sages, the blood of her martyrs, — constant, steady, unwearied, age after age, — she stemmed the torrent of vice, refuted the pagan philosophies, overthrew the idols of the nations, and won the Roman empire to Christianity. Scarcely was her triumph complete in this great empire, when the barbarian nations, like mighty waves of a Northern sea, rolled down over the sunny fields of the South, sweeping all before them, destroying every green thing, and threatening, not only to efface every vestige of Roman civilization and art, but to overwhelm the Church itself in the widespread ruin. But the billows of that spring-tide of barbarism dashed in vain against the Rock of Peter; in vain the whirlwinds and tempests of battle whistled and roared around it, for the Wise Builder himself had founded it, and the gates of hell could not prevail against it.

Here was a new world for the Church to subdue. Wild and lawless, heathen and heretic united, the barbarians covered the face of Europe, — a motley and chaotic assemblage of tribes, languages, customs, and governments. But the Church began her work again, and dauntless missionaries went forth on every side, till Goth and Visigoth, Saxon and Hun and Vandal, before whose fierce valor the mailed legions of the empire had quailed, yielded to the peaceful teaching of those men of God, and bowed their necks to the sweet yoke of Christ. And thus the Church went on, diffusing the light of civilization and Christianity, till, long before the approach of Protestantism, paganism, barbarism, and heresy had alike disappeared ; all Europe was civilized ; all civilization was Christian ; and all Christians were Catholic.

This glorious change the Church had effected chiefly by her religious teaching ; but in addition to this, she had directly operated on the social and political amelioration of Europe by the celibacy of the clergy, and by the temporal power of the Popes.

1. What was the effect of this celibacy ? The distinguished Protestant statesman and philosopher, M. Guizot, with profounder thought and more candor than has usually characterized Protestant authors in speaking of Catholic institutions, declares, in his *General History of the Civilization of Europe* (lect. 5), that it was their celibacy alone which prevented the clergy from forming a caste like those in India. Had the clergy been married, it would have been, he says, morally impossible for the Church dignities not to have become hereditary, like the rank of the feudal lords. For the clergy would naturally have allied themselves by intermarriage and common interests with the feudal nobility, and would have united with them in retaining in their own hands all the intelligence of the age, all the wealth and power of the nations ; while the lower classes would have been irretrievably sunk in ignorance, poverty, and servitude, like the wretched lower castes of India. " This would have been," he says, " the inevitable consequence of the marriage of the clergy ; whereas the effect of the celibacy was, that, while all else around her fell under the *régime* of privilege and birth, the Church alone maintained the principle of equality, and admitted all men, without regard to their origin, to all her charges and all her dignities." This avowal is alike creditable to M. Guizot, and conclusive as to the influence of this institution on civil liberty. For not

only did the example of the Church, in this matter, have a vast influence in bringing temporal governments to acknowledge the general rights of mankind, — but, as a matter of fact, the Church by this institution not only threw open to the poorer classes all the means of education, all the treasures of learning, all the dignities and wealth which she herself possessed, but, moreover, through the immense temporal power which the clergy then enjoyed, opened to them at the same time all the highest offices of the state. So that it was the glory of the Catholic priesthood in those barbarous ages, when the rights of mankind were in vain pleaded for, to accomplish, by severe institutions against themselves, that which even in modern times has been obtained only by revolution and bloodshed. Yes, even as the modern deliberative assemblies of State are but the faintest shadow of those great Catholic Councils in which the collective wisdom of nations was called to regulate harmoniously the affairs, not of a single country, but of all Christendom, so the eligibility of every man to the highest office in the republic, which this nation of ours boasts as its greatest glory, wrenched, as it was, from England only by eight years of war, is but the faintest shadow of what has for eighteen centuries been the ordinary course of events in the Church of God. For, long before modern political institutions were thought of, the Church had practised them for centuries in her own bosom, and presents us the living model of every social improvement which has been made. And if we consider that the priesthood, by renouncing marriage, not only renounced the strongest of natural affections, the love of domestic happiness and comfort, but also that ambition which they might have gratified so fully by founding illustrious lines and dynasties ; if we consider how far those men must have stood above the common views of the age, who, while they possessed wealth and power greater even than those of the feudal nobility, nevertheless hesitated not to assume into their glorious company, and make partakers of all their dignities, the wretched slaves and serfs, who in the eyes of others were little better than brutes ; if, finally, we consider that this was not a step *forced* upon them, as every such participation of the people in *temporal* governments has been forced upon those governments, but that the Church herself, in the plenitude of her power and influence, maintained this institution, guided only by the spirit of Christian love and self-sacrifice, and that age after age she has, for eighteen centuries, unwaveringly

preserved it ;—if we seriously and honestly reflect on these facts, in connection with the motives which usually govern men's actions, we cannot fail to recognize in this institution the inspiration and support of Almighty God, and, recognizing his presence, we cannot fail to acknowledge that the Catholic Church is that Church of which the inspired Apostle writes to the Ephesians (v. 25–27), that “Christ loved the Church, and delivered himself up for it that he might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life ; that he might present it to himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle, nor any such thing ; but that it should be holy and without blemish.”

Nor would the occasional misconduct of individuals be a stumbling-block ; for while, on the one hand, the upholding of the Church by God still leaves every individual master of his own actions and personally accountable for them, it is certain, on the other hand, that the dereliction of individuals has never been so general as to impede the regular onward progress of the Church, or prevent her from accomplishing the glorious ends for which she was constituted. No, the tree which Christ planted has never failed ; a twig may have withered and dropped off here and there, but the glorious old trunk has never shown sign of decay, but continues ever putting forth new flowers and new fruit, in one ceaseless spring-time of blossom, and one ceaseless summer of maturity.

2. The second engine of political liberty was the temporal power of the Popes ; for at a time when the people were too weak to protect themselves, the Church stretched out her hand to them, and preserved them from the encroachments of the civil authority. The greatest errors are prevalent among Protestants as to the origin, nature, and exercise of this power. It must be remembered, that it did not consist in extent of territory, for the Popes never added an acre to their own dominions, however easily they might have done so. Nor did it consist in armies and fleets, for the Popes' soldiers were never very formidable. It consisted simply in influence in political transactions, — an influence which, looking at it in a merely human point of view, was not at all usurped, but the voluntary and natural offering of all Catholic nations. When the Church civilized the barbarians, in whose hands were the intelligence, ability, and integrity of the age ? — in the hands of the barbarians, or of the Church who civilized them ? Was it not natural, then, that, not only reverencing the sacred char-

acter of the Church, but acknowledging her superior human intelligence also, they should have put themselves entirely under her tutelage, and desired her advice on all matters, as well temporal as spiritual? Looking at it, therefore, we say, in a merely human light, it was but the homage justly due to superior virtue and ability.

And the Church used this power for the common good;—she interfered with the natural growth of no country whatsoever; the various forms of government grew up, under her fostering care, according to circumstances and the character of the people; here monarchy, there feudalism, and in Italy alone, where the influence of the Popes was most immediate and powerful, republicanism. The Church stood by, the natural ally of all, the enemy of none; the natural mediator between kings and their subjects, the living expression of the Almighty will, the living expounder and enforcer of his laws,—to bid monarchs stop, when ambition led them to oppress; to bid nations stop, when they mistook license for liberty. She stood the mediator between all, herself formed of every class, possessing the confidence of all, admirably adapted to aid every class in what was just, and to prevent the unjust preponderance of any.

Hence we find that two opposite charges are made against the Church by her enemies;—the one, that she has leagued with kings to oppress the people; the other, that she has leagued with the people to overthrow the royal authority. The fact is, that she has leaned neither to one side nor to the other, but, when either has transgressed, she has thrown her influence into the other scale, till the balance was restored.

Nevertheless, in history we find her more frequently siding with the people against the king than with the king against the people; because the kings more frequently sought to tyrannize. And this is why many of the kings made such violent efforts to weaken her influence in their states,—for they felt, that, so long as she had a strong footing, their power was essentially limited; whereas, if she were once removed, they could easily overpower the nobility, their only important check, and trample at will on the people, who had no bond of union in themselves, no power, wealth, or intelligence of their own to cope with them, though they found a rich store of all in the Church, their mother, who never turned a deaf ear to the entreaties of her children. So far, then, was the temporal influence of the Church from being a source of tyranny, that it con-

stituted the only solid check on the arbitrary will of the monarchs, and prevented their power from becoming absolute and all-absorbing. Nobly, therefore, did the Popes merit the title which the Protestant historian Voigt gives them of “Tutors of the European nations in the ways of civilization.”

It was under the combined influence of the spiritual teaching of the Church, and the actual operation of these institutions, that Europe rose from the abyss of idolatry, tyranny, debauchery, and degradation in which she appears when the Church was founded, to the state of glorious progress in which we see her at the commencement of the sixteenth century. The foul slavery of Rome had long given place to the milder form of serfdom, and serfdom was now fast yielding to freedom, and the people were forming a strong part of society, as the feudal system gave way to a more enlarged and perfect social organization. The barbarian tribes had coalesced into powerful nations, — Germany, France, Spain, Italy. Government had assumed a definite shape ; parliaments, diets, states general, cortes, everywhere existed as checks on the royal power ; large and powerful cities had grown up, vast universities been established ; the great republics of Genoa, Pisa, Florence, Venice, in Italy, and the Hanseatic league in Germany, had carried the products of Europe to every part of the known world ; industry and the arts had reached a wonderful degree of development ; poetry and painting had attained to perfection in Italy ; Vasco de Gama had discovered the passage of the Cape of Good Hope ; Columbus had discovered a new world in America ; printing was spreading light among the nations ; and in every thing connected with human welfare, physical, moral, and intellectual, the world seemed marching with rapid strides towards perfection. The Church had done this, for the Church alone existed ; and what she had done she created, for none went before to show the way. And now Protestantism appeared, — not to convert idolaters, for that was already done ; not to civilize barbarians, for they were already civilized ; not to create new elements of temporal prosperity and happiness, for every element of human welfare was already in active operation, — but she came to impede, to destroy, the harmonious development of what was rapidly progressing under the fostering care of the Church who had created it.

The immediate effect of Protestantism was to sow seeds of deadly hatred, not only among friendly nations, but between

different portions of the same nation. Desolating civil and religious wars followed its footsteps wherever it appeared, in Germany, France, England, the North; and wherever Protestantism triumphed, commenced a series of cruel persecutions against the Catholics, scarcely paralleled in the annals of the Roman Neros.

The influence of Protestantism on political liberty was as disastrous as on civilization generally. Its first object of attack was the temporal power of the Popes, and, by destroying this before the people had yet acquired strength to defend themselves, it left the royal power without a check, and the people without protection. Moreover, not content with stripping the Popes of their temporal authority, it transferred their spiritual authority to the kings, and the throne in Protestant countries acquired immense additional power by becoming the head of the Church, and possessing all its patronage. But with an inconsistency which has equally characterized it in matters purely religious, while Protestantism thus, on the one hand, put an immense power into the hands of kings, it, on the other, excited the people against the crown by preaching doctrines subversive of order. Its influence was twofold; — on one side, to dispose the people to rebellion, partly by its doctrines, and partly by depriving them of the moral means of redress which they before had in the Papal authority; and on the other side, to dispose the kings to tyranny, by making them fear the people, while at the same time their power to crush them was increased. Thus the crown and the people were brought face to face in direct and deadly opposition, and hence the rebellions and revolutions which occurred in all the countries where Protestant principles acquired sway. And hence naturally we see these revolutions followed by the establishment of absolute governments in all the Protestant countries; in England, Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, and Germany generally. For not only is it the natural effect of rebellion to produce despotism, as of despotism to produce rebellion, but the people themselves at last gladly resign a vast power to the executive, rather than remain a constant prey to civil contention. Nor can we wonder at the formation of similar absolute governments in the countries which remained Catholic; for, though Protestantism itself could get no hold there, the influence of its principles was felt everywhere, and, on the one hand, compelled the governments to look to their own welfare, while, on the other, the people willingly permitted the government to do, as

a preventive of evils, what in Protestant countries was required for their cure.

But it is necessary to remark, that an absolute form of government has not those evils in Catholic which it has in Protestant countries. For, in the first place, as Catholic principles exclude the government from power in spiritual matters, the clergy, though possessing no temporal power, constantly exert a moral check which is wanting in Protestant countries. Moreover, the equality of all before the Church, the union of all classes in religious confraternities, the deep mutual sympathy in all that relates to the highest interests of man, produce a fellowship of feeling among all classes which is utterly wanting in Protestant countries, and exert a moral influence on both governors and governed which makes those material forms comparatively unnecessary which are found so absolutely essential in Protestant countries.

Such, then, was the immediate and direct influence of the Reformation on political liberty. If we look at Europe after Protestantism had been one hundred and fifty years at work in it, we find the civilizing work of the Church thrown back, the civil wars produced by Protestantism scarcely yet ended, or ended only by the substitution of despotism. The moral checks of Catholicity being removed, the nations were forced to have recourse to rebellion, and the governments to bayonets.

What political amelioration has taken place since the fierce bigotry of early Protestantism has given way to comparative indifference it would be idle to attribute to Protestantism. Catholicity has been at work as well as Protestantism, but neither has exerted a great and direct influence on political liberty. The amelioration which has taken place in political institutions is to be attributed chiefly to the extension of industry and commerce, and the multiplication of the modes of communication between countries, which have given to the people greater wealth, power, and intelligence than were before possible, and have therefore enabled them to hold a more important position in political affairs, than, from the nature of things, they could have filled before.*

* Nevertheless, even this effect in Protestant countries is seen only in our own country and in England, and it is shown in England to be the effect of no principle, because, with liberal forms at home, where she is forced to them, she wished to tyrannize over us, and does still tyrannize over poor Ireland and over her provinces in the East, where the people have not power to resist her. But the other Protestant countries of Eu-

We have now shown that the Catholic Church has never favored tyranny,—that not only are its principles completely opposed to it, but that in its own institutions it practised from the beginning all that has in modern times been considered most glorious. The constitution of the United States is not opposed to the spirit of Catholicity; on the contrary, it is of all national constitutions the most like what the Church has always adopted in her own practice. From Catholicity this country has nothing to fear, but every thing to hope; for Catholicity would make it a matter of conscience to preserve the constitution in its integrity, and would have sufficient influence to preserve the people in order with little outward force.

But it is a most grave error to suppose that true liberty depends upon, or can be insured by, written constitutions or material forms. Liberty depends not on the form of the government, but on its administration, and a good administration can be insured only by religion. Where religion is wanting, no form of government, however admirably devised, can long save the people from oppression. For irreligion is necessarily immoral and selfish, and therefore disposed to injustice, and, when occasion offers, will inevitably tyrannize;—mere outward forms will do little, where the life-giving spirit is wanting. On the contrary, where both rulers and people are profoundly religious, even an absolute form of government will not be oppressive, because the government will confine itself to the true object of government, the welfare of the people, and the people will cheerfully conform to what they see is for their good. And, on the other hand, where there is religion, the most liberal forms of government may flourish, for the sense of responsibility to God will of itself suffice; but where religion is wanting, this element must be supplied by force; for obedience to government is necessary to the very existence of society, and where religion does not supply moral means, the government must strengthen itself by physical ones.

If, then, you would insure liberty in any country, strive to make your children solidly religious. But religion you will seek in vain, except in the Church which Christ has founded. If nothing else, sad experience at last will show you that lib-

rope, Norway, Sweden, Prussia, and the German states generally, are still governed by absolute princes, without written constitutions or limitation. And this is enough to show that Protestantism, as such, has no tendency to produce even those forms which Protestants themselves generally consider essential to liberty.

erty is impossible without religion, and religion without the Church.*

ART. III. — 1. *Deux Mots sur le Monastère de La Cava.*

Par GUILLAUME DE CORNÈ, Directeur des Archives du Monastère.

2. *Monasterii Sanctissimæ Trinitatis Cavæ Ordinis Sancti Benedicti Congregationis Cassinensis asserta Privilegia Constitutionibus Summorum Pontificum.* Romæ : Typis Reverendæ Cameræ Apostolicæ.

ONE of the most delightful excursions a traveller can enjoy in the environs of Naples is undoubtedly a visit to the celebrated monastery of La Cava, more commonly known in the neighbourhood under the name of "*La Trinità*." Whether he be an artist in quest of beautiful scenery, a student of antiquities, or a devout pilgrim, he is sure to be more than satisfied, and to obtain at La Cava both literary and religious instruction.

The monastery is situated in a valley of the Western Apennines, four miles from Salerno, and about forty-six from Naples. Were we engaged in a literary sketch, in place of a sober archæological narrative, we might remark, that the traveller is almost uncertain, at the end of his journey, whether the road is not more interesting than its termination. For, leaving Naples in the cars, you are whirled along the edge of its far-famed gulf, passing before the royal palace at Portici, then, over beds of lava, through Torre Annunziata and Torre del Greco, behind which stands Vesuvius, with its bright column of smoke rising, at times, straight from its fiery basis up into mid air, like a pile of icebergs, at times bending horizontally before the wind, and stretching at an angle with the top of the cone far over the smiling Campania, like some gigantic serpent of glass. Your attention is occasionally recalled to

* Should any of our readers wish to see this subject treated more at large, we would recommend to them the work of Balmes, noticed by another hand in a subsequent article, — a work to which we have been greatly indebted in preparing this brief essay, and in which the author most profoundly investigates the comparative influence which Protestantism and Catholicity have exerted on every subject connected with the temporal welfare of society.

the mountain by sudden rebuffs, which at that distance sound not much louder than the puffing of the engine, but to a person standing on the crater assume the reality of deafening thunder, shaking the ground beneath, and followed by volleys of cinders, and red-hot fragments of stone, and crystals, which shoot high up through the smoke, and either fall again into the chasm, or roll down its sides accompanied by streams of burning lava.

You are roused from your contemplation of the wonders of nature by the train stopping near Pompeii, whose miniature palaces and lofty temples shine brightly in the sun, showing you what man was able to erect in the hour of his pride, — a monument of Vanity to Silence and Death. Angri, Scafati, Pagani, and Nocera are passed in rapid succession. Pagani is endeared to the Christian traveller by the memory of St. Alphonsus Liguori, who made it his dwelling-place for many years, and whose relics are enshrined there, beneath the altar of San Michele, the mother-house of his Order. Cava is only three or four miles beyond Nocera, and will soon be linked to Naples by the railroad which the Neapolitan government intends to carry on to Salerno.

Few parts of Italy present a view equal to that of the neighbourhood of La Cava for the singular contrast of wildness and beauty, the whole forming a panorama of romantic grandeur which would be more naturally expected in the mountains of Switzerland than on the smiling shores of Campania the Blest.

As you ride up the winding road that runs from the town of La Cava to the abbey, new hills seem to rise suddenly before you, while those you have passed are as suddenly lost to the eye. For a long time you enjoy only an extremely limited horizon, as the rugged path threads its way between a deep precipice on one side and a cluster of mountain-tops on the other, abruptly severed by narrow ravines, and covered with wild vegetation. At an unexpected turn of the mountain-pass, the smiling valley of Cava opens beneath you far and wide, with its well-cultivated fields, its bright little town, its meandering river, and the blue hills in the distance, over which the sun pours a stream of glory upon the enchanting scene.

From this point of view two objects especially attract the attention of the spectator. On the left hand, the Apennines, swelling in terrific grandeur from the valley, present to the eye their rugged sides covered with a forest of chestnuts, which

form a broad mass of deep and dark foliage, and end in a lofty ridge, overtopped again by two banks of naked rock, which join together at the highest elevation, leaving beneath a wide quadrangular opening, which appears in the distance like a great window hewn through the solid mountain-side by the hand of Nature. This phenomenon has given to the place the appellation of *Monte Fenestra* (Mount Window), and the effect produced by the rays of the sun shining through this strange aperture is very striking. On the opposite side, a Capuchin convent is descried, whose little courts, gardens, and vineyards look like a landscape traced by art on the side of the hill, which shoots still higher up into a grayish isolated rock in the form of a sugar-loaf. This eminence was formerly crowned by a little fort, the ruins of which are still found scattered about. On an evening during the Octave of the Corpus Domini a temporary altar is erected there, and a procession wends its way up to it, the festival ending with the Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament, given, under the broad canopy of Italy's blue sky, from that sublime height, in full view of all the inhabitants of the valley, to their families, their dwellings, their fields, and forests. The whole ascent is illuminated by hundreds of torches, colored lanterns, and ranges of fireworks, the summit ending in a perfect blaze of splendor. The awful moment of the terminating ceremony is announced by a peal of martial music and the echo of innumerable volleys, the whole pageant, combined with the picturesque grandeur of the surrounding scenery, producing an effect which is described as truly magnificent.

But return we to the abbey. To find one's self suddenly beneath the gilded ceiling and surrounded by the stuccoed walls of the convent church, after wandering so long amongst the wild fastnesses of the rugged Apennines, is so delightful a surprise as to seem the effect of magic. This surprise is not lessened at discovering what treasures are contained in this happy wilderness. It will not, we hope, prove unacceptable to our readers, if, before describing them, we give a brief account of the origin and early history of the monastery.

The date of its foundation has not been established with precision, but Pellegrini and Mabillon refer it to the beginning of the eleventh century. About the year 1006, a monk of illustrious lineage, whose family was allied to the Lombard princes of Salerno, but who was still more distinguished by his virtues than by his noble birth, departed that city, where he

had the direction of several monastic institutions, to find a solitude where he might lead a life of penance and prayer, far remote from the noise and vanity of a deceitful world. He discovered a spot answering his pious intentions in one of the wildest defiles of the Metellian valley, called *Cava arsiccia*, which name was afterwards given to the town situated a mile and a half from the convent. The holy recluse chose for his dwelling an humble hermitage, which a monk of Monte Cassino, called Liutius, had erected long before in the midst of the wilderness, hoping to enjoy in its secluded cell that peace and retirement of which Monte Cassino had been deprived, in consequence of the intrusive election of an abbot sustained by the secular power.

The odor of the sanctity of Alpherio Pappacarbone, for this was the name of the new inhabitant of La Cava, soon began to diffuse itself abroad. A numerous band of pious persons, who like himself were weary of the world, and desired to embrace a life of perfection, came to put themselves under his guidance. Alpherio with great reluctance consented to assume the direction of these good brethren, and, obeying the mysterious decrees of Providence, which did not permit him to remain in the obscurity he had so anxiously sought after, erected in due time a convent and church in that solitary place. The hymn of praise was heard to swell upon the mountain breeze from the lips of a numerous choir, and the steam of the censer soared towards the skies from recesses untrodden before by the foot of man. Alpherio dedicated the new institution to the Ever-blessed Trinity, and taught his twelve companions the rule of Cluny as he had learned it in the monastery of San Michele della Chiusa in Savoy. While ambassador at the court of the Emperor Otho the Third, he had been forced by illness during a journey to apply for hospitality at the above-mentioned monastery, where he received the habit at the hands of the venerable Abbot Odilon.

Several years had elapsed, during which Alpherio trained up his disciples in a life of piety united with study, when he was gathered to his fathers in a good old age. He was succeeded in the abbacy by Leo of Lucca, and then by his nephew, Peter Pappacarbone, who, at the request of Leo, had come to their monastery from Cluny.

The remains of these venerable abbots repose in the church originally built by their hands, and are justly venerated as the relics of saints. Under their direction, the abbey increased in

reputation, and many of the inhabitants of the neighbouring valleys came to put themselves under its protection. Many flourishing townships were formed in this manner during the Middle Ages, not only in Italy, but in Germany, France, and England. The abbey, invested with the rights of a landlord, formed the nucleus of the increasing settlement, which was protected by the shield of religion, and, when it became necessary, by the sword of the abbot, who was not backward in defending his tenants, if the insolent feudal seignior, the marauding Saracen, or the lawless bandit dared to attack them beneath the shade of the convent walls. The origin of the town of Cava is usually dated, according to Eustace, from the invasion of Genserich, and the destruction of the neighbouring town of Marciana, whose inhabitants took shelter in the mountains, and, at the persuasion of the abbot, settled around the monastery.

It is unfortunate that the accomplished classical tourist did not find leisure to pay a visit to the abbey, as he would doubtless have met there some further poetical coincidences to show that we Catholics are not, after all, quite so unamiable as might be supposed, and that our religion may be even brought finally to harmonize with the enlightened spirit of the age, if our affable Protestant masters will deign to encourage it with the dews of their piety, and beautify it with the irradiations of their superior wisdom.*

* On a reperusal of these expressions, we are led to fear lest they be taken as a slur upon the memory of the amiable author of the *Classical Tour through Italy*. But our allusions are wholly directed to his book, which has been so much read and so highly praised by Protestants. The spirit of the work, as far as religion is concerned, is, we fear, but too accurately described above. It is said that Eustace, in his later years, often expressed his regret that the work had ever been published. Perhaps, if the times he lived in and the connections amongst whom he moved had been different, he would not have obscured the lustre of his fine talents by a defence of his religion, the servile and yielding spirit of which is the most cruel libel he could have penned against it, albeit interspersed with expressions of sincere attachment to the Church.

The Catholic religion cannot be justified on the grounds of Protestantism, as Christ cannot be proved amiable or agreeable according to the principles of the world. If Protestants do not like the Church such as she is, so much the worse for themselves. She will never soften down, or explain away, the austerity of her doctrines to suit their fancy, or come to a compromise to allure them to her communion; and it is both treacherous to her, and unfeeling towards them, to describe her in such a manner as to induce them to believe that they can be welcomed in by

The monastery was in its highest degree of splendor, when Pope Urban the Second, who had been compelled, by the rudeness of the times, to seek refuge in Salerno, governed by the Duke Roger Borsa, became desirous to give a token of his friendship to its inmates by consecrating the newly erected church of the Most Holy Trinity. Urban had formerly been a monk of Cluny, under the name of Odon, and, having followed the Abbot Peter to La Cava, he had passed several years within its walls.

Among the privileges granted by Urban to the monks, the most remarkable one is the elevation of Peter to the dignity of a bishop. The Duke Roger likewise invested the abbot and his successors with temporal dominion over all the lands of the abbey. The monks made use of this power to protect the neighbourhood from the incursions of the numerous petty princes whose turbulent spirit never permitted them to live in peace with their vassals, or in friendship with their neighbours. The Abbot Costabile, by the erection of Castel Abate, provided a refuge for the inhabitants of Licosia, as Peter Pappacarbone had done for the vassals of the convent spread over the Marcine valley by the construction of the stronghold called *Corpo della Cava*.

Nor is this the only obligation the inhabitants of the country are under to the Benedictines. During centuries of ignorance and barbarism, their convent-walls were the asylum of science and literature, as their precious archives amply testify. Far from the gaze of the world, the Italian monk spent his life in transcribing the works of the Fathers, and the classics, while the ancestors of those who now upbraid his memory with the sacrilegious epithets of *lazy*, *useless*, and *ignorant*, were setting fire to palaces and churches, and tumbling to earth the stately monuments of Roman grandeur and ingenuity.

Through each succeeding age, the monastery of La Cava continued to be exemplary in the maintenance of religious discipline, and in its love for learning, until the introduction of commendatory or honorary abbots caused a degree of relaxation in its cloisters which it was found necessary to repress by efficacious measures. Cardinal Carafa, the last commendatory

her, without abandoning altogether those sentiments, maxims, and habits which fitted them to move with applause outside. They have been led to understand pretty well that Christ and the Devil are enemies, but they want to be persuaded a little better that the former can never agree with the world and the flesh. God help them !

abbot, began the good work by resigning, with permission of Pope Alexander the Sixth, his abbacy into the hands of the Benedictine congregation of St. Justin of Padua. Through the vigilance of the new superiors of the monastery, the influence of ancient authority was reasserted, and studies were resumed with an ardor which made several names dear to the republic of letters.

In the sixteenth century, the town of La Cava, which had been elevated by Benedict the Ninth to the rank of a city in 1394, ungrateful to its faithful protectors, was led by the spirit of the age to get weary of its ancient lords and their patriarchal sway. The Order yielded to the earnest solicitations of the citizens, and the abbot made over to them the rights of temporal jurisdiction with which his predecessors had been invested. The city of La Cava was subsequently elevated to the rank of a bishopric, but the other domains of the abbey remained in its possession. Things continued in this state down to the days when the French conquerors, marching into Naples, drove the bishop from his cathedral, and the monks from their convent, substituting the musket for the crozier, and the roll of the drum for the music of the psalms.

Fortunately the rapacity of the invaders spared the precious archives of the monastery. They were not dispersed, nor sold at auction, nor stuffed ignominiously into boxes to be carried to Paris, as it was customary to do in similar cases, but, being considered a section of the records of the kingdom, they were confided to persons who guarded them with praiseworthy vigilance. After the fall of Joachim Murat, the most humane tyrant of his day, and the return of the Bourbons, the monks regained peaceful possession of their ancient home, and of the treasures of learning which it contains.

After this outline of the history of the convent, taken from chronicles preserved in it, we will proceed to say something of the attractions it has for a traveller. The church, which seems at first sight to start up, as if by enchantment, in the midst of crags and forests, is nearly overhung by the jutting brow of a rock that protects it on the northern side. It is more to be admired for its solidity, a necessary precaution in a mountainous neighbourhood visited at times by tremendous storms, than for the beauty of its architecture. In the vestibule is to be remarked the tomb of Queen Sybilla, wife of Roger, king of Sicily. The style of the interior is a mixture of Greek and Roman. The organ-loft is an elegant piece of workmanship,

in the Gothic style, tastefully executed by Chevalier Petrelli. The fame of the organ of La Cava has spread all over Europe. It has eighty-four stops, and three key-boards of six octaves each. Nine thousand francs were spent, not long ago, merely to add new instruments to it. The whole receives life from one enormous pair of bellows, the breath of which is made at pleasure to imitate the sound of almost every known instrument. The builders of this celebrated organ were Quirico and Gaetano Gennaro of Lanciano, whose names have been made the theme of their praises by nearly all European periodicals.

The chapel on the right, ornamented with a profusion of rare marbles and precious stones, contains the relics of St. Alpherio, and his three immediate successors in the government of the abbey. In the nave of the main altar, on the same side, there is an inscription which refers to the consecration of the church by Urban the Second, in 1092, and opposite to that a piece of marble in the wall, which bears a kind of inverted mitre. This device, which is evidently symbolical, has given rise to the strangest conjectures. That which supposes the said marble slab to cover the tomb of the Antipope Burdin, exiled to the monastery of La Cava to do penance for the disturbances he had created, is not the least curious. As this conjecture has no sure foundation in history, perhaps the symbol in question is nothing but the escutcheon of a knight buried at a remote period in that part of the church.

The secluded position and fortified walls of the convent protected its archives from those lamentable inroads which dispersed the literary treasures of many other abbeys. There is nowhere else to be found a collection of documents so ancient, so important, so well preserved, and so judiciously arranged. Mabillon calls this collection *integerrimum*. The admirers of the *Dark Ages* (amongst the foremost of whom, humble as we are, we count ourselves) find in this sanctuary vast records of the utmost importance to history, and a rich collection of laws, customs, deeds, formularies, and donations, the consideration of which is indispensable to him who would form a just idea of those times, so indiscriminately misrepresented and so little understood. Before mentioning a few of the most remarkable documents, we cannot refrain from paying a just tribute of praise to the venerable religious for the neatness and order with which the archives are kept. The well-written catalogue formed by their patience and industry furnishes the curious

with the most satisfactory classification. In the first column, each diploma or charter is specified ; in the same line on the ensuing columns is found its number, the year, the month, and indiction of its date, the name of the prince or king under whom it issued, the kind of writing it exhibits, the quality of its seal, and, finally, a summary of its contents. A new chronological catalogue has likewise been written, in alphabetical order, in the form of a dictionary.

The archives are composed of forty thousand parchments, upwards of sixty thousand acts of different kinds, and about sixteen hundred bulls and diplomas.

The first act in this long list is dated A. D. 840. By it, Radelchis, Prince of Benevento, grants to the Abbot of St. Sophia the possessions of a certain Lambayard forfeited by the crime of rebellion. Two other diplomas famous in the history of La Cava refer to some of its earliest endowments. One bears the date of 1025, and the other of the following year. By them, Waimher the Third, Prince of Salerno, makes a donation to the abbey of the valley which Alpherio had chosen for the site of its erection, and of the surrounding woods, which had hitherto been hunting-grounds of the prince. To this donation he adds ample privileges and exemptions. The seal of Waimher is a pendent one of wax, on one side of which is a bust of the prince, with his crown and sceptre, and the inscription *Waimaius Princeps*, and on the reverse the closed hand of Justice. By another act, a subsequent Prince Waimher, styled, nevertheless, *the Wicked* in the Cava chronicle, grants to the convent of St. Maximus of Salerno the property and person of a certain Lupo, with his wife, his children, and grandchildren, for having treasonably acted as guide to the Saracens, when they besieged Salerno in 870. It is remarkable, that, not long after, having been dethroned by his rebel subjects, Waimher the Wicked was obliged to seek refuge in this same monastery. The document is signed 899, and, although of little importance in itself, it settles the date of important historical events.

To the right, upon entering the archives, is perceived a celebrated diploma of Roger, king of Sicily, dated in the first year of his reign, 1130. The king yields up to the monks of La Cava extensive lands in Sicily, and a goodly number of Christian and Saracen vassals. The diploma bears a golden seal, with an impression of our Saviour standing with a book in his hand, and on the reverse a full-length portrait of Roger

dressed in a *Dalmatica*, the robe of a deacon. This is intended, most probably, to show his dignity of legate *a latere* of the Pope in Sicily. At the end of the writ is an autograph signature of the Norman leader in Greek letters.

There is to be found, likewise, an act of Baldwin the Sixth, king of Jerusalem, dated *anno* 1181, which grants free navigation to the ships of the monastery in the waters of Syria.

There is an act which speaks of the *morgengabe*, or morning-gift which the bridegroom gave to the bride the morning after their marriage. A law of King Luitprand expressly establishes that the *morgengabe* is in no case to exceed the fourth part of the donor's property! A verdict of the year 844 condemns a certain Theodelgard to pay the sum of nine hundred pence, in reparation of her injured honor, to a maiden of free condition. Upon Theodelgard's declaring himself unable to advance the sum, the act mentions that the judge *seized him by the hair*, and handed him over to the offended party as security for its payment. An act of 1053 gives the exact measure of the foot used by the Lombards; and another, in which Nicholas, Count of the Principate, grants extensive lands to the abbey *per fustem*, is attached to a small wooden roll, which bears the inscription, *Nicolaus Comes P. R. C.* A privilege granted by Pope Alexander the Fourth deserves attention for the title which he takes, of Supreme Lord of Sicily.

In a bull of Urban the Second, issued at the time he consecrated the church of the Blessed Trinity, the Pope confirms, in virtue of the same authority, and at the *humble request* of Roger, the privileges granted by this prince to the monastery. We may remark, in passing, that among these privileges there is the singular faculty by force of which the religious could save from death any person condemned by the secular power. We may be permitted to express a thought which passed before our minds in recording it, — what interesting use might be made of this privilege in works of fiction, the scene of which lay in the Middle Ages!

The bulls published by different Popes, and preserved at La Cava, amount to five hundred and sixty. An exposition of their contents would certainly be interesting, but few of them remain unpublished. The few we inspected contained grants of jurisdictional power to the monastery, chiefly by Urban the Second, Paschal the Second, Alexander the Third, and Gregory the Fourteenth.

The convent library is not remarkable for the number of its

books, but it has a magnificent collection of manuscripts and rare editions. The manuscripts, of which there are more than sixty, from the seventh down to the fourteenth century, are in different respects highly valuable. We will mention, —

1. The book of Bede on the history of Italy from the ninth to the tenth century, the margins of which are covered with interesting notes, written from year to year by contemporary witnesses. These valuable notes have been published by Muratori, in his great collection of Italian writers, but unfortunately with not much accuracy.

2. Two manuscripts of the fourteenth century, elegantly written and beautifully illuminated.

3. We have purposely reserved for the last two of those delightful rarities which the learned traveller must not expect to meet with more than once at every six hundred miles, and over which he gloats with the eagerness of a worldly-minded gourmand who has a favorite dish, not seen for a considerable time, placed unexpectedly before him. One is a Latin Bible of the seventh century, so exquisitely written and so entirely preserved, that it cannot be viewed without amazement, considering its antiquity. Its neat and regular pages present five different kinds of writing. In the capitals the uncial characters predominate, and in the text the small Roman letters, amongst which last there is an occasional resemblance to the ancient Lombard. This precious manuscript contains all the books of the Old and New Testament, but they are arranged differently from the usual order. The Psalms, of which there is one more than elsewhere, present several variations, which are found, also, in the Old Italic version, circumstances that prove the antiquity of the manuscript.*

* We will add to this description the remarks of Dr. Wiseman upon this celebrated manuscript, which have been pointed out to us since this was written. We copy from the first of his *Two Letters on some Parts of the Controversy concerning 1 John v. 7*.

“The first document to which I beg the attention of critics is the beautiful manuscript of the Vulgate preserved in the venerable Benedictine abbey of La Cava, situated between Naples and Salerno. . . . When visiting that part of Italy some years ago, I turned aside to the monastery, chiefly for the purpose of inspecting it. I have, however, found still more favorable opportunity to study its text. For the indefatigable librarian of the Vatican, Monsignor (now Cardinal) Mai, considered this manuscript of sufficient value to deserve an exact transcription. This was ordered by Pope Leo XII., and in the course of last summer (1834) the last sheets were deposited in the Vatican library by Father Rossi, the archivist of La Cava. It will be difficult at a distance to esti-

The second rare manuscript alluded to is a Lombard code of the tenth century. It is the most ancient collection of Lombard laws in existence, and teems with the most precious items of information. This manuscript, in 1642, furnished Camillo Pellegrini with six treatises, which he has published in the *History of the Lombard Princes*. Mabillon, the historian Giannone, Pratilli, and the Abbé de Razan, and, still more recently, Carlo Troja, consulted it with success on several important points. When the writer of the present article visited La Cava, in 1846, Father de Cornè, then director of the archives, was engaged in the laborious task of illustrating this important remnant of the Middle Ages with explanatory, historical, and philological notes, and was in hopes to be able to publish it in due time, with his copious and erudite commentary.

What distinguishes the library of La Cava is a collection of more than six hundred volumes of the earliest editions issued after the invention of the art of printing. We will mention in particular a book beautifully printed at Mayence in 1467 ; the well-known Bible of Hailbronn of 1476 ; the first editions of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Eusebius ; and the first edition of the golden little treatise *De Imitatione Christi*. Moreover, St. Augustine *De Civitate Dei*, printed by the Benedictines of Subiaco (if we remember well) in 1465, the first book ever printed in Italy. There is also a Juvenal of 1478 ; a Tibullus

mate the labor and trouble with which this transcript has been effected. It contains the Old and New Testaments, copied line for line, and word for word, with an exact imitation of the painted and ornamental parts. The original manuscript is written on a beautiful vellum, in large quarto ; each page, like the celebrated Vatican (1209), contains three columns. There is no division between the words except by an occasional point. The character is exceedingly minute ; the initial letters of paragraphs are somewhat larger and stand out of the lines ; the marginal notes are written so small as to require a good lens in order to decipher them. A very detailed description has, however, been published by the Abbé Razan, who has carefully collected all those characteristics which can have weight in deciding its age. I will give the result of his investigation." The Abbé winds up, rather unexpectedly, by concluding that the manuscript is *only* a thousand years old, agreeing with Cardinal Mai in attributing it at least to the seventh century.

The marginal notes refer to the errors of the day. For example, opposite the famous text of John v. 7, the comment says, "*Audiat hoc Arius et ceteri.*" Were a monk of our days commenting on the Holy Bible in the same convent, on the same stool, near the same altar, he would probably write, in the same spirit, opposite some other text, "*Audiat hoc Fourier, Pusey, Ronge, et alii.*"

of 1488 ; and, finally, Boccaccio's book *De Genealogia Deorum*, printed for the first time at Reggio, an edition of the rarest value.

The library of La Cava likewise possesses four hundred impressions in the black letter. In running over these works, an idea can be had of the variations undergone by that Gothic character, so pertinaciously adhered to for a long time, then all but universally abandoned. The Germans are the only people who have preserved an alphabet somewhat similar to the old-fashioned calligraphy. Fortunate for them, had they adhered with equal fidelity to far more important institutions venerated by their Catholic ancestors, and not permitted the unfrocked Augustinian of Wittenberg to make use of the honest, though somewhat unwieldy, gear of their ideas to dizen out a new gospel for mankind !

In examining the earliest productions of the press, the curious are often surprised, while turning over the leaves of books, the strong white paper of which, the even, neat, and clear type, is scarcely equalled by the best specimens of our own times, after all the myriad inventions and improvements of three centuries.

We have only to mention a few of the most beautiful paintings which adorn the quarters occupied by the abbot, and then bid adieu to La Cava.

We will do it briefly, mentioning, —

1. A *Sacra Famiglia* on wood, attributed to Raphael, and at least one of the finest productions of that school of smiles and sunbeams.

2. Two paintings by Pietro Perugino ; viz. *The Adoration of the Magi* and *The Resurrection of our Saviour*.

3. An *Assumption* by Andrea Sabatini of Salerno, a scholar of Raphael.

4. *Judith*, by Hundorst, better known as Gherardo delle Notti. According to the well-known style of this master, the whole scene is artificially illuminated from one point, and the effect produced is strikingly allied to reality.

5. *Jacob*, disguised as Esau, receiving the blessing of his aged father, by the same artist.

6. *The Burial of our Saviour*. The author is Jacopo da Ponte, commonly called Il Bassano.

7. *St. Jerome*, by Mattias, a Calabrian priest. There is in the convent a *St. Augustine*, by the same author, which we did not see, but it was represented to us as possessing great merit.

8. All these are admirable, more or less, for their particular perfections. But the writer will never forget the ecstasy of surprise and emotion with which he stood for a considerable time contemplating a *Mater Dolorosa*, by that gentle and feeling master, Carlino Dolce. The artist must have been possessed by a poetical desire to produce, living and breathing, the heavenly vision which existed in his imagination, and he has been half successful. In the features of the Blessed Mother there is a radiance of celestial beauty, tempered and *spiritualized* by noble, unaffected modesty, that is truly inimitable. The delicate form seems to stand out from the canvas, and the beautiful hands, which she holds joined before her breast, are of such astonishing perfection, that the more they are examined, the more you are inclined to believe them real and not painted. The composition and finish of the drapery leave nothing to be desired.

But these are the minor beauties of the painting. The artist has contrived to give such a settled expression of resigned yet deep grief to the heavenly features of the bereaved Mother, to the eyes, to the mouth, and breast heaving with a long-drawn sigh which relieves not the heart, that the beholder inevitably feels the influence of sorrow in his own breast. For our own part, we could not help remembering the words, "*O vos omnes qui transitis per viam, attendite et videte si est dolor sicut dolor meus,*" which the Church applies to the Blessed Virgin, bereaved of her divine Son by our sins. We lifted up our hearts to the Mother of Jesus with the appeal of the Litany, — "*Regina Martyrum, ora pro nobis.*"

9. Another piece, the healthy and natural cast of which is very remarkable, is a *Judgment of St. Benedict*. It is by Albert Durer. A youthful monk, guilty of some flagrant transgression of the rules, is brought before the saint by another monk who stands as his accuser. St. Benedict is seated. His mild and charitable look is that of a man in whom paternal authority is directed by wisdom and virtue. Before him stands the young man, whose pale, unsettled features, downcast look, and timid attitude belie the exculpation which he attempts to deliver. By his side is another monk, of maturer years, whose hard and sunburnt countenance, though bearing the expression of severity, still make you believe him to act only from an honest sense of duty, while with pointing finger he shows the companion whose fault he is repeating to their superior. The last figure is that of a monk whose salient forehead, and eyes

vaguely turned towards the culprit, are a fine portrait of unconcerned curiosity, and contrast with the earnestness of the others. The distribution of light, the simplicity of composition, the nature and truthfulness of the parts, and, above all, the masterly execution of the heads, do immortal honor to the Nuremberg artist.

This is a brief notice of the celebrated *Monasterium Cavense*, written partly from our own recollections, but mostly taken from a description of it printed by Father Guillaume de Corne, of whom we made honorable mention in another place, and the title of whose pamphlet we have placed at the head of this article. To this gentleman, who is distinguished at once by the characteristic courtesy of the Benedictines and the learning which is hereditary in his Order, we acknowledge ourselves doubly indebted for his oral and written illustrations of the treasures of the abbey.

The monastery has been visited from time to time by several of the crowned heads and princes of Europe, and by nearly every *savant* who travelled as far as Pompeii; and amongst a vast number of celebrated names which we saw in a blank book on the library table, we remember to have observed that of Cardinal Mai, and the well-known handwriting of *Sir Walter Scott of Abbotsford*.

The hardy monk of St. Bernard built his hermitage in the marshy valley, which was afterwards rendered a garden by his toil and industry. The unassuming Franciscan devotes his life to the religious instruction of the poor, in hamlets and villages spread over the country. The affable Jesuit consecrates his energy and learning to the training up of the youth in populous cities, where they are exposed to the perverse influence of a world refined in wickedness. But the erudite Benedictine is to be found in his cell, on the brow of some rugged mountain, enriching with comments the page of an early Father, pruning the redundancy of annals penned centuries ago by some less keen-sighted brother, or putting the heresies of the day to blush by bringing to bear upon them the steady light of Scriptural and traditionary evidence. So the varied usefulness of the different Orders is expressed in an old distich:—

“Bernardus valles, montes Benedictus amabat,
Franciscus pagos, magnas Ignatius urbes.”

We have endeavoured to relieve the seriousness of more weighty disquisitions by giving in this lighter article a sample

of what a section of one religious Order has done for religion, science, and civilization. A work has been issued lately in Italy by Father Tosti, descriptive of the abbey of Monte Cassino, containing its history to the present time, an account of the treasures it contains, and a collection of notes and documents of great value ; thus showing what another section of the same Order did for the same cause. Who is ignorant of the Herculean labors of the Maurine Congregation of St. Benedict, and of their admirable fruits ? Nevertheless, those who are in the habit of profiting by the works of the learned and holy monks will still cry out that they were an idle encumbrance to society ! Of such men and their advisers we will say no more, but hope better at least from you, good reader, concluding in the words with which the religious writer of the second little work whose title is prefixed to this article concludes his Preface :—“ *Hæc, benevole lector, quovis partium studio amoto lubens accipe, teque omnibus precibus obtestamur, ut divi Benedicti sobolem vetusto amore prosequareis.*”

ART. IV. — *The Apocryphal Books of the Old Testament proved to be Corrupt Additions to the Word of God. — The Arguments of Romanists from the Infallibility of the Church and the Testimonies of the Fathers in Behalf of the Apocrypha discussed and refuted.* By JAMES H. THORNWELL. New York : Leavitt, Trow, & Co. Boston : Charles Tappan. 1845. 16mo. pp. 417.

SOMETIME in 1841, Mr. Thornwell, a Presbyterian minister, and “ Professor of Sacred Literature and the Evidences of Christianity in the South Carolina College,” published, anonymously, in a Baltimore journal, a brief essay against the divine inspiration of those books of the Old Testament which Protestants exclude from the canon of Scripture. To this essay, as subsequently reprinted with the author’s name, the Rev. Dr. Lynch, of Charleston, S. C., replied, in a series of letters addressed to Mr. Thornwell, through the columns of *The Catholic Miscellany*. The volume before us is Mr. Thornwell’s rejoinder to Dr. Lynch, and contains, in an Appendix, the original essay, and the substance of Dr. Lynch’s reply to it. The rejoinder consists of twenty-nine letters,

which cover nearly the whole ground of controversy between Catholics and Protestants, and, though written in a Presbyterian spirit, they are respectable for ability and learning. The work, though nothing surprising, is, upon the whole, above the general average of publications of its class.

The purpose of the essay was to "assert and endeavour to prove that *Tobit, Judith, the additions to the Book of Esther, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, Baruch, with the Epistle of Jeremiah, the Song of the Three Children, the Story of Susannah, the Story of Bel and the Dragon, and the First and Second Books of Maccabees* are neither sacred nor canonical, and of course of no more authority in the Church of God than Seneca's Letters or Tully's Offices." (pp. 339, 340.) In the present work, the author attempts to maintain the same thesis, and to refute the objections urged by Dr. Lynch against it. He professes on his very title-page to have *proved* the books enumerated "to be corrupt additions to the word of God," and to have discussed and *refuted* "the arguments of Romanists from the infallibility of the Church and the testimonies of the Fathers in their behalf." The question very naturally arises, Has he done this? Has he proved that these books are uninspired, as he must have done, if he has proved them to be corrupt additions to the word of God; and has he refuted the arguments of Catholics, or rather of Dr. Lynch, in their behalf?

The arguments which Dr. Lynch adduces for these books are drawn from the infallibility of the Church and the testimony of the Fathers. If the Church is infallible, the testimony of the Fathers is of subordinate importance, for the infallibility alone suffices for the faithful; if the Church is not infallible, it is of still less consequence what the Fathers testify; for then all faith is out of the question, both for Catholics and all others. We may, therefore, waive all consideration, for the present, of the argument for the deuterocanonical books drawn from the testimony of the Fathers, and confine ourselves to that drawn from the infallibility of the Church. The argument from infallibility must, of course, be refuted, before the author can claim to have refuted Dr. Lynch, or to have proved his general thesis, that the books in question are "corrupt additions to the word of God."

The Catholic Church, undeniably, includes these books in her canon of Scripture, and commands her children to receive them as the word of God. This is certain, and the author concedes it; for he adduces it as a proof of her "intolerable

arrogance." If she is infallible in declaring the word of God, as all Catholics hold, these books are certainly inspired Scripture, and rightfully placed in the canon. This is the argument from infallibility; and it is evident to every one who understands what it is to refute an argument that it can be refuted only by disproving the infallibility, or, what is the same thing, proving the fallibility, of the Church. To prove the Church fallible, moreover, it is not enough to refute the arguments by which Catholics are accustomed to prove her infallibility; for a doctrine may be true, and yet the arguments adduced in proof of it be unsound and inconclusive. It will, therefore, avail the author but little to refute our arguments for the infallibility, unless he refutes the infallibility itself; for so long as he is unable to say positively that the Church is fallible, he is unable to refute the argument *from* her infallibility. It may still be true that she is infallible, and if she is, the books are not uninspired compositions, but infallibly the word of God.

Mr. Thornwell, who regards himself as an able and sound logician, appears to have some consciousness of this, and indeed to concede it. Accordingly, he devotes a third of his whole volume to disproving the infallibility of the Church, or rather, to proving her fallibility. "I have insisted," he says in his Preface, "largely on the dogma of infallibility, — more largely, perhaps, than my readers may think consistent with the general design of my performance, — because I regard this as the prop and bulwark of all the abominations of the Papacy." (p. 8.)

But to prove the fallibility of the Church, or to disprove her infallibility, is a grave undertaking, and attended with serious difficulties. The Church cannot be tried except by some standard, and it is idle to attempt to convict her on a fallible authority. If the conviction is obtained on a fallible authority, the conviction itself is fallible, and it, instead of the Church, may be the party in the wrong. The Professor cannot take a single step, cannot even open his case, unless he has an infallible tribunal before which to summon the Church, — some infallible standard by which to test her infallibility or fallibility. But before what infallible tribunal can he cite her? What infallible authority has he on which he can demand her conviction?

The only possible way in which the fallibility of the Church can be proved is by convicting her of having actually erred on some point on which she claims to be infallible. But it is evident, that, in order to be able to convict her of having erred

on a given point, we must be able to say infallibly what is truth or error on that point. Clearly, then, the Professor cannot commence his action, much less gain it, unless he has an authority which pronounces infallibly on the points on which he seeks to convict her of having actually erred. But what authority has he? Unhappily, he does not inform us, and does not appear to have recognized the necessity on his part of having any authority. He sets forth, formally, no authority, designates no court, specifies no law, lays down no principles. This is a serious inconvenience, and affects both his legal and his logical attainments. His argument, let him do his best, must be *minus* its major proposition; and from the minor alone we have always understood that it is impossible to conclude any thing.

Mr. Thornwell denies the infallibility of the Church, and he recognizes no infallible authority in any one of the sects, including even his own. He has, then, no authority which he can allege, but the authority of reason, and his own private judgment. His own private judgment is of no weight, and cannot be adduced in a public discussion. The authority of reason we acknowledge to be infallible in her own province; but her province is restricted to the natural order, and she has no jurisdiction in the supernatural order, to which the Church professes to belong. The Church has the right to be tried by her peers. Reason is not, and cannot be, the peer of the supernatural, and is totally unable, in so far as the Church lies within the supernatural order, to pronounce any judgment concerning her infallibility one way or the other.

Reason, undoubtedly, knows that God is, and that he can neither deceive nor be deceived. It knows, therefore, if he appoints the Church, commissions her, as his organ, to declare his word, that she must declare it infallibly; for then it is he himself that declares in her declaration, and if she could either deceive or be deceived, he himself could either deceive or be deceived. If, then, reason finds sufficient or satisfactory grounds for believing that God has appointed or instituted the Church to declare his word, to teach all nations to observe all things whatsoever he has revealed, it pronounces her infallible, and acknowledges its obligation to receive, without any questioning, whatever she teaches.

Reason, again, knows that God cannot be in contradiction with himself, and therefore, since both the natural order and the supernatural are from him, that he cannot establish princi-

ples in the one repugnant to those established in the other. On the authority of reason, then, we may always assert that he cannot teach one thing in the natural order and its contradictory in the supernatural order. If, then, it be clearly established, that the Church, on matters on which she claims to teach infallibly, teaches what is in contradiction either to the supernatural or the natural order, it is certain that she is fallible. But as reason cannot go out of the order of nature, we can on its authority establish the fallibility of the Church only on the condition of convicting her of having actually contradicted some law or principle of the natural order. If the Church, in other words, contradict reason, reason is competent to conclude against her, but not when she merely transcends reason; for what is *above* reason may be true, but what is *against* reason cannot be.

It follows from this that the authority of reason in the case before us is purely negative, and that the Professor can conclude from it against the Church only on condition that he proves that she actually contradicts it. But it is necessary even here to bear in mind that the natural can no more contradict the supernatural than the supernatural the natural. When the motives of credibility have convinced reason that the Church teaches by supernatural authority, her teaching is as authoritative as any principle of reason itself, and may be cited to prove that what is alleged against her as a principle of reason is not a principle of reason, with no less force than the alleged principle itself can be cited to prove that she contradicts reason. The Professor must, then, in order to prove her fallibility, adduce a case, not of apparent contradiction, but of real contradiction, — a case in which what she teaches must evidently contradict an evident principle of reason, — so evident that it is clear that to deny it would be to deny reason itself.

The position, then, which the Professor must take and maintain, in order to establish his thesis, is, that *the Church, in her teaching on matters on which she claims to teach infallibly, has taught or teaches what contradicts an evident and undeniable principle of reason.* This he must do before he can prove the fallibility of the Church, and he must prove the fallibility of the Church before he can refute the argument drawn from it for the books enumerated. Has he proved this? Unhappily, he does not appear to have understood that this was at all necessary, or to have suspected that it was only by proving the Church to be against reason that he could conclude her falli-

bility. He does not appear to have known that there are and can be no questions debatable between Catholics and Protestants but such as pertain exclusively to the province of reason. He labors under the hallucination, that he has something besides the reason common to all men which he may oppose to us, that he has the revelation of Almighty God, and that he is at liberty to attempt to convict the Church, not on reason alone, but also on the word of God. This would be ridiculous, if the matter were not so grave as to make it deplorable. He has no word of God to cite against us, and if he cites the Holy Scriptures at all, he must cite them either in the sense of the Church, or as simple historical documents ; because it is only in the sense of the Church that we acknowledge them to be inspired. We can cite them as inspired Scripture against him, as an *argumentum ad hominem* ; for he holds them to be inspired Scripture as interpreted by private judgment. But he cannot against us ; for the argument would not be *ad hominem*, unless cited in the sense of the Church, since it is only in that sense, that, on our own principles, they are the word of God.

The fact is, Mr. Thornwell from first to last forgets in his argument that we are as far from admitting his authority as he is from admitting ours. He writes under the impression, that he has the true Christian doctrine, and is invested with ample authority to define what is, and what is not, the word of God. He assumes his Presbyterianism to be true, and when he has proved that Catholicity contradicts it, he concludes at once that Catholicity is false. But Presbyterianism is only his private judgment, and therefore of no authority. By what right does he erect his private judgment into a criterion of truth and falsehood, assume that it is infallible, and proceed to pronounce *ex cathedra* on the revealed word of God ? We cannot recognize his authority as sovereign pontiff, unless he brings us credentials from heaven, duly signed and witnessed. His assumption we cannot admit. He is confessedly fallible, and his decisions we cannot even entertain. He does not come to us duly commissioned by Almighty God to teach us his word ; he is simply a man, with no authority in the premises which may not be claimed and exercised by every other man as well as by himself. In an argument with Catholics he can be only a man, and is at liberty to adopt no line of argument that would not be equally proper in the case of a pagan, Mahometan, or any other infidel.

Protestant controversialists are exceedingly prone to forget this. They assume that they have the word of God, that they know and believe what God has revealed, and that they have in their opinions a standard by which to try the Church. Yet they claim to be reasoners, and tell us that we have surrendered our reason ! But whether the Church be or be not commissioned to declare the word of God, it is certain that they are not. Certain is it, that, if she is not authorized to declare it, no one else is ; and equally certain is it, that no one not so authorized has any right to adduce in an argument any thing he takes to be the word of God, save by the sufferance or consent of his opponents. It is a grave mistake to suppose that there is any other common ground between us and our adversaries than that of reason. It will not do for our adversaries to suppose, that, because we hold to the inspiration of the Scriptures, they may allege them in their own sense against us ; for we admit their inspiration only on the authority, and in *the sense*, of the Church. On her authority, and in the sense in which she defines their doctrines, we hold them to be the word of God ; but in no other sense, and on no other ground. Independently of her authority and interpretations, there are no inspired Scriptures for us. This fact must never be lost sight of, and it would save Protestants an immense deal of labor, if they would keep it in mind, and govern themselves accordingly. If they cite the Bible against us, on any authority or in any sense but that of the Church, it is not for us the word of God, but simply their private opinion, by which we are not and cannot be bound. Among ourselves, who admit the authority of the Church, and therefore the inspiration of the Scriptures, it is lawful, on a point on which the actual teaching of the Church is matter of inquiry, to appeal to the written word, as also to the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, and the analogies of faith ; but it is never lawful for those out of the Church, denying her authority, to make a like appeal against us ; for the *authority* to which we appeal is resolvable into the authority of the Church, which they deny.

The rule we here insist upon is that of common sense and common justice, and rests for its authority on the principle, that no man has the right to assume in his argument the point that is in question. We ourselves cite the Scriptures against our adversaries, but always either *ad hominem*, — because they, though we do not, admit their inspiration independently of the authority of the Church, — or as simple historical documents,

whose authenticity and authority as such documents, but not as inspired writings, reason is competent to determine. But we never assume our Church and her definitions as the authority on which to convict those without of error ; for to do so would be a sheer begging of the question. Undoubtedly, if our Church is right, all her adversaries are wrong. It needs no argument to prove that. We, therefore, take our stand in the argument, either on what our adversaries concede, or on the common reason of mankind, and attempt to prove from the one or the other, or both, that every one is bound to believe and obey the Church. Protestants must not expect us to allow them more than we claim for ourselves. They may need more in order to make out their case ; but we are not aware that they have any right to special privileges, or to exemption from the common obligations of reason and justice. As there are no concessions of ours which can avail them, they must in their controversies with us take their stand on the reason common to all men, and, since common to all, alike theirs and ours. They must bring their action at common law, not on a special statute. Then they must restrict themselves to those questions which come within the jurisdiction of reason, and which she is competent to decide without appeal. Then they must waive all questions which pertain to the subject-matter of revelation ; for these all undeniably lie in the supernatural order, and therefore without the province of reason.

We frankly concede that Mr. Thornwell has proved that Catholicity is not Presbyterianism, and that, if Presbyterianism is the revelation of God, Catholicity is not. But this amounts to nothing ; Presbyterianism is neither proved nor conceded to be Christianity. He cannot, therefore, assume it against us. We concede him not one inch of Christian ground on which to set his foot. We demur to every argument he adduces or attempts to adduce from the convictions or prejudices of his sect, or from his own conceptions of the word of God. We listen to no arguments, we entertain no objections, we plead to no charges, not drawn from the common reason of mankind. We must, therefore, beg him to descend from his tripod, and meet us as a man with no authority but that which belongs to the reason of every man.

We must, in view of this state of the case, eliminate from Mr. Thornwell's arguments against infallibility, as not to be entertained, all that he urges on the authority of his own religious convictions or prejudices, and confine ourselves simply

to what he adduces on the simple authority of reason. These last, all that is legitimately adduced, consist of an attempted refutation of Dr. Lynch's argument for the infallibility of the Church, and certain philosophical, historical, and moral objections alleged against the Church.

We might well pass over Mr. Thornwell's attempt to refute Dr. Lynch's argument for infallibility, because, if successful, it would accomplish nothing to his purpose. The argument he has to refute is the argument *from* the infallibility of the Church, not the argument *for* it; for the question is not on believing that infallibility, but on denying it. It may, as we have said, be true, and yet the arguments by which we attempt to prove it be unsound and inconclusive. The defect of proof is a good reason for not believing, but it is not always an adequate reason for denying. The thesis the Professor seeks to maintain requires him to deny the infallibility of the Church, or to assert her fallibility, and therefore the burden of proof devolves on him. He asserts that the disputed books are corrupt additions to the word of God, which he cannot possibly prove without disproving the infallibility of the Church, which declares them to be inspired Scripture. But he claims to have won a victory over Dr. Lynch, and his friends have bound the laurel around his brows. We are, therefore, disposed to subject his claim to a slight examination, and to inquire if his shouts have not been a little premature, and if, after all, the victory does not remain with his opponent. If he has succeeded, he has gained nothing for his thesis; but if he has failed, we can conclude against it at once, at least so far as he is concerned.

Mr. Thornwell states Dr. Lynch's general argument for the disputed books to be, —

“Whatever the pastors of the Church of Rome declare to be true must be infallibly certain :

“That the Apocrypha [the books enumerated] were inspired, the pastors of the Church of Rome declare to be true :

“Therefore it must be infallibly certain.”

This is stated in Mr. Thornwell's language, not in Dr. Lynch's, and is by no means so well expressed as it might be; but let that pass. Substituting the names of the books alleged by Mr. Thornwell to be corrupt additions to the word of God for the term *Apocrypha*, we are willing to accept it. To this argument, which he has shaped to suit the objections he wishes to bring against it, Mr. Thornwell's first objection is, that it is “vitiated by the ambiguity of the middle.” The words,

“pastors of the Church,” may be understood either universally, particularly, or distributively, — to mean the whole body of the pastors, some of them, and every one individually.

Ambiguity of the middle is where the words are taken in one sense in the major, and in another sense in the minor ; but where they are taken in the same sense in both the premises, although in themselves susceptible of several meanings, there is no ambiguity of the middle. In the argument as stated, the words, *pastors*, &c., are, in themselves considered, susceptible of the senses alleged, but as used in the argument they are tied down to one sense. The rule of construction is, to understand all words used in a general or universal sense, unless there be some reason, expressed or implied, in the context or the nature of the subject, for not doing so. There is, in the present case, no such reason in either premise, and therefore we must take the words generally, or universally, in both, — for the whole body of pastors. If so, there is no ambiguity of the middle.

But Mr. Thornwell asserts that Dr. Lynch does use the words in the three different senses mentioned. He accuses him of meaning by them, at one time, the whole body of pastors *collected or assembled* in council, at another time, *a part* only, and finally, *every one* individually ; and alleges as proof, the fact, that in his Letter he predicates infallibility, 1. of the whole body of pastors in their collective capacity, 2. of the Council of Trent, in which only a part were personally assembled, and 3. of each single teacher or missionary.

1. That Dr. Lynch, when he predicates infallibility of the body of pastors in their collective capacity, means the whole body, takes the words, *pastors*, &c., universally, is conceded, but that he means the whole body *assembled in council* we deny. He speaks of them as a body of individuals in their *collective* capacity, not as a collected or congregated body ; and that he does not mean the body of pastors assembled in council is evident from the fact, that he contends that the pastors of the Church had decided the question of the inspiration of the books in dispute long before the Council of Trent, since, to do so, they did not need to assemble in a general council. Thus he says expressly, — “ The doctrines of the Catholic Church can be known from the universal and concordant teaching of her pastors, even when her bishops have not assembled in a general council and embodied those doctrines in a list of decrees.” (pp. 370, 371.) It is evident, then, that Dr. Lynch holds

the pastors of the Church to be a body of individuals, to have a collective capacity, and the faculty of teaching infallibly in that capacity, even when not congregated. If Mr. Thornwell had recognized a difference between *collective* and *collected*, or congregated, he would easily have surmounted this part of his difficulty, without any foreign aid.

2. The acts of the Holy Council of Trent, touching faith and morals, Dr. Lynch unquestionably holds to be infallible, not because he predicates infallibility of a part of the body of pastors, but because they were the acts of the whole Church represented in it, or at least made so by subsequent adoption, as is evident enough from his language. The proof, therefore, that he takes the words in a partitive sense, is inadequate.

3. That each single pastor teaches infallibly in his *collective capacity*, as "member" of the body of pastors, is conceded, but that he does so individually or in his individual capacity is denied; for in his individual capacity he cannot teach at all. Dr. Lynch speaks of his teaching infallibly only in his capacity as member of the body. As member of the body, the only sense in which he is a teacher at all, he participates of its infallibility, and teaches by its authority, and infallibly, not because he is individually infallible, but because it is infallible. Consequently, in representing the single teacher as teaching infallibly, Dr. Lynch does not use the words *pastors*, &c., in a distributive sense.

Mr. Thornwell is unfortunate in his proofs, notwithstanding he had shaped his statement of the argument with special reference to them. He fails to substantiate his objection of "ambiguity of the middle," and consequently all that he says, which is founded on it, falls to the ground. The beautiful argument he had constructed to prove that a Catholic can never know when and where to find the infallible authority, on which he had expended so much labor, and lavished so many rare ornaments, falls to pieces through default of a foundation. Decidedly, it is an inconvenience to build without any thing to build with or to build on. It is worse than being compelled to make bricks without straw.

Mr. Thornwell, after his objection to the form of the argument, proceeds to deny and to refute its major, namely, the infallibility of the Church. His first effort is to refute Dr. Lynch's argument for it. Dr. Lynch contends that "we cannot be called on to believe any proposition without adequate proof"; that, "when Almighty God deigned to inspire the

works contained in the Holy Scriptures, he intended they should be believed to be inspired"; and that "therefore there *does* exist some adequate proof." Thus far all is evident enough, and the Professor brings no objection to what is alleged. We may assume it, then, as conceded, that there *does* exist some adequate proof of their inspiration, that is to say, some authority competent to declare the fact. What is it? "It must be," says Dr. Lynch, "a body of individuals to whom, in their collective capacity, God has given authority to make an unerring decision on the subject." It must be such a body, because it can be nothing else. This body is composed of the pastors of the Catholic Church. Therefore the pastors of the Catholic Church have authority to make an unerring decision, that is, have infallible authority to declare the word of God.

Mr. Thornwell does not deny, that, if such a body exists, it is the pastors of the Roman Catholic Church. On this point he raises no question, and we may regard him as conceding it. He denies the necessity of any such body as Dr. Lynch asserts. He objects, first, to the form of the argument by which Dr. Lynch undertakes to prove it. The argument, he says, sins by an imperfect enumeration of particulars. It is a destructive disjunctive conditional, which must contain in the major all the suppositions which can be conceived to be true, and in the minor destroy all but one. But Dr. Lynch has not included all such suppositions in his major, and therefore, conceding that he has destroyed in the minor all he has enumerated save one, he is not entitled to his conclusion. Dr. Lynch has enumerated four methods:—1. Every individual, on the strength of his own private examination, is to decide for himself,—private judgment; 2. Every individual is to receive books as inspired, or reject them as uninspired, according to the decisions of such persons as he judges qualified by their erudition and sound judgment to determine the question,—the judgment of the learned; 3. We must take the inspiration of Scripture from some individual whom God has commissioned to announce this fact to the world; or 4. From a body of individuals to whom, in their collective capacity, God has given authority to make an unerring decision on the subject. But a *fifth* supposition is possible, says the Professor, namely, "God himself by his Eternal Spirit may condescend to be the teacher of men, and enlighten their understandings to perceive in the Scriptures themselves infallible marks of their inspira-

tion." This supposition Dr. Lynch has "entirely overlooked," "strangely suppressed," and therefore cannot even by destroying the first three suppositions conclude the fourth.

But Dr. Lynch has not "entirely overlooked," "strangely suppressed," this fifth supposition, but expressly mentions it, and gives his reasons for not including it in the number of supposable methods. Mr. Thornwell has generously furnished us the evidence of this. After enumerating the four methods stated, Dr. Lynch says (Appendix, p. 359):—"I might perhaps add a *fifth* method; that each one be informed what books are inspired by his *private spirit*. But I omit it, as, were it true, it would be superfluous, if not a criminal intrusion on the province God would have reserved to himself, to attempt to prove or disprove, when our duty would be simply to await in patience the revelation to each particular individual. You are not a member of the Society of Friends, and your essay is not an *exposé* of the teachings of your private spirit, but an effort to appeal to argument." With this passage before his eyes, we cannot understand how the Presbyterian minister could assert that Dr. Lynch entirely overlooked this fifth method, for undeniably the Catholic Doctor means by the private spirit precisely the same thing the Presbyterian does by God condescending to teach men by his Eternal Spirit. Moreover, the reasons assigned by Dr. Lynch for not including it in the list of supposable methods are conclusive, at least till answered. These reasons are two:—1. That, if assumed, all argument would be foreclosed, either as superfluous or as criminal; and 2. Mr. Thornwell evidently rejects it, because he appeals to argument, and therefore against him it cannot be necessary to include it. These are solid reasons, and Mr. Thornwell should have met them before accusing Dr. Lynch of having entirely overlooked the method of interior illumination, and especially before insisting upon its being supposable.

Mr. Thornwell is apparently disposed to maintain that this fifth method is the one actually adopted, but this he is not at liberty to do. The method is private, not public, and cannot be appealed to in a public debate. In a public debate, the appeal must always be to a public authority, that is, to an authority common to both parties. If the authority to which the appeal is to be made is private, there can be no public debate; if private, interior, immediate, as must be the teachings of the spirit, there can be no argument. Argument in such case would be superfluous and even criminal. When, therefore, a

man resorts, on a given question, to argument, and to public argument, he necessarily assumes that the authority which is to determine the question is public, and denies it to be private. Mr. Thornwell in his essay made his appeal to argument, and wrote his essay to prove that the question he raised is to be settled, not by the private spirit, but by public facts, arguments, and authority. He therefore cannot fall back on the private spirit. Having elected public authority, he must abide by it. If he cannot now fall back on the private spirit, he cannot allege it as a supposable method ; and if he cannot so allege it, he cannot accuse Dr. Lynch's argument of sinning by an imperfect enumeration of particulars, because it omits it.

Mr. Thornwell, furthermore, is very much affected by Dr. Lynch's supposed temerity in restricting the number of supposable methods to the four enumerated. He grows very eloquent, and manifests no little pious horror at what he calls an effort to set bounds to Omnipotence. All this is very well, but he himself excludes the method of private teaching, by writing his book to prove, on other grounds, that the books in question are uninspired, and he does not even attempt to suggest an additional method. Nobody, unless it be himself, seeks to limit Omnipotence ; nobody, to our knowledge, denies that Almighty God might have adopted the private method, if he had chosen to do so. The question is not, as is evident from the whole train of Dr. Lynch's reasoning, on abstract possibilities, but on what is or is not possible *in hac providentia*. Nobody pretends that the private spirit is not supposable because it is metaphysically impossible, but it is not supposable because incompatible with other things which we know must be supposed, and which Mr. Thornwell undeniably does suppose.

The alleged *fifth* method not being supposable, unless Mr. Thornwell chooses to condemn himself for attempting to argue the question, and to confess that all his arguments are senseless and absurd, nay, profane and criminal, the objection raised to Dr. Lynch's major falls to the ground ; and as he does not pretend that the conclusion is not logical, he must grant the conclusion or deny the minor. But he cannot grant the conclusion without conceding the infallibility of the Church, which he seeks to disprove. He therefore asserts that " the minor is lame, and can at best yield only a lame and impotent conclusion." The minor is proved only by removing or destroying the first three suppositions. But this is not done ; for the ar-

guments by which Dr. Lynch seeks to do it apply with equal force against the fourth, which he must retain. But the legitimacy of this reply is questionable. One of the four suppositions must be true, for some adequate proof does exist. If the objections adduced are in themselves considered sufficient to remove the three, they cannot be urged against the fourth, for that would prove too much, namely, that there is no adequate proof. If insufficient, they must then be shown to be so on other grounds, or else we can always reply, one supposition is true, and it must be the fourth, because it cannot be one or another of the first three.

We deny the assertion, that the arguments against the three apply with equal force against the fourth. We begin with Dr. Lynch's argument against the first supposition, — that every individual is to decide for himself on the strength of his own examination. This is utterly impossible ; for the bulk of mankind want the ability, the leisure, and the opportunity to acquire the amount of science and erudition necessary to enable them to come to an absolutely certain conclusion on the subject of the inspiration of the Scriptures. This is evident to every one who considers, — 1. The controversies which have obtained respecting the canon ; 2. The nature of the questions to be settled, and what it needs to enable one to decide respecting the fact of the inspiration of ancient books on intrinsic grounds ; 3. That every one is required to believe the truth on the subject, not only after a life of inquiry, and historical and scientific investigation, but from the moment of coming to years of discretion ; and 4. The actual condition of the generality of mankind in relation to science and erudition. These considerations are amply sufficient to disprove the first supposition ; for every one is commanded to believe, and the proof, to be adequate, must be adequate in the case of every one, — of the ignorant slave and rude savage, as well as of the learned and gifted few, — of the boy or girl in whom reason has just dawned, as well as of the scientific veteran or the gray-haired scholar.

The Professor replies : The learning asserted to be necessary, if necessary at all, must be so because the fact of inspiration in general is not determinable without it, and therefore must be as necessary in the body supposed as in the individual deciding for himself. But the body must acquire it either by investigation or by inspiration. If by investigation, it has no advantage over the individual, and whatever proves his inability applies with equal force against its ability. If by in-

spiration, then it must have the same learning to be able to determine the fact of its own inspiration, and the people who are to receive its decision must also have it in order to be able to judge of its inspiration. Hence the Professor sums up triumphantly, — “When you shall condescend to inform me how the Fathers of Trent could decide with infallible certainty upon the Scriptures, without the learning which is necessary, in your view, to understand the evidence, if they themselves were uninspired, or how, if inspired, they could, without this learning, either be certain themselves of the fact, or establish it with infallible certainty to the people, who, without your learning, must judge of the inspiration of the Holy Council, — when, consistently with your principles, you resolve these difficulties, one of the objections to your argument will cease.” (p. 51.)

This is the argument in all its force. Its substance is, whatever difficulties there may be in the way of the method of private judgment, precisely the same difficulties are in the way of the body of individuals supposed, and can no more easily be overcome by it than by the individual himself. This is the common Protestant reply to our objections against the method of private judgment, and is tantamount to saying, that a man has just the same difficulties to overcome in simply declaring what he believes and always has believed as in determining by personal inquiry and examination what he ought to believe; or that it is as easy to ascertain and verify the truth we are ignorant of as it is merely to express with precision the truth we already possess and always have possessed from the first moment of our existence!

But let us examine this famous argument, which, in one form or other, is the great, and virtually the only, argument by which Protestants seek to evade the force of the objections of Catholics to their scheme of proof. Dr. Lynch asserts that a certain amount of science and erudition is necessary to enable an individual, on the strength of his own examination, to come to an absolutely certain decision on the fact of the inspiration of an ancient writing, whose inspiration is determinable, not on extrinsic, but mainly on intrinsic grounds. Then, says the Professor, the same amount is necessary to enable an inspired individual to judge of the evidence of his own inspiration. But this conclusion can follow only from the assumption, that the evidence of inspiration must be the same for the inspired and the uninspired. If you make the evidence mediate in the

uninspired, you must also make it mediate in the inspired ; and if immediate in the inspired, then also immediate in the uninspired. But it is not mediate in the inspired ; for, unquestionably, he who inspires immediately evidences the fact to the one he inspires. How, then, contend for mediate evidence in the uninspired ? Grant this reasoning, and the author condemns himself. The evidence is immediate, and yet he has written a book to settle the question by argument and erudition, both of which are mediate. He has, on this hypothesis, evidently proved nothing ; for he has offered inappropriate evidence, and must be mistaken when he says that he has proved the books enumerated to be “ corrupt additions to the word of God.”

Again ; the Professor asserts, that, if the learning alleged be necessary in the particular case, it is so because the fact of inspiration is determinable in no case without it, that is, that a thing cannot be true in the particular unless it be true in the universal, — as if one should say, some men cannot be black, because all men are not black ; or, some are black, therefore all men are black ! We presume Mr. Thornwell's servant is a black man ; therefore, he himself is a black man. The principle the Professor adopts is, not only that what is true of the *genus* must be true of the *species*, but, also, that what is true of the *species* must be true of the *genus*. Thus, man is an animal ; but a goose is an animal ; therefore, man is a goose ; — or, a goose is an animal ; but man is an animal ; therefore, a goose is a man. But the principle, if adopted, carries us farther yet. It is the denial of all *differentia*, — the fundamental error of Spinozism or pantheism. Thus, under the *genus* substance, God is substance ; but a moss is substance ; therefore, God is a moss, or reverse it, and a moss is God ! Is this a principle to be adopted by a Professor of “ the Evidences of Christianity ” in so respectable an institution as the South Carolina College ? Has the Professor yet to make his philosophy, as well as his theology ?

But, evidently, there is a difference of species ; for the Professor would take it as unkind, nay, uncivil, in us, if, because he comes under the genus animal, as does every man, we should insist on including him in the species *goose*. It cannot, therefore, follow, that, because a thing is true in the particular, it must be true in the universal. Consequently, Dr. Lynch may assert that a certain amount of science and erudition is necessary to decide on a particular fact, by a particular agent, on particular grounds, and yet not be obliged to concede that the

same amount is necessary in every case, whoever the agent, and whatever the grounds on which he is to decide. The amount alleged to be necessary may not be necessary in the case of the inspired themselves to determine the fact of their own inspiration ; it may not be necessary in the case of the eyewitnesses of the miracles by which the inspired evidence the fact that God speaks to and by them ; it may not be necessary to those who receive the fact immediately from the inspired themselves, or on the authority God himself has commissioned to declare it ; and yet be indispensable in the case of a single individual who has, on the strength of his own examination, to decide whether a book written some two or three thousand years ago is or is not an inspired composition ; as it needs no argument to prove.

The knowledge, be it more or be it less, necessary in the case, to determine what books are and what are not inspired, must be possessed by the body supposed, as well as by the individual, we concede ; and if that body is destitute of it and has it to learn, it must learn it either from investigation or inspiration, we also concede ; otherwise we deny it. But the body asserted in the hypothesis is, by the very terms of the supposition, already in possession of the truth, and of all the knowledge necessary to declare it, and, in deciding the question, has only to declare solemnly what it already holds and has held from the moment of its institution. Therefore, it has to acquire the knowledge neither by investigation nor by inspiration ; for it has not to acquire it at all. Unless, then, the Professor chooses to maintain that to declare what one already holds directly from our Lord or his Apostles is the same thing as for an individual ignorant of it to learn it by the examination of historical documents and scientific investigation, he must concede that the parity he seeks to establish between every individual's deciding the fact of inspiration on the strength of his own examination, and the Church, or body of teachers supposed, doing it on the authority of our Lord and his Apostles, from whom it received it immediately, has no foundation except in his own fancy, and that the conclusions which depend upon it fall to the ground.

The Professor's reasoning is vitiated by his supposing a *body* of individuals totally different from that supposed in the hypothesis he is arguing against. The body he supposes is no body or corporation at all ; but a simple aggregation of individuals who at any given time compose it. Between such a body and

the Apostles there must needs be all the distance of time and space that there is between the Apostles and the individuals themselves. It would and it could possess only what the individuals composing it should bring to it, and they could bring to it only what they acquire in their individual capacity. "The mere fact of human congregation," as the Professor rightly contends, could confer no power, beyond the aggregate power of the individuals congregated. Hence the aggregate body, or collection of individuals, as well as the single individual, would need to obtain, either by investigation or inspiration, the knowledge necessary to come to an infallible decision. It needed no learned professor to tell us all this, which is by no means beyond the reach of any man of ordinary sense. Indeed, we feel humbled when we find learned men bringing such objections to us, — humbled for ourselves, that they can think so meanly of our understandings as to suppose us capable of holding any thing against which objections so obvious even to a child may be urged, and humbled for them, that they should imagine, that, in bringing such objections, they are telling something recondite, or that it is possible that such objections can have any power to demolish that lofty and spacious edifice, the Church, founded upon the rock, firmly built and cemented, which has withstood all the assaults of wicked men and devils for eighteen hundred years, and against which the gates of hell shall never prevail, not even to loosen a single stone or to detach a single tile.

But *this* body, this aggregate of individuals, is not *the* body supposed by Dr. Lynch, and to prove that this has no advantage over the individual is nothing to the purpose, for nobody, certainly no Catholic, denies it. The Professor's argument is a sheer paralogism, of that species which consists in proving what is not supposed in the question, and which is not denied by the adversary, — a sophism for which the learned Professor has a peculiar fondness, and into which he falls with remarkable facility. The body supposed by Dr. Lynch is the Church teaching; for he says, "the pastors of the Catholic Church claim to compose it." But the Catholic Church, as a body or corporation, the only sense in which it is alleged to have any teaching faculty at all, is not an aggregation of individuals who at any given time compose it, — a body born and dying with them; but the contemporary of our Lord and his Apostles, in immediate communion with them, and thus annihilating all distance of time and place between them and us.

She is, in the sense supposed, a corporation, and, like every corporation, a collective individual possessing the attribute of immortality. She knows no interruption, no succession of moments, no lapse of years. Like the eternal God, who is ever with her, and whose organ she is, she has duration, but no succession. She can never grow old, can never fall into the past. The individuals who compose the body may change, but she changes not ; one by one they may pass off, and one by one be renewed, while she continues ever the same ; as in our own bodies, old particles constantly escape, and new ones are assimilated, so that the whole matter of which they are composed is changed once in every six or seven years, and yet they remain always identically the same bodies. These changes as to individuals change nothing as to the body. The Church to-day is identically that very body which saw our Lord when he tabernacled in the flesh. She who is our dear Mother, and on whose words we hang with so much delight, beheld with her own eyes the stupendous miracles which were performed in Judea eighteen hundred years ago ; she assisted at the preaching of the Apostles on the day of Pentecost, when the Holy Ghost descended upon them in cloven tongues of fire ; she heard St. Peter, the prince of the Apostles, relate how the Spirit descended upon Cornelius and his household, and declare how God had chosen that by his mouth the Gentiles should hear the word of God and believe ; she listened with charmed ear and ravished heart to the last admonition of “ the disciple whom Jesus loved,” — “ My dear children, love one another ” ; she saw the old Temple razed to the ground, the legal rites of the old covenant abolished, and the once chosen people driven out from the Holy Land, and scattered over all the earth ; she beheld pagan Rome in the pride and pomp of power, bled under her persecuting emperors, and finally planted the cross in triumph on her ruins. She has been the contemporary of eighteen hundred years, which she has arrested in their flight and made present to us, and will make present to all generations as they rise. With one hand she receives the *depositum* of faith from the Lord and his commissioned Apostles, with the other she imparts it to us. Such is the body supposed, between which and the individual Mr. Thornwell must establish the parity he contends for, or not establish it at all. What has this body to do, in order to decide what books are, and what are not, inspired ? Merely to declare a simple fact which she has received on competent authority, —

merely what our Lord or his Apostles have told her. What needs she, in order to do it with infallible certainty? Simply protection against forgetting, misunderstanding, and misstating; and this she has, because she has, according to the hypothesis, our Lord always abiding with her, and the Paraclete, who leads her into all truth, and "brings to her remembrance" all the words spoken to her by our Lord himself personally, or by his inspired Apostles, — keeping her memory always fresh, rendering her infallible assistance rightly to understand and accurately to express what she remembers to have been taught. Here are all the conditions requisite for an infallible decision; and all these must be supposed, because they are all asserted in the hypothesis.

Now we demand what parity there is between such a body, which has only to state what it believes and always has believed on the inspiration of Scripture, and which has the supernatural assistance of the Holy Ghost to state it infallibly, and an individual who has nothing but certain writings before him, and who has to determine, by the examination of documents and scientific investigation of the intrinsic evidences, whether they are inspired or not, — a fact which, since it is supernatural, lies out of the order of nature, and is therefore only extrinsically provable. Who so blinded by passion, by pride, by prejudice, or ignorance, as to pretend, that such a body, supposing it to exist, can no more come to a certain conclusion, is in no better condition for coming to a certain conclusion, on the fact of the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, than an ignorant slave on our plantations, or a rude savage of our forests? Who is he? Indeed, it is the learned Presbyterian minister, the "Professor of Sacred Literature and the Evidences of Christianity in the South Carolina College"! It is evident to any man of ordinary sense, that such a body can decide the question infallibly, and equally evident that the ignorant slave or the rude savage cannot.

To the dilemma, therefore, in which the Professor affects to have placed his Catholic opponent, we reply: — The Council of Trent could, uninspired, but simply assisted by the Holy Ghost, decide with infallible certainty upon the inspiration of the Scriptures, without the learning necessary in the case of the individual deciding for himself on the strength of his own examination, *because it had only to give an authoritative expression to the actual faith of the body of pastors it represented*, — and it could establish the infallibility of its expression

to the people who were to receive it, because, to do so, it had only to establish that it did express the universal faith of that body, easily collected from its being received by the whole body as soon as made known. The other part of the dilemma falls of itself. We do not assume, nor are we obliged to assume, that the Fathers of Trent were inspired. Inspiration is needed only where the truth to be promulgated is unknown and has to be revealed ; where nothing is to be done but infallibly state the truth already revealed and believed, the infallible assistance of the Holy Ghost, without inspiration, suffices.

We have here shown that the difficulties suggested are resolvable on Catholic principles ; the Professor must therefore concede, according to his promise, that one objection to Dr. Lynch's argument ceases. But this one objection is his only objection to that argument, so far as it bears against the first-named method ; and since this is removed, the argument, thus far, is not refuted. If not refuted, it, at least against the Professor, is sound, and, then, the first method is destroyed, and Dr. Lynch is entitled to his conclusion against it.

There remain to be considered the second and third suppositions. The second, that of relying on the judgment of the learned, the Professor passes over in profound silence, and therefore yields it up as indefensible. It is remarkable, however, that Mr. Thornwell should do so ; for it is really the method actually adopted by the majority of Protestants, and abandoning it is virtually abandoning Protestantism itself. Undoubtedly, Protestants assert private judgment ; but the private judgment on which they actually rely is not the private judgment of each individual, but the private judgment of those assumed to be learned and wise and prudent. Protestantism must never be taken at its word ; for one of its essential properties is, to profess one thing and to do another, or to give us the name without the thing, — the sign without the thing signified. Whoever knows Protestants at all knows that they take their opinions, not on their own private judgment, but on the authority of their masters. Whenever they do not do so, we find them becoming downright Rationalists, or absolute apostates from Christianity ; and it is never, only as grouped around some leader, swearing by the words of some master, that we see them retain any thing of the form of religion, or present any compact appearance. The people are aware of their own inability to decide for themselves what they ought to believe, and they only decide what heresiarch they will follow, — what

master they will have. Thus they say,—“ So said Martin Luther, so said John Calvin, or George Fox ; so teach Edwards and Dwight, Owen and Gill, Wesley and Swedenborg, Murray and Ballou, Channing and Fourier, Emerson and Parker.” It is not in himself the poor Protestant confides, but in some leader who seems to him, for his learning, wisdom, and sound judgment, worthy of confidence. If here and there a bold, energetic individual starts up with perfect confidence in his own judgment, and has the courage or the audacity to proclaim, as the truth of God, his own personal conceits or convictions, he either founds a new sect, or a new party or faction in the sect to which he pertains ; as we see in the instances of Muncer and George Fox, Brown and Sandeman, Wesley and Whitefield, Erskine and Irving, Southcote and Pusey, Campbell and Bushnell, Channing and Parker. If each judged for himself, we should see no sects, parties, or groups ; each would stand alone, on his own two feet, acknowledging no master, and no fellow, saying always *I*, never able to say *we*.

This must needs be. How, except by relying on such men as Mr. Thornwell, could the great body of Presbyterians, for instance, come to any conclusion on the question discussed in the volume before us ? In fact, they do not attempt to obtain a conclusion by any other means. “ Mr. Thornwell is a godly man ; he is a great and learned man ; he has investigated the subject ; he wont deceive us ; and we will believe what he says.” Here is the fact, disguise it as you will, and Mr. Thornwell knows it as well as we do. We must, therefore, regard his passing this method over in silence as a tacit confession that in his judgment Protestantism is not defensible.

Nevertheless, we cannot be much surprised that Mr. Thornwell passes this method over in silence. It is not a method to be avowed. Protestant ministers would have a short lease of their power, if they were to avow it. They would be pressed with a multitude of questions, which it would be very inconvenient to answer. “ After all,” — the justly indignant people whom they have led might say, — “ this private judgment you preached was only a pretext, a bait to catch gudgeons. You never meant it ; you only meant that we must submit our judgments to yours ! Is it true that you monopolize all the learning, all the wisdom, all the judgment, in the world ? What guaranty can you give us, fallible men as you confess yourselves, that you yourselves are not deceived,— nay, that you are incapable of deceiving us ? You deceived us, when you prom-

ised us the right of private judgment. What reason have we to suppose you do not deceive us in other things also ? ” Such questions might be put, and, if put, it is obvious that it would be very inconvenient to answer them.

The first method is disproved ; the second is abandoned ; only the third remains. This, that of a single individual duly commissioned by Almighty God to announce the fact of inspiration to the world, the Professor does not attempt to defend as true, or as one which he does or can hold ; but he maintains, that, on Catholic principles, it is probable, and therefore Dr. Lynch is entitled only to a probable conclusion, — not sufficient for his purpose, because he must conclude with absolute certainty. The Professor concludes, that, on Catholic principles, this hypothesis is probable, from the fact, that, on Catholic principles, it is a probable opinion that the Pope is infallible. But his argument involves a transition from one *genus* to another, and therefore concludes nothing. The single individual asserted in the hypothesis is commissioned in his individual capacity to announce the fact, and it is in this capacity that he is to do it. But such a commissioned individual is not the Pope, or Sovereign Pontiff. No Catholic holds the Pope in his individual capacity to be infallible. He is infallible, as we hold, and as we presume Dr. Lynch also holds ; but only in his capacity of Supreme Head of the Church, in which sense he is included in the fourth hypothesis, as joined to the body of individuals asserted, inseparable from it, and essential to it. Concede, then, the infallibility of the Sovereign Pontiff, nothing is conceded in favor of the third method ; for in the sense in which he is infallible he is the Church, or essentially included in the fourth method ; since the head is not without the body, nor the body without the head.

The third method, then, is not the method. Then no one of the first three. Then the fourth is ; because some method of proof does exist, and it can be no other. Mr. Thornwell, therefore, has not refuted Dr. Lynch's argument. If he has not refuted it, against him, it stands good. Then the method of proof is the body supposed. But this body has authority to make an unerring decision on the subject of inspiration, that is, to declare unerringly what is or is not the word of God, therefore infallible in declaring the word of God. But this body is composed of the pastors of the Catholic Church. Therefore the pastors of the Church are infallible in declaring the word of God, the proposition Dr. Lynch undertook to

prove. It would seem from this, that the learned and logical Professor's shouts of victory were decidedly premature. It is clear, also, since we are not considering what is or is not possible in the abstract, but *in hac providentia*, that the whole controversy turns between the first method and the fourth; for the private spirit is not admissible, and the Professor does not defend the second, and cannot, and would not if he could, defend the third. It is, then, either private judgment or the Catholic Church. So the Professor virtually concedes or maintains. What, therefore, he further adduces in his Fourth Letter, namely, that it is as easy to prove the inspiration of the Scriptures as the infallibility of the Church, cannot be entertained. There does exist some adequate proof; this is conceded. It evidently cannot be the method of private judgment; for it is absolutely impossible for a field slave, for instance, ignorant of letters, and with no time or ability to learn, to be able to decide for himself, on his own examination, whether *Tobias* or *Ecclesiasticus* is or is not an inspired composition. But, if not private judgment, it must be the infallible Church, and therefore the Church and its infallibility follow from the necessity of the case. This necessity overrides every possible objection. Bring as many objections as you please, and we dismiss them, as proving, if any thing, too much, and therefore nothing. *Quod nimis probat, nihil probat.*

Thus far we have confined ourselves, after stating the question, to showing that the Professor has not refuted Dr. Lynch's argument for the infallibility of the Church. This has been perfectly gratuitous on our part, for the burden of proof is on the Professor. But having vindicated Dr. Lynch's argument for the infallibility of the Church, we are now able to conclude it against Mr. Thornwell from the necessity of the case, the strongest argument that it is possible to use. Infallibility overrides all objections; and consequently, the Professor, let him do his best, cannot prove the fallibility of the Church. Here, then, we well might rest; but we find our author rather an amusing companion, and we should be sorry to part company with him so soon. We hope, therefore, to be able, in an early number, to consider the direct proofs of the fallibility of the Church, which he has attempted to bring. In the mean time, we recommend him, since he must hold his logical reputation dear, to make himself acquainted with Catholicity, before attempting again to write against it, and review also his logic, before he again asks his opponent to reason in syllogisms.

ART. V. — *Le Protestantisme comparé au Catholicisme dans ses Rapports avec la Civilization Européenne.* Par M. L'ABBÉ JACQUES BALMES. Paris: Débecourt. 1842—44. 3 tomes. 8vo.

WE have not placed this work, by the erudite and eloquent Balmes, at the head of our article for the purpose precisely of reviewing its diversified contents and dwelling on its many peculiar merits and attractions. Adapted in a special manner, from the subject of which it treats, to meet the wants, and by its style and composition to suit the taste, of the present day, we should, indeed, be happy to draw from its varied pages, and prepare for the delight and useful entertainment of our readers, some of those striking views and deep thoughts, rapidly unfolded reasonings and brilliant passages, with which it everywhere abounds; but we can, for the present, only throw together some thoughts suggested by its first hasty perusal, and add, in the spirit, though not with the polished pen, of the author, a few facts and reflections concerning the practical results of Protestantism on the well-being of the lower classes of society; — not with any the less poignant grief for the misfortunes of our fellow-beings, because these results lead us to appreciate all the more feelingly the unmixed benefits which have ever flowed from Catholicity, over the humbler as well as upon the higher walks of life. A very incomplete sketch is all that we pretend to draw; nevertheless, those who follow us, while we trace the bare outlines of one of the many subjects designed by Balmes's master hand, may obtain some faint idea of his general plan, and occasionally, perhaps, catch a glimpse of the enlarged and complete portraiture of his volumes. The work itself will prove eminently useful, and serve as an ever-ready prompter of new views, to those who may desire to carry out through other departments the comparative study of the social features of Protestantism; it contains much, also, untouched by us, which will render broader and deeper the contrast between the blessed influence of the unreformed Church of God upon the lowliest of the faithful, and the unblest consequences entailed upon its followers by that sorrowful delusion styled the Reformation.

The Reformation began by holding out to Christendom flattering prospects and promises of a new order of things,

such as would, upon the realization of its designs, present to the world a social Utopia. Full time and ample opportunities have been enjoyed for a fair trial of the experiment. The Protestant world may now be presumed to have some evidences to show that it has not all along relied on false promises. Some instalment of the good fortune to be conferred and entailed upon mankind should now be forthcoming. Or if the space of three hundred years is not really allowance enough for working out into effect designs so surpassingly beneficial to society, when accomplished, may not the present generation be permitted, without too much presumption or irreverence, to look around for some tokens of assurance that the pledge given long ago is about to be redeemed, and that its rich portion will not the less surely come one day, for having been so long deferred? Some faint streaks of gray dawn along the horizon might tell, that, though "long-expected morn delays," still the night is not to last for ever.

The comparative study of the social well-being of the people, which in the religion of Him whose kingdom is not of this world can be only of secondary importance, rises in the face of Protestantism, in consequence of its having held out these prospects and promises, into a matter of even fearful magnitude, and grows into a question of the absolute truth or falsehood of the Reformation. On man's temporal and temporary prosperity hangs an issue of no less than vital consequence to the system of amended religion. Upon this ground the reforming scheme was started; — first with an eye to the things of Cæsar, and then to the things of God. The Catholic order *reformed* or reversed is to "seek" the "*adjicienda*" or temporalities, and hope and confide in Providence that "the kingdom of God and his justice" will be "added thereto," as circumstances and occasion require. In accordance with this idea, the Reformers seized a favorable opportunity of calling the attention of men to their social footing, — with which they were easily made discontented, — and then requested them to look to the groundwork of their faith, upon which, they were told, every thing to be complained of depended. If this dependence or connection be disproved by the existence of equally bad effects after the assumed cause — the faith — has been reformed, — the Reformation is proved to be grounded on a falsehood. "An imposition on the Christian family" is its real title and character, if the religious change be accompanied by not only equally

bad, but worse and more deplorable effects. This was not foreseen or dreaded in the outset, and the course then pursued was one which steadily tended to make men consider religion more closely in its relations to the happiness of this world than that of the other. The determination was to reform Christianity into a satisfactory and comfortable way of living here, rather than to furnish Christians with any new or surer means of attaining to life hereafter. The reformed creed was of course thus strengthened in the mind, with all the convincing force, and its belief was sunk deeply in the heart by all the weight, of earthly considerations. Protestantism may be supposed to have obtained its view of Christianity and "sighted" religion reformed, not while patiently bearing the cross up the road that leads heavenward, but while wandering, "on pleasure bent," down the pathways that wind round the social conveniences and branch out variously into the temporal affairs of men. The promises held out by the Reformers to those whom they sought to gain over, and the measures they adopted to render their movement popular and acceptable, all look in this direction. A practice was found fault with and abolished; and *then* the doctrine which upheld it was rejected. Whatever appealed more directly to those usages, ways of life, and restraints which go far towards making up the outward burden of a people's religious and civil duties, was seized upon with a helping hand and accommodated dexterously to the uneasy shoulder, by being lightened of its weightiest articles; the doctrines connected therewith—in the manner, you might say, of network or lacing—narrowing and shortening themselves conveniently to suit the change.

This line of proceeding—whether adopted blindly or with foresight of its consequences, it matters not to the people—was well calculated to bring about in their incautious and deluded minds a conformity to the doctrinal opinions of those pleasant friends of humanity, who seemed, meanwhile, solely intent on changing the condition and altering the mode of life and manners of society. Their whole course of operations seemed to say to the people, Every thing good, comfortable, nice, and respectable will be yours, only the old religion must first be reformed. In confirmation of this, it may be generally observed, through the whole history of the Protestant sects, that they act perfectly in character against the Church; drawing invariably their best materials for a plea against her doctrines from the situation and conduct of individ-

uals, or the outward condition of communities. There appear, indeed, to be no other desires in their warm hearts, and no further thoughts in their enlightened minds, than such as would fain enable man to compass and "gain the whole world," — without ever pretending to any special mission concerning the *quid prodest*, or "what shall it profit a man," of the Gospel. The intentions and designs of the Reformation movement, the objects first aimed at, and last to be obtained by all possible means, may also be pretty safely deduced from the eulogies of Protestantism upon itself. It would really seem to follow, from the tone of all these exultations, that if the secular enlightenment, social well-being, and prosperity of the people in this world have not been consulted by the Reformation in a distinguished manner and to an eminent degree, there is little else left on which Protestantism would deign to be congratulated. Does it not seem everywhere tacitly conceded, through this business of innovation and improvement, that in the matter of fitting people for the world to come, by penance and mortification, by constant discipline and searching austerity, by voluntary and vowed self-denial and detachment from this world, the old Church answered full well enough, and needed no reformation or improvement?

But then, it is said, Christendom was in so unsocial and unelevated a condition after the Dark Ages! The dignity of the race, the self-respect and independence of the people, the free impulses of the human mind, and the unbounded right of every man to self-management and free choice in all things, were surrounded by so many restraints and restrictions, all obstinately looking to some mode of existence not precisely like this worldly life, that a fundamental change was demanded by the social position of Christendom. There seemed clearly implied in the ideas according to which the Church directed human affairs a dread, or a vague suspicion, about the soul-saving effect of trusting man fully to himself and to his own ideas of social comfort in the advancing position of nations from barbarism towards refinement. And what heart, beginning to be hopefully elated with the advance already effected, could bear with this diffidence and cautiousness? Of that worldly-wise eagerness and ambition requisite to lead on the nations rapidly and by the shortest path to the eminence — now appearing almost in view and easily attainable — of human perfectibility in a social golden age, the Church seemed

to possess little or nothing. Her "Ages of Faith" — really Dark Ages in the progressionist's view — had strangely confirmed her in a habit, natural enough in her "Ages of Persecution," of devoting, now even more fearfully than then, the larger share of her time and efforts to the spiritual man, only looking after his physical well-being, which was bettering itself fast enough, as after a relative and secondary concern; and who was there, tasting the first fruits of her hard-earned civilization, that languished not to see her course liberalized and reformed? Every thing in the moderate and measured proceedings of the Church towards the people betrayed her strong and almost offensive recollection of the stern barbarism and sensual grossness of those nations, which it had cost her much prudent toil, it is true, to bring gradually to the point which now had been reached. But was not every one, who had conceived high ideas of what could and might be done from the elevation to which the Church had now led him, panting for some less tame leadership? Fifteen ages of every variety of texture had unrolled themselves before the Church, and received, together with the unfading sign of faith, such outward finish as their materials would bear. Should the sixteenth century, rich with all the accumulated treasures and wisdom of the past, suffer the slow progress and course of events to continue still to be regulated by that moderator and sanctifier of past ages? Should it not rather, on the contrary, subject the Church to the impress of the present and succeeding ages of light? After hundreds of years of obstinately sustained labor and toil and struggle to accomplish her business with mankind, through unnumbered difficulties created by worldliness and irreligion, and through intricate cases suggested by the flesh against the welfare of the soul, — none of which would oppose her again in more enlightened times! — some prospect of a long respite from such complicated cases dawns at last. Will not the Church now bend unreservedly to the work of man's happiness in this world, and provide fearlessly for his social elevation and enlightenment, in accordance with *his* opinions and desires? Amid the peace and prosperity into which, in spite, it may be, of all his own resistance and endeavours, she has now introduced the Christian, can she not even for a moment relax from that all-engrossing concern about his future life? The light and splendor, gathering under her guidance through many centuries, is now freed from the last passing cloud, and streams from the sixteenth far down through

bright vistas opening into succeeding ages, and still, "What doth it profit a man?" is the calm expostulation of the Church with the admirers of the brightness in which she moves! But ardent and exalted imaginations are overpowered by the sight of so much profit to be realized for men in their social interests and relations. An earthly paradise blooms out before their eyes; *Reformation* beckons them on; man, they are sure, may now dare trust to himself in this broad daylight, — now think and act for himself, and make his way into the social Eden that opens before him; and they step out of the ranks, leap all circumvallations, pass every outpost, and bear onwards their own banner rapidly and precipitately down the illumined way, and far into regions of progress and improvement not yet filled with light. Religion was made for man, they now reflect; — should not, then, Christianity, under which civilization has gradually advanced thus far, tend to still higher civilization at once, leave the tardy to their unearthly thoughts, and join the explorers also, and outstrip the Church, — the Church, that still delays, endeavouring to make all things, whether they advance or whether they recede, conform as of old to the views of her mission, and abide by her unchanging standard and fixed ideas?

Thus felt and reasoned the proud and the disaffected in the beginning of the sixteenth century. The Church had in her civilizing labors done so much for social well-being, that they had come to regard social well-being as the supreme good; she had carried society forward so far, that they felt its absolute perfection might be easily and speedily realized, if she would only turn her attention solely to that end. But as she would not hearken to their advice, deviate from the course she had marked out from the beginning, or hasten her steps according to their wishes, they resolved on her reformation, and, instead of submitting themselves to her direction and control, to subject her to theirs. The Reformation they resolved on they made. It has now gone through three centuries in search of a social Utopia, — with what success let Christendom in the nineteenth century answer.

But it is important, in seeking this answer, that we bear in mind the different positions which the Church and the Reformation respectively occupy with regard to social matters and the people. As the Church still perseveres in maintaining that these things have only a relative and secondary importance, she will not of course be very loud in her claims upon society for

whatever very acceptable consequences may have followed her constant pursuit of the one thing necessary. When her faithful members are hated by the world, or find its prosperity a snare, or suffer persecution for her sake, she not only reminds them that true prophecies are sure to be fulfilled under every system of social progress, but that the beatitudes from the same source are as truthful as any philanthropic axiom. Utilitarian piety it cannot be her object, since it is by no means her interest, to encourage. A sadly deficient means would it prove of securing in all ages and nations unity and universality of belief, to insist upon its close connection with worldly success, comfort, and prosperity, — ever and everywhere, in fact, the most variable and least general of all human conditions. Besides, tastes vary so much among men, ages, and nations, even on this point, that, were such an argument for embracing and holding her faith insisted upon, “the history of the variations of social views, as well as social movements, among Christians,” would then furnish the best memoirs for Church history; whereas the Church now principally traces by these the annals of what is called religion outside of her pale. There is no likelihood, then, it would seem, that the Church will be too forward in claiming great merit for the good things of this world which she may have given to the nineteenth century.

The Reformation, on the other hand, it may be expected, will, consistently enough, seek to hold up prominently before the world, as the fulfilment of the Reformers’ promises, and as the proof of their truthfulness and success, the largest possible amount of good realized in this world through the blessed Reformation. As the very unsatisfactory and deranged state of society from which it had its origin founded the character of its mission, moulded its essential features, and shaped its course, how can it be otherwise than unfailing in attention to its great merits and various achievements for society? To rehearse or point out in the Church those faults, defects, and failures in every thing concerning social happiness which first called forth and still employ this beneficial agency, must consequently claim an equal share of attention. We should also consider that Protestantism must of necessity, not only indulge occasionally, but be continually steeped, in self-applause, or else die by stopping the breath which from the first animated it. For the very name and conception of a *reformer* must carry with them pretensions to singular excellences and marked superiority. A system which thus writes its own name must

be sure of its own capabilities, if real, or, if successfully deceptive, live on self-delusion. Together with a high idea of its own accomplishments and qualifications, the Reformation must be moved with great pity, if not contempt, for the object that stands in need of its zealous labors. The more it considers itself in this contrast, the more it must be encouraged to think well of itself. The lower the Church that needed to be amended is sunk in the eyes of mankind, the higher must be the key in which the Reformers are extolled for their undertaking ; so that the meed of praise awarded to Protestantism is commensurate with the obloquy cast upon the Church, and all sectarian greatness finally resolves itself, through this analytical process, into a successful diffusion of the belief of the very great evils, of a social and secular bearing, with which Christendom was oppressed previously to the dawn of the Reformation. All the good there is in the present state of society must, therefore, be considered by the Reformation as its own production. To waive this, or allow it to be disputed, would have fatal consequences. For, if such evils as are assumed to have existed are discovered to have had only an imaginary existence, Protestantism can be only an imaginary reformation. If the social degree, which was thought by the Reformation to be so low as to disgrace Christianity, was really so high that nothing on earth could then have reached it save a divinely guided institution, to reform means, first, to defame the success of God's work among men, and then to pretend to better success. If greater evils have arisen, and are daily springing into being, since the Reformation, than were ever discerned before, Protestantism appears as one of those delusions that delude only to deform. Not leaving well alone is generally attended with bad consequences ; and the Reformation will be found to have been the destroyer of much that was very well, and the author of as much more that is very evil.

But circumstances, artfully taken advantage of, tend to screen every failure of the Reformation beneath benefits still accruing to society from the very state of things so much calumniated at the time of its rise. And, fortunate at least in this, Protestantism manages, through all its failures, to obtain from the Catholic influences it could not entirely destroy some specious appearance of success, by pretending to be connected, as their efficient cause, with all those social advantages which are only parallel with it in time. Nothing is more convenient for reformers than to declare that they have produced all the good in the

midst of which they live, and to maintain that every thing worth mentioning, which has happened *since* the reformation, is really *due to* the reformation itself, — *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*. 'This is the sophistry, which, when prepared to suit party or sectarian prejudices, looks like argument in the Protestant declaimer's favor, but which, when plainly stated, is perfectly ridiculous and absurd. Suppose, for instance, that the accident of the Reformation had never happened, you will be told, that then, from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth, the sun would never have once risen or set, and that the men of 1516 would, perhaps, long before 1848, have been completely transformed into a generation of fools. Truly ! But the colleges and the universities in which even the Reformers themselves were taught in their boyhood all they knew, — the golden age of literature, which had already so far advanced, — printing, which had already been invented, — America, which had already been discovered, — poetry, painting, sculpture, which had already attained a perfection not yet surpassed, — Christendom already begemmed all over with those time-honored and unrivalled cathedrals, hospitals, and city-like asylums for the afflicted, — the wisdom, the legislation, and military achievements of so many long-renowned nations, — chivalry, learning, benevolence, already organized for hundreds of years, in innumerable bodies spread over the whole Christian world, and counting by crowds and enlisting by thousands the noble, the ardent, and the gifted in their cause, — not to mention, *hors de propos*, in the presence of Reformers, holiness and its connections, — what would these not have grown into, in the course of the last three centuries, if the cause which produced them had remained in all its force and activity ? No matter, is the reply ; if the Reformation had not taken place just then, some other catastrophe would have swallowed them all up at once. So the Reformation must receive the thanks of all Christendom for all modern civilization and enlightenment, arts and sciences, inventions, improvements, intellects, and all !

This species of sophistry, gravely carried out, under various forms, leads many who are deluded by it to place to the credit of the Reformation, not the good it has hindered, but the good which it fortunately could not hinder, and which exists in spite of it, and is really due to Catholicity alone. For it is no sophistry to say, that the cause that alone had given so much real good to the world has been the best and only pre-

server of its own works, and that the Church, if not interfered with, would successfully have continued what it had always sufficiently performed. Moreover, if conjectures well founded on analogy can ever be allowed, we may venture to say, casting our eyes now over the once Catholic, happy, and civilized Africa and Western and Central Asia, that, had reformation after reformation been as fortunate in expelling the influence of the Church from the European as from the Mohammedan world, the heresiarchs of the sixteenth century would have been men as uncultivated as they became irreligious, and the history of our nineteenth century—had it then found an historian with a pen—would have been written in some unchristian and uncivilized language, which is not, thanks be to the Church of God! our mother tongue. Still, it is not uncommon to hear the improvements and advancement effected in various departments in latter times, and occurrences which, in the necessary course of the world, could not have been expected at an earlier period, but which the course of three hundred years would have brought round at any rate,—though, in all likelihood, without any cost to humanity, if the Reformation had not come along with them,—all boldly and unblushingly attributed to that same Reformation, a phenomenon which had no greater connection with such progress than its having been permitted by Providence to appear and go on just at this period of time, lest mankind might have become too happy in this world, and have felt less disposed to look on it in its Christian light, as only a place of trial and probation.

The real worth of Catholicity and Catholic influences, as proved by experience to be the most efficient elements of civilization, can, in fact, be despised or denied by no Christian of the present day, who does not owe to the very nest he would fain soil every feather of his own boasted plumage, be whatever it may the attire of knowledge, civilization, or Christianity in which he struts through the world. For the study of the last three hundred years, after an ordinary acquaintance with the fifteen preceding centuries, must convince any impartial mind, that whatever there is really valuable and beneficial to mankind in what we now possess, beyond what was possessed at the opening of the sixteenth century, is nothing but the growth of the seeds then long sown and cultivated, and can in no sense be said to be the fruit of the Reformation. The impartial student will be inclined, on the contrary, to maintain that the true fruits of Protestantism are not that por-

tion of the promising and duly expected harvest which has hung, through sunshine and storm, and ripened on some of the boughs, but whatever has been rudely shaken off in unripeness from as many other branches of the tree of Catholic civilization, which was flourishing in such luxuriant richness and with such goodly promise before the Reformation storm arose. Of a continually augmenting caravan of precious things, some rich remnants have reached us ; but what would have been our store, had no despoiler waylaid or intercepted its course ! Follow the march of united Christendom through one thousand five hundred years' of overpowering brilliancy of success, — look at its unshrinking contests with every enemy, and its triumphs over Gnostic sensualist and Platonic refiner, Manichæism in its Eastern originality and its Western diluted form of a hundred heresies, — over the Jewish slaveholder of white Christians and the Moorish invaders of Christendom, — over Mohammedanism, and over the Goths, with their predecessors and followers from every rugged clime, — and then fix your eyes and heart on its accumulated trophies and treasures, on its still unbroken front and godlike array, as it stands glittering on the borders of the sixteenth century, on its way to us, and conceive you never possibly can how this nineteenth century is only what it is, without allowing the Reformation to have possessed a superhuman power for evil. From what eminence, into what depth, has not the illustrious brotherhood of civilized men, separated by the evil genius of reformation, been sunk and plunged ! The wisdom of fifteen generations flung to the winds, the social experience and social erudition, the science and art of benevolence, tried and approved for a millennium and a half, despised and unlearned, and the world now presenting the deplorable spectacles everywhere beheld !

And sad, nay, heart-rending, indeed, is the present condition, the social condition, of the Protestant world. Raise the veil which an artificial civilization hangs over the face of society, fix your attention on those who form the bulk of every community, the laboring classes, the working population, — in the unchristian language of the day styled “the masses,” as if they were only huge blocks of brute matter, — and what is it you behold ? Is it the social Utopia, the earthly Eden, promised, to gain which was the real end and aim of the Reformation ? Alas, no ! You discover that pauperism, with its concomitant evils, during these Reformation times, has taken such gigantic strides as to have outstripped all calculation, and more than

fulfilled the worst predictions. The noblest hearts of the present generation are saddened, and the wisest heads are puzzled, at the sight. Governments, political economists, associations, and philanthropic schemes of every kind, struggle with ardor, but almost without hope, against the headlong course of this torrent, which is loosing the very foundation-stones of the social edifice, and threatening to submerge — unhappily, not alone — every vestige and remnant of Protestantism in the flood of evils which the Reformation let loose upon itself and the world. “*Mala res, spes multo pejor.*”

If we had no other evidence, the number and variety of plans and schemes for bettering the condition of the great mass of society would suffice to prove most abundantly, in a matter-of-fact and utilitarian age like ours, that the necessity which calls them into being must be great in the extreme ; while the invariable abandonment of the most promising systems, after a short trial, and the constant search for better plans and more efficient schemes, prove with equal clearness, that, as yet, no means that can be called availing or encouragingly effectual have been found or devised. We every day read or hear of new theories for social reform, and improved systems for ameliorating the condition of the indigent and for the elevation of the lower classes of the people. Every day brings forth some amended legislative enactment on the subjects of education and of the poor, and old, rejected reports are superseded by new committees of inquiry on these matters. We have, in an interminable succession from all quarters, poor-laws, poor-rates, school-rates, factory-bills, relief-bills, plans, theories, and proposals amended and altered, and then amended again, put in operation for a time, found ineffectual, and then rejected, to give place to another plan, theory, system, enactment, or reform, — the afflictions of suffering humanity still continuing, meanwhile, in full force, neither amended, rejected, nor relieved, but increasing. Owenism and Fourierism, and every species of philanthropism, are now tried by amateurs in benevolence, as similar experiments, not long ago, were essayed by amateurs in faith and religious reform, from Luther’s *ism* even down to Parker’s *ism* ; and we now have any number of sects of the philanthropic species, bickering and debating about reformations in workhouse systems, almshouses, and pauper laws, and about new-found means of training and cultivating the never properly understood human being, from college and university bills down to reports about schools of industry, farm-

schools and industrial schools, infant schools and ragged schools. In one thing only all seem agreed, — that there exist, even in the so-called most enlightened and liberal nations, an immense amount of ignorance, vagrancy, and abandonment of the young, the most appalling destitution and misery among a large portion of the working classes, as well of the peasantry in the country as of paupers in cities and towns and counties, and a rapidly increasing mortality amongst all these classes, and consequently new maladies spreading amongst all other classes, — and, to heighten the whole, that there is a horrid and pestilential demoralization and immorality in the masses, as they style them, and a most frightful abundance and increase of crime.

This fearful state of things, all agree, cannot be attributed to any present and temporary cause, since it could not have suddenly reached such a pitch, but must have been going on, though less observed, for a great length of time, until at last its wide-spread extent and aggravated nature have revealed its horrors to the most inattentive and alarmed governments as well as individuals. Of more than one nation may be said truly what the *Edinburgh Review* for July, 1847, says, — “that the destiny and very existence of the nation depend on the satisfactory adjustment of these great questions”; or that, if these great objects are left unattained, it will become one of the many nations of whom it is sadly said, — “They were a great people in their day.” All agree, that the onward course and increase of the evil are rapid and portentous, and by this admit that as yet no remedy, or even palliative, has been found or effectually applied, — nothing to arrest or direct its course, — since all the systems and theories, plans and reforms, of single individuals, organized bodies, or legislatures and governments, have proved thus far unavailing; and the daily call is still for more efficient systems, better plans, and newly reformed reforms.

This is the unavoidable conclusion that is forced upon us by all we see and hear and read of, — from the most authentic records and reports of human suffering and crime, and from the official accounts given of their own achievements by social reformers, political economists, and philanthropists, whether in fashionable saloons or private studios, in sectarian Bible-Society rooms or government cabinets, Every number of every English review we meet with confirms every part of this statement. The evil has long been

going on and accumulating, — therefore we must say it arises from no present calamity or pressure. It is wide-spread, and therefore must own some very common and general origin. It exists and has been in existence under various forms of government, particularly the liberal and enlightened, — therefore you cannot attribute it to imperfect political organization. It cannot owe its origin to want of liberty, since it thrives and grows most rapidly in this the reign of freedom and liberty ; — want of mercantile or manufacturing progress cannot have engendered it, as these now go on literally by steam, and commerce has nowadays its prince-merchants, and the intercourse of trade has opened colonies and markets in every part of the habitable and almost uninhabitable globe ; — want of knowledge and science and advancement in the age cannot have produced it, for these are by no means “the Dark Ages.” No ; this age, in which the misery and abasement of man have reached their lowest depths, is *the* age which by progress, science, improvements, and inventions has out-topped all past ages.

Where, then, can we find the origin and cause of this distressing state of things, so independent of man’s advancement in the arts and sciences, in inventions and in politics, in trade and in commerce, as to go on ever increasing side by side with the increase of all these things ? What cause can it be that follows all these from mother country to colony, and has been so long working onwards, in spite of all the philanthropy and liberality of the last two or three centuries, that now, in the meridian height of the enlightenment of the nineteenth century, it has attained its very highest pitch ? It is certain that absolute ignorance of human nature, and want of knowledge of the human heart, must have presided at its cradle, and allowed it to grow up to this giant-like form ; for these alone can account for the inefficiency and uselessness of all the elaborate measures, immense means, and multiplied reforms now put into operation for its removal, hindrance, or relief. There has been, therefore, and there still is, in all this matter, a sad want of the light and direction of Him who knows and loves all that he has made, and who alone can beneficially govern, by his revelation, that human nature which he created, relieve and solace those human beings whom he has placed in this world, and the depths of whose heart he alone can search. But whence can have arisen this want ? Assuredly, there has been no suspension of the ordinary opera-

tions of Divine Providence in governing and ruling mankind. What Divine agency, then, has been interfered with to produce and perpetuate this lamentable state of things? There is, besides the ordinary providence of God, only one other Divine agency that we know of, and therefore it must be that; namely, the agency and influence of his blessed extraordinary providence, which we name the true Church of God, and fondly style our Holy Mother. It is this which has been interfered with, — not with impunity. This interference, the cause of all our woes, has been called the *reformation of the Church*, and passes under the general name of Protestantism!

What, then, since the evil evidently flows from this interference, has suffering humanity to expect from Protestantism? When, in a moment of passion and excitement, an evil deed is perpetrated, he who commits it may be blind to its awful guilt, and form no idea or have no foresight of its dire consequences; yet, though unforeseen by him, and though slow and long in reaching their accomplishment, these consequences are still the fruits of his evil-doing, and can and must be traced back to him. Such is the case with the notorious heresiarch of the sixteenth century, and his associates. It matters not, then, whether they foresaw and intended it, or not. The fact is, their doings checked and threw back the onward vigorous career of Catholic civilization, and thus interrupted the successes of those beneficent institutions that for fifteen hundred years had procured, were then providentially procuring, and would of course have continued the longer the more effectually to procure, the welfare and the relief of the indigent, the helpless, the infirm, — indeed, of every class of suffering humanity that was or would be an object of the extraordinary dispensations of Providence. They destroyed by their doings, which they styled the work of reformation, myriads of such institutions, disbanded legions of those enlisted for the welfare of the poor and the safety of the world, killed the spirit that built the hospital and filled it with guardians, and never so much as thought of providing a substitute. They caused much of the time and means which God had destined to the glorious works of benevolence, during the last three hundred years, to be diverted to another purpose, by making it necessary, through their malice, to employ them in self-defence against innovators and their machinations, or in the protection of those of the faithful they were waylaying and striving to seduce from the faith.

In this they inflicted an injury, not only on themselves, but also on those who remained true to the Church; though the sufferings of these have been light in comparison with those of their own deluded followers. By their so-called reformation they withdrew a portion of the Christian community from the Church, and have kept them for three centuries deprived of that hallowed influence and protection which alone, for fifteen hundred years, had succeeded, through every species of danger, difficulty, and trial, in saving, comforting, and relieving humanity. If, then, the consequences of these doings stand out so frightfully apparent in the present state of the suffering portion of mankind, it is clear that we are not to expect that the hand which, under pretext of reformation, has inflicted the wounds, will heal them by another reform, and it must be conceded, that, after all the attempts of philanthropy, socialism, and governments, there is no hope but in *unreformed* things, in going back, in being restored to the provident and loving care of the Church of God. If suffering humanity has a ray of hope yet unextinguished, it comes from looking forward to this restoration. If, indeed, faith is the vivifying principle, the soul, of the Christian body, if charity is inseparable from the life which that soul imparts, and if benevolent works show the warmth and activity of that life, it is not strange that true faith, real charity, and genuine works of Christian benevolence should all go off the scene together. So the body's activity ceases with its life, and life ends when the soul departs.

But why has not this doctrine, so plain and undoubted, been equally soon and strikingly apparent in the present matter? The reason may be easily given. It is impossible to suppose that the impulse given by Catholicity in the direction of benevolence, though checked at once, should at once be entirely stopped by the loss of faith. It is natural that it should have gone on for a time, till, growing weaker and fainter, it should finally die away. A good habit acquired by an individual or community, though the means by which it was acquired and strengthened have ceased to operate, does not all at once cease to facilitate the performance of a good work. The recollections, the traditions of a people once Catholic, — even its monuments, though in ruins, — long preserve, un-effaced by innovation, some of the beneficial influences of the Catholic spirit. The wayward, disobedient, and rebellious boy, who has spurned parental authority, and gone to make, as

he thinks, a better home for himself, will long, in spite of himself, feel the influence of the instruction and the care of the parent whom he has rejected, and of the happy homestead which he has lucklessly abandoned. If, then, among those who have rejected the faith effects like those produced by the principles of faith are still visible, they proceed, not from the error that has been embraced, nor yet from living faith, but from that rejected faith which still outlives its rejection, at least in some of the lessons it taught.

It is plain and evident, moreover, that no portion of mankind, though segregated from the direct influence of the Church, can escape the indirect influence of her Heaven-guided example and proceedings. Do you think that the sects, if by any possibility they could have got rid of this indirect influence of the Church in matters of doctrine, would have halted or limped long in carrying out at once their principles to the full conclusion they all reach in time? No; if Deism, Rationalism, and Transcendentalism did not bloom out fully the first season on every branch of the Protestant tree, it was only because the air and the soil around it retained still some of the effect of the long culture and watering of the Catholic Church. Even the boldest innovator had not courage enough to protest against and reform away all that the old Church taught and teaches; because she is there still, unimpaired, beaming inside and outside with truth, and fulminating error; and error gets out of the influence of truth only by growing bolder the farther it gets from it, and then getting farther from it the bolder it grows. Say the same of the moral and the same of the benevolent effects of faith, and their diminution and destruction. It is not surprising, then, that even after three hundred years there should be found out of the Church some traces of that Catholic agency which had been active and fruitful for the preceding fifteen hundred years. The light shed by the sun during some ten or twelve hours lingers on still even when it has set, until it gradually grows fainter and more dim through the decreasing twilight. If there be ever any good and congenial souls out of the Church, who, rare as diamonds, seem to have some glow of Catholic charity, they are indeed like gems in darkness issuing rays they have treasured from a sun long set.

Now it is not wonderful that much should be mistaken for a time as the effect of Protestantism, which was in reality only the effect of old Catholicity, which Protestantism could not yet efface. Hence the difficulty of seeing at once in

practice, and as clearly as in principle, that as the body without the soul is dead, so indeed does Christian charity go down into the grave where faith has been buried by the Reformers. We say Christian charity, — for we do not pretend to say that the charity or benevolence that a pagan may have, and the world had before the Church came, natural kind-heartedness, may not exist still in those out of the Church. Philanthropy and Co. are its incorporation. But we do mean to say, that, among those who have left the faith and the Church, whatever there is besides this in individuals, whatever there is beyond the creation of this in institutions, is all due to the faith of the Church, — which leaves, even after her rejection, the sweet odor of benevolence where she once was, and copies of her great models, which can indeed be badly copied, but not originally conceived or designed by any but herself.

Should you now tell us that it follows from what we here say, that, if the influence of the Church once died out completely among them, and she took back all her own from those who reject her, the world separated from the Church would be in these matters much in the same state in which she found the pagan world of antiquity, we would only answer, that to be without the Church before she came, and to be without the Church after rejecting her, is in both cases to be equally without the Church, and so far in the same state; though to reject her implies more guilt, but not less misfortune, than never to have had her, and therefore may leave people, if not in precisely the same state, in one a little worse. There are, also, some people, nowadays, who seem to discover a strong tendency to the spirit of pagan times in the spirit of the age that is, and who contend that the knowledge or opinions of evangelical truths retained by the sects would have profited them little without the Church, or at least without her indirect influence and practical illustration of them. This view finds, undoubtedly, much in the present to confirm it. Indeed, the sects seem themselves to have some suspicion of its truth, and to believe that they find a defence of themselves, not in proving their superiority to pagans, but in proving that they have not fallen below them. Thus the late Robert Hall, the distinguished Baptist minister of Bristol, England, says in defence of Protestantism: — “Look at the sects and parties into which professed Christians are unhappily divided. Where is there one to be found which has *innovated* on the rules of heathen life, by substituting vice in the place of virtue?” In general terms this is undoubtedly true, and we con-

cede the praise it implies. *We* have never intended to represent the uncatholic world as *worse* than the pagan.

But if the view here taken be correct, and the Christian body expires with the departure of Christian faith, whence, you may ask, comes the system of public establishments, — poorly managed, indeed, — now, in one form or another, spread over the whole civilized world? Since, as is well known, there were no such establishments before the time of the Church, we can safely answer, that they would not exist now, were it not for Catholicity and her countless institutions, the embodiments of her charity. The embodiment may be imitated by those who are not Catholics, but the essence is to be found only in the Church. Before Christianity, — which being a fact is the Church, — there were, indeed, kind-hearted individuals, but society had nothing else for the suffering but words of compassion. Public beneficence was unknown, unless there may have been, as in an Eastern kingdom, such an exception as a hospital for old horses! The founding of public establishments of benevolence never entered into the systems of administration of the nations of antiquity. What has been done in the way of public charitable establishments by the government in Protestant countries certainly cannot be due to Protestantism; for it furnished nothing of the kind for a model. Indeed, wherever they have been founded, it has been, not by Protestantism, but in spite of it; for the world in founding them has had to go against the sect, and give up prejudice against the Church, at least so far as to imitate, as best it might, Catholic institutions, rebuild what the sect had destroyed, and thus far rehabilitate Catholicity in spite of heresy. Protestantism originate such establishments! Why, the wonderful success and happy results of the Church's time-honored and countless monuments and means of charity were the very things which pointed out to Protestant governments the only likely way of making up in some measure for the horrid deficiency everywhere felt in the Protestant world, and which the Reformation had created by its rejection of Catholicity and its charitable foundations. The selfish nature of private opinion would never even have dreamed of such lovely things, if the benign and beautiful forms of benevolence everywhere called up by the inspirations of Catholic charity had not gleamed like a bright vision across her weary and slumbering eyelids. Such monuments no more belong to Protestant charity than the religious and Gothic architecture of

certain sectarian meeting-houses in this and other cities owes its origin to Protestant genius. Both the one and the other are but poor attempts at copying what always sprung, fresh, glowing, and spontaneous, from the fine mind and big heart of glorious old Mother Church, even in the so-called "Dark Ages," as well as in the earliest times.

But what, in fact, has been the success even of these institutions, borrowed along with much practical experience from the ancient Church, and now maintained and directed by *reformed* governments and Protestant associations? We see what it has been, everywhere, in the present frightful condition of the lower classes in all Protestant countries. Millions, appropriated to build and sustain every species of them, fail utterly to purchase what the prayers and faith of the Catholic Church have in all ages abundantly called forth without bribe or salary; and the truth beams out to all eyes not wilfully closed, that it is not enough to build and furnish a hospital or poor-house, an asylum or a farm-school, and hire men and women to watch over them for a livelihood. More reliable means than can be secured by "cash payments" must be obtained, or institutions of public beneficence will only serve to aggravate the evils they are intended to cure. Take men and women of sound minds and expansive hearts, apprenticed from earliest youth to meekness and benignity; school them in austerity and self-mastery, discipline their will and understanding by prayer and deep meditation, and fire them with the resolution to consecrate their whole being, to employ the whole course of their lives, and to devote their undivided energies to the cause of charity and deeds of benevolence; give some of them hospitals for their homes, the sick and suffering for kindred and friends, to minister to those they love with the warmth of divine charity for their only thought and pleasure; send others abroad to the abodes of the weak and the afflicted, the infirm and the destitute, and let them look forward to no happiness but such as is measured and fashioned by their present tenderness and kindly care; give others still for their families the groups of poor children they gather around them, and allow them to spend their lifetime with no thought on earth but that of moulding those young hearts to goodness and true worth, — of forming them for heaven; — do this, reformers, if you can, and you will have secured for humanity an amount of solace, succour, and relief which all your millions can never purchase through the agency of mercenary superintendents and overseers.

But until this be done, look, for a proof of the value of un-catholic schemes, on the sad picture presented to the world by even the first of Protestant nations, that fortunate and enlightened empire, where Protestantism, seated on the throne, has reigned for these three hundred years supreme, established and seconded by the law of the land. And what, in fact, is the condition of the lower classes in Great Britain? What has the establishment and the "united wisdom" of the nation, with all its "commissioners," "committees," and "boards," been able to effect to supply the loss of Catholic faith animating British charity in the good old times of "Merry England"?* Popular education was to have beatified the people; but, unhappily, on the one hand, popular education—out of the Church—has not been found to be all that was expected, and on the other, no means have been found of obtaining its general diffusion, even such as it may be. The possession of the elements of secular knowledge is now admitted by many to be in itself an equivocal benefit, as no inference in its favor can be drawn from the prison statistics, which so elaborately set forth the numbers of those who can or cannot read and write.† A "most powerful and original thinker" confidently presumes that any man, who looks, in the right state of his senses, at the manner in which children are still brought up, after all reforms, in many parts of the land, — England, — will be convinced that parents are

* "Without being intensely selfish, our countrymen, whether at home or abroad, as well as their sons or brethren of America, have the spirit of enterprise so strong in them, that they are but too apt to forget the claims of humanity and justice, nay, even the true welfare of their offspring, in the prosecution of it. This love of enterprise is at once a virtue and a vice of the Saxon race, the source of many of their most glorious achievements and of their worst crimes. There are but too many Englishmen who, like Lot, seeing that the land is good, would be content to be settlers in Sodom and Gomorrah, provided that their capital would but return cent. per cent.; and thousands more who, in the present ecstasy of a profitable gain, are much of Vespasian's opinion, expressed in the words of the satirist, *Lucri bonus est odor ex re qualibet.*" — *Edinburgh Review*, July, 1847.

We cannot admit that this is a characteristic of the Saxon race, for it was not so in old Catholic times, and that it is so now is due only to the Reformation, and its enlightenment. The Reviewer would do well to meditate Sir John Denham's couplet in *The Progress of Learning*: —

"'T is happy when our streams of knowledge flow
To fill their banks, but not to overthrow."

† *Edinburgh Review*, October, 1847.

“bringing up their children a nuisance on the face of the earth.”* Many others seem to agree with Dr. Millingen, † that the education imparted to the masses will not “diminish the sum of human frailty.” Popular education, if anywhere among the reformed, must assuredly in Scotland produce very salutary effects towards increasing the comfort, morality, and elevation of the lower classes. We look into the number for May, 1847, of the *North British Review*, printed in Edinburgh, and read :—

“Mr. Symonds, the Government Commissioner, thus describes the filth of our Scottish towns :— ‘The wynds in Glasgow comprise a fluctuating population of from fifteen thousand to thirty thousand persons. . . . Thieving and prostitution constitute the main sources of the revenue of this population. *No pains seem to be taken* to purge this Augean pandemonium, this nucleus of crime, filth, and pestilence, existing in the second city of the empire. These wynds constitute the St. Giles of Glasgow ; but I owe an apology to the metropolitan pandemonium for the comparison. A very extensive inspection of the lowest districts of other places, both here and on the Continent, never presented any thing half so bad, either in intensity of pestilence, physical and moral, or in extent, proportioned to the population.’

“Before a committee of the House of Commons, the same gentleman said, — ‘It is my firm belief, that penury, dirt, and misery, drunkenness, disease, and crime, culminate in Glasgow to a pitch unparalleled in Great Britain.’”

What the pitch is there, we may soon see. Meanwhile, the Scottish Reviewer adds, from his own knowledge :—

“Much talk there has been, but nothing has yet been done, either to stay or to abate the evil. The moral and physical virus is going on accumulating and concentrating in the poorer parts of *all our Scottish towns*, one day to burst forth in fearful retaliation upon the classes by whose sufferance and apathy these things are so. Not Ireland, but our own neglected towns, threaten one day to become the pest-houses of Great Britain.”

Farther on we read :—

“A little while ago, the schoolmaster *abroad* was to do every thing for the poor man. It was only needful to count the proportions at school, or enumerate the readers and writers and arithmeticians, to know the measure of the well-being of the

* John Foster, *On Popular Ignorance*.

† *Mind and Matter*, &c. London, 1847.

people. But did we succeed in coaxing, bribing, or persecuting all the children in all the wynds, lanes, and closes of Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee, and Paisley to school, and in securing to them, to the full measure, the Scottish education of mere letters, or, if you will, of intellectual superiority to the boors of Norfolk, what would they be the better? Man is not only what the schoolmaster makes him, but much more what the daily and hourly, the thousand nameless influences of the sights and sounds of his home and neighbourhood make him; and to oppose only the schoolmaster, or even the schoolmaster and pastor [reformed], to the constant daily and hourly influences and training of dwellings and neighbourhoods, divested of *all that can cheer or elevate human beings* [true faith?], is to oppose the force of a torrent by a few twigs!" "To Glasgow and to Edinburgh," further reports Mr. Symonds, "justly belongs the bad preëminence"—in physical degradation.

Let us now view the educational state of the agricultural districts of England. Take Norfolk county as a fair specimen.

"The county of Norfolk," says the *North British Review*, as cited above, "is a rich agricultural county. It contains not less than seven hundred and fifty parishes. The average population of these seven hundred and fifty parishes is little more than five hundred souls; and its parish churches [reformed!] lie so close to each other, as to appear at every turn of the road or of the coast. In such a state of ecclesiastical sufficiency, one would have expected the intellectual and moral returns to have been amongst the highest in the kingdom, and that Norfolk would have been a great moral and intellectual garden. What says the inspector of the Church of England? 'Very few adults of either sex can read or write. An opinion prevails, that those who remain of the preceding generation more commonly possessed those acquisitions. A female has officiated as clerk in a parish for the last two years, none of the adult males being able to read. In another parish, the present clerk is the only man in the rank of a laborer who can read. In another, of four hundred souls, when the present school was established, two years ago, no laborer could read or write. A Dissenting minister, addressing a small congregation, was lately interrupted by a cry of "Glory be to your name!" He immediately repressed the cry, explaining that such language could be used only to the Deity. The answer was,—"Then glory be to both of you!" 'This,' says the inspector, 'I have too much reason to believe, is a *characteristic* fact, the suppression of which would, therefore, disguise the truth.'"^{*}

"The intellectual emancipation of the laity was one great result of the Reformation"†

^{*} *Minutes of Committee of Council on Education, 1840-41.*

† *London Quarterly Review*, June, 1847.

Perhaps their temporal comforts have, nevertheless, been looked to. Mr. Perry, who, during a period of more than seven years, journeyed over a large portion of England, in the capacity, as he informs us, of travelling agent of an association of philanthropists, draws the following picture of "the general state of the peasantry in most of the strictly agricultural counties of England":—

"Our improvements in agriculture, as a science, are capable of being profitably carried to an extent far beyond what they have yet been. But hitherto they have, in many instances, *been purchased at a price which humanity shrinks from contemplating.* The soil has been made more productive, but those who till it have not the means of enabling them to enjoy its fruits. Farm-houses have everywhere been greatly improved, but a large proportion of the farm-laborers live in wretched and cheerless hovels. Rents have risen in an extraordinary manner, but poor-rates have increased to an amount which heavily taxes these rents. . . . Nearly two hundred and forty years ago, England had so many poor, that her legislature saw it to be necessary to make a legal provision for them; but never, till within the present century, could it be said of England's sturdy peasantry, that, *as a class, they were pauperized*; and never, perhaps, in the annals of any nation, is the fact recorded, that the very means and causes which led to an aggrandizement of its aristocracy, such as no country save this ever witnessed, had the effect of *morally and physically deteriorating the condition of its industrious population to a level to which no Christianized and civilized state on the face of the earth at this moment presents a parallel.*" *

Mr. Perry advises the land-owners "to retrace every wrong step which they or their fathers have taken." But, Mr. Perry, will any thing avail to give them, as you desire, "some other resource than the poor-rates, the moment their labor is even temporarily suspended" (p. 40), unless they retrace the first great *faux pas* of their fathers? These poor-rates, you have informed us before, began "two hundred and forty years ago"!—some fifty years after the Reformation. "We hold it to be demonstrable that the condition of the working classes generally has much improved within the present century, as compared with the last." †

We can form, then, an idea of the central portion of the Reformation times;—they were worse than the present. The *Westminster Review* treats us to a view of the first and earliest

* *The Peasantry of England.* London, 1846.

† *Westminster Review*, April, 1847. *Theories of Population.*

portion of these glorious times, in comparison with this, their latest period, in which we now live.

"There is the recorded fact, that seventy thousand outlaws, vagrants, paupers, and others, who, in 1846, would have been relieved in *workhouses* in England, or provided with *Indian meal* in Scotland, or set to works, reproductive or otherwise, in Ireland, or, at the worst, shut up in well warmed and ventilated penitentiaries, [O philanthropic Reformation!] were, under the government of Henry VIII., summarily disposed of by the hangman. He had sixty thousand men in jail at once. Under the reign of the most merciful of his three children and successors, Harrison says, the average of executions was still four hundred per annum."*

In England, not long ago, one million workingmen, on the brink of starvation, struck work, as a quaint writer has it, "because no work was to be had," rose in insurrection, and left a dark marginal note on the page of "progress" in manufactures. "The physical condition of the working classes," says the author of *England and the English*, 1833, "is more wretched than we can bear to consider"; and he shows, from the documentary evidence on "the Factory Bill," that "the strongest boys employed in factories become crooked in their limbs, and maimed, in a short time, by constant work, day and night, — the form and limbs of young females crippled by seventeen hours a day hard work, all the year through. The weakest children are made, through poverty, to do the drudgery of mules and dogs." Nothing can equal the shameless abandonment of the female peasantry of England, if we may believe the same author.

A postscript to the *Westminster Review* for April, 1847, states that about seventy thousand children are now in immediate contact with pauperism in those dens, styled workhouses, in England. In the year 1845, says the *London Quarterly Review* for December, 1846, "there were taken into custody by the metropolitan police, 14,887 persons of both sexes, under twenty years of age. . . . But this is not a full statement of the annual mischief; much escapes the vigilance of the law; much falls somewhat within the limits of crime; much, however pernicious, cannot be ranked with offences against the queen's peace." These are the poor children, born in hatred of Popery, whom the *Quarterly* compares in boldness, pertness, and dirtiness to London sparrows, though looking, he humanely thinks, pale, feeble, and

* *Ibid.*

sadly inferior to them "in plumpness of outline." What a contrast to the superstitious little Papist rooks, that, well-fed and sleek, used to chatter and swarm around the cathedrals, abbeys, convents, and monasteries in *monkish* times! Nevertheless, they are emancipated, and live under the light, and share the benefits, of the "glorious Reformation."

As to the mining population, we read in the *North British Review* for November last, — "Certain it is, that till about the commencement of the present century, colliers were kept in a state of perpetual bondage, and, from the first moment of their existence, were considered as belonging to the property which gave them birth"; and that "the work of the *females* consisted in carrying the coal from the place where it was excavated to the bottom of the pit, whence it was taken to the surface." From a work by Mr. Bald, who has been nearly half a century at the head of the mining in Scotland, we may copy the following, cited by the Reviewer: —

"The mother sets out first, carrying a lighted candle in her teeth; the girls follow; and in this manner they proceed to the pit-bottom, and, with weary steps and slow, ascend the stairs, halting occasionally to draw breath, till they arrive at the hill or pit-top, where the coals are laid down for sale; and in this manner they go for eight or ten hours, almost without resting. It is no uncommon thing to see them, when ascending the pit, weeping most bitterly from the excessive severity of the labor; but the instant they have laid down their burden on the hill, they resume their cheerfulness, and return down the pit singing.

"The execution of work performed by a stout woman in this way is beyond conception. For instance, we have seen a woman, during the space of time above mentioned, take on a load of at least one hundred and seventy pounds avoirdupois, travel with this one hundred and fifty yards up the slope of the coal below ground, ascend a pit by stairs one hundred and seventeen feet, and travel upon the hill twenty yards more to where the coals are laid down. All this she will perform no less than twenty-four times as a day's work."

The Reviewer adds: —

"This extract presents no overdrawn picture, no exaggerated statement. In some respects, indeed, it falls short of what a coal-bearer's work was within the last ten years. It is utterly impossible for language to convey to a stranger any thing like an adequate idea of the immense toil which those poor women had to undergo. It was reckoned nothing extraordinary at a Lothian colliery, where bearers were employed, for a woman to carry on her back from

thirty-five to forty hundred weight of coal each day, a distance of between three and four hundred yards, the greater part of the road not higher than four and a half feet, and in some cases a considerable portion of it covered with water."

With regard to the determination to abate the danger of explosion, the Review (p. 39) says :— "The question must be brought to this issue," — the reformed doubt, — "Whether is capital or human life to be sacrificed ?" and humanely adds :—

"It will, no doubt, be a hard thing, if the proprietors of these coal-fields shall be compelled to carry on their operations under such restrictions as may for a time render them unproductive and unprofitable, or even suspend the working of them altogether; but it would be a harder thing still, if they must be worked as at present, with the chance, nay, the certainty, of every few months converting hundreds of homes into places of perpetual desolation and woe." *

Mr. Thomas Beggs, who is extolled in the *Westminster Review* for his sound views and most comprehensive grasping of the subject of education and the improvement of the working classes, makes use, in his lately published work, *Lectures on*

* We pass over, for want of space, in sketching the condition of reformed England, the horrors of the old convict system of penal settlements, the egregious "solecism of founding infant empires in crime," — settlements which really pertain to England, and of which the *Edinburgh Review* for July, 1847, in an article entitled, "What is to be done with our Criminals?" — a fearful question for British statesmen, since crime increases in their country at the rate of twelve per cent. *per annum*, — says, that the only real difficulty in presenting the arguments against the system is "that of giving any tolerable expression to them; of knowing in what dialect of civilized man, by what periphrases of decency, to bring the atrocities which recent documentary evidence has disclosed before the minds of our countrymen. It is impossible to read them, much less to write them, without feeling the cheek alternately burn with shame or blanch with horror." But transportation to New South Wales or Van Diemen's Land being suspended, in what a condition must the Australian colonies be left, on their way to become, as they *will* become, vast nations, perhaps extensive empires, — immense moral wildernesses, sprung from the wild luxuriance of the Reformation stem! Alas! wherever England sends out and establishes her colonies, she plants the seeds, nay, often transports the full-grown tree, of her own corrupt — reformed — civilization; as the old Phœnicians established, wherever they opened a colony or a factory, the idolatrous worship of the Tyrian Hercules; and who can tell down through how many generations of their posterity it will perpetuate the curse under which she now groans and writhes in agony?

the Moral Elevation of the People, of a very appropriate figure, in our present view, to bring before the minds of his "reformed" readers "the moral elevation of the people" of England. He portrays as gloomy and horrid a picture as his fancy can well furnish, of the state and condition of some ill-fated country, whose "priests are elevated as hierophants," where "the fate of the human mind is emphatically sealed," where "fanaticism and superstition brood over the minds of the people," where "barbarism and sensualism prevail, and hang their heavy cloud over the tomb of intellect, virtue, and knowledge." Is there, kind reader, any such country in any civilized region of this sublunary world of ours? Hear Mr. Thomas Beggs, whom we must presume to be well informed, at least, as to the condition of his own country. Writing of England in our day, he says: — "*In extensive districts this mental darkness hangs over our population. The ignorance of our people is a stain upon our character as a nation, and the time has come when there will be much danger in neglecting it.*"

What is well known to have ever been a glaring calumny, when applied to the most retrograde Catholic people in the most unfavorable times, we are, then, forced to admit to be plain truth with regard to England, irradiated with all the pure light of the Reformation shed upon her people since its first dawn to its meridian splendor in this present day! The Reformation, then, it seems, has alone been able to realize that state of things which had nowhere existed, even in fancy, but among the Reformers. They alone, in the sixteenth century, were frightened at the imaginary social monsters, which, strange to say, they have now produced. But this is not the first time that it has happened that the spectre which disordered the imagination of the parent has become visible to every eye in the form and features of the child.

Could we persuade ourselves, while going over these scenes of degradation and wretchedness, that "perfect clearness," as Carlyle says, in the evil "were equivalent to a remedy," we would continue our painful task with less reluctance. But we have said enough to disclose the workings of the Reformation on the lower classes in England. With these workings before their eyes, political economy and philanthropy are startled at the practical results of their creed of truths, and their benevolent impulses. They now cast at one another the cause of the cruelty and inhumanity which confessedly fall, between them both, on the "masses." "It has been of late the fash-

ion," says an economist in the *Westminster Review* for last April, "to decry the truths of political economy as the creed of inhumanity. The inhumanity is with those who would substitute the weakness of the heart for the soundest axioms of experience. We throw back the charge of cruelty upon the pseudo-philanthropists of the day." "A bad political economy," says the *Edinburgh Review* for last October, "has been, directly and indirectly, the cause of half the crimes of Europe."

Public opinion seems to many the only powerful agent competent to effect any thing really beneficial to society. The efficiency of the provisions of the penal code, the maintenance of any law, the certain detection and punishment of crime, the verdicts of jurors, the truthful observance of an oath, the value, in a word, of all the great social safeguards, depend chiefly upon public opinion, or, if you please, the healthy state of the general conscience. And what can procure this better than religious private opinions and interpretations? Now it seems, from the *Edinburgh Review* for July last, that a lamentably perverted sentimentality is extensively diffusing itself among the people, which may soon render it problematical whether *any* penal code really calculated to answer its object can be devised, — "a sentimentality which weeps over the criminal, and has no tears to spare for the miseries he has caused, — which transforms the felon into an object of interest, and forgets the innocent sufferers from his cruelty or perfidy." With regard to other equally important matters, the same Review, for October, 1847, says, public opinion on the subject is still *a making* in England. The able writer in the *Westminster*, quoted above, now confesses that "his faith in the *progress of opinion* has been lessened, and his confidence in the improvement of human institutions shaken, — that the world moves, indeed, as was said by Galileo, but that it moves in a circle. In the physical sciences a steady advance appears to be maintained; but in the moral we alternately advance and recede. Like the course of the earth as a planet, our path is in a prescribed orbit, which we never leave, and in which we are perpetually returning upon the same track." "To attempt," he adds, "to counteract prevailing hallucinations by a few words of plain sense, is to lift up a voice in the wilderness, which no man regardeth." And yet "the study of our social condition, with the view of bettering the mode of existence of the poorer and

more numerous portion of mankind in the civilized countries of Europe, is one of the most striking and cheering *characteristics* of the present century. Widely different as may be the opinions of some of the principal writers on these subjects, — Malthus [!], Sismondi, Degerando, Senior, Quêtelet, Sadler, and others, — the discussion, nevertheless, of the matters of which they treat serves at least to kindle *sparks of light*, which, if not revealing the whole truth at once, *may guide us to the track where we shall eventually discover it.*"* It would be attained sooner by studying Balmes, and the true history of Catholic institutions.

Even M. Michelet† is touched to the heart by the unsolaced suffering and helpless wretchedness to which he beholds the poor man of the present day so pitilessly abandoned. He would not be so impolite as to say, in the face of the enlightenment of this *siècle*, that there is no help for him save and except where he found it before, — that is, under the blessed guardianship of the Church. But he really insinuates as much in his gallant review of the whole case. All the evils the poorer classes now labor under must be charged, according to M. Michelet, to the transfer made some time ago of the direction and care of schools, hospitals, alms, and the protection of the poor from the Church to the lay power. The Church, you see, *wilfully* gave up the trust and the office, and therefore is blamable for these really heart-rending consequences. The Church, so actively and successfully engaged through former ages in these occupations of a humane character, modesty-stricken, one day retired from the world, piously disburdening herself on reformers, governments, and philanthropists of every thought and further concern about all these matters of the poor, and of charity, and of benevolence, which would only tend to mix her up too much with worldly distractions. We see and feel the consequences.

Now we agree perfectly with M. Michelet, that the disappearance of the Church from the stage where suffering, sorrow, wretchedness, and the thousand ills that flesh is heir to were struggling in the embraces of compassion, benevolence, and heaven-born charity, through a contest always more favorable, *duello mirando*, to the messengers of heaven than the evils born of earth, was indeed contemporaneously followed

* *Westminster Review*, April, 1847. Art. *Theories of Population*.

† *Histoire de la Révolution Française*, Tome I. Paris, 1847.

by the reappearance on the scene of misery in a thousand shapes, overpowering the slight opposition thrown before it, and stalking fearful and gigantic amid the powerless and puny forms of reformation, philanthropy, and all their thwarted and bustling little train. But before this last act there was an intervening act, which comprises an important feature of the drama, and this has been left out. Wherever the Church is seen to retire in any measure from the exercise of the corporal works of mercy, history presents us with a *tableau*, of which M. Michelet has transferred to his canvas only an isolated figure, suppressing those historic groups whose presence alone can account for the attitude, and explain the position, in which he portrays his modest and world-forsaking Church. She is indeed to be seen, as he represents her, wending her way from the asylums of misery and misfortune, to other scenes, or into the peaceful shades of retirement; but then history shows us, behind her retiring footsteps, a savage and threatening crowd, — with reform upon their banner, — dismissing by one door of these asylums their old guardian and keeper, in a condition of worldly nakedness and wounds well suited to excite modesty in that meek personage, and inspire thoughts of retirement from such company. Meanwhile the inmates of these despoiled abodes are thrust out by the opposite gateway, with a pittance of out-door relief to buy a new home for them in the world. Lazarus, indeed, scarce beyond the reach of his novel protectors, breaks out into menacing gestures and expressions of rage; but his anger is directed at the invaders of his happy abode and the despoilers of his ancient guardian, — not, as M. Michelet seems to think, at the expelled and retiring benefactress, whose fate he well knows he always has shared and always will share through weal and through woe.

The change which, as history shows, soon comes over the abbey halls where Lazarus once had a home, and the successors of the poor man's friend now bestowing all their tenderness on hounds and hunters, and other such variations of scene, appearing in the background of the picture, — all this should be more than enough to elicit M. Michelet's as well as Lazarus's detestation. But no! he first philosophizes over the robbery of the poor man's friend, and then pities the poor man, but blames his friend, for the mutual position they now hold. If M. Michelet had the moral courage of Montalambert, he would tell all this pitiful tale in a few words of plain French,

giving us to understand his idea to be, that, without the Church, the poor, the afflicted, and the wretched have nothing to expect, but still again and again poverty, affliction, and wretchedness. This, too, he might say *avec connaissance de cause*, — for the experiment has been tried, *et que voulez vous faire !*

If, according to the sentiment of Dr. Vaughan, in his letter to the *Morning Chronicle*, Sept. 10, 1847, applauded by the *Edinburgh Review*, "government should be thankful to see its province daily reduced to a smaller and still smaller compass," that is, by voluntary efforts on the part of the people, what can present higher claims upon the attention, or more fully entitle itself to the thankfulness, of governments, than the admirable workings of Catholic faith in the direction of benevolence? The Catholic Church possesses peculiar qualifications — qualifications which no other body does or can possess — for rendering those voluntary efforts not only common and almost universal among individuals, but perpetual in associations which are willingly formed and sustained in her bosom, and of a twofold efficiency, through the self-imposed character of disinterestedness, and the professedly tender and meek spirit of the unsalaried staff and officials of her volunteer corps of benevolence. Legal enactments in the nature of poor-laws and poor-rates were never demanded of the government, until, along with the rejection of the Catholic Church, most of those means and appliances for the relief of the suffering and indigent, which Catholicity had abundantly supplied, were necessarily lost, and some substitute for them was required, not indeed by the diminishing, but by the daily increasing, number of sufferers.

We have in what has been said the proof and the acknowledgment, that as yet nothing has been devised to supply the place of what was taken from the people by the loss of Catholicity. It is impossible at the present day to deny, and no one pretends to deny, the almost hopelessly sad state to which the bulk of the lower classes are now sunk, in those countries which glory the most in the benefits of the Reformation. After three centuries of extraordinary progress and prosperity, Dr. Vaughan very appropriately presents to us a Protestant government, much in the attitude and bearing of a step-mother addressing a sadly conditioned family bereft of their natural parent, — "Since your mother is no more, I should be thankful to you if you would manage to provide for your own wants."

We have taken Great Britain for our example because she is the model Protestant country, and because surely it is in her, if anywhere, we may see the real workings of reform, and collect its genuine fruits. If even in Great Britain Protestantism has been able to produce only a moral and physical state of the population unheard of, prior to reforming times, in any civilized nation, and from which she herself starts back with horror and alarm, surely we may say that she has utterly failed in realizing the social Utopia she promised. In a foregoing article we have proved, that, under a political point of view, she engenders only tyranny or anarchy, oppression or the Reign of Terror. If, then, as we now see, in a social point of view she brings in her train, not the increase, but the destruction, of social well-being, she must stand condemned of impotence to produce the good she proposed, and, as we said, of a superhuman power to produce, in its most aggravated forms, the very evil she declaimed against and promised to redress. May we not, then, say, that there has been enough of reform, and ask, if, after the failure of its experiment, tried, under every advantage, for three hundred years, suffering humanity does not point to the absolute necessity, not of a further reform, but of a *restoration* of that which has been *reformed* away?

ART. VI. — *Oraison Funèbre d'O'Connell, prononcée à Rome, par le R. P. VENTURA, Théatin, June, 1847.*
Le Propagateur Catholique : New Orleans.

OF the illustrious subject of Padre Ventura's Oration, which our friends of the *Boston Pilot* have republished in English, and which every body has read, it cannot be necessary that we should speak. We could not say more than the learned and eloquent Théatin has said, were we to try; and we have no disposition to say less. Nor can it be necessary to speak of the general character and merits of the Oration itself, — a political manifesto addressed by an eminent tribune of the people to all Christendom, and intended to have an immediate bearing on the movements for political reforms in Rome and Italy. Padre Ventura is a distinguished man, and perhaps one of the most popular and effective pulpit orators of the day. With his general tone, doctrines, and aims we

should be sorry not to sympathize. We go with him, heart and soul, in his love of liberty, his hatred of oppression, and his war against tyrants and tyranny.

But if he has been correctly translated, either in French or English, — of which we cannot judge, not having seen the original Italian, — he makes use of some expressions in his Oration, and especially in the Preface to his second edition, in which he defends its doctrines and makes his own eulogium, to which, as at present advised, we are far from being prepared to assent. As we understand him, he contends, that in the present posture of affairs in Europe, the true policy of the Church is to abandon the governments, appeal to the people, and form an alliance between religion and liberty. Such a policy, he appears to maintain, is necessary to the preservation of the Church, and will be to the advantage of both liberty and religion, — the former gaining sacredness, order, and stability, and the latter an infusion of popular energy, which will enable the Church to bring once more under her influence the populations now disaffected with their rulers, and with her, because they believe her to be leagued with them to oppress. This seems to us to be his general doctrine, and we are unable to distinguish it from the policy contended for with so much zeal and eloquence by De Lamennais and his associates, after the French Revolution of July, 1830, in the brilliant columns of the *Avenir*.

We confess, in the outset, that any talk of an *alliance* of religion and therefore of the Church with any thing outside of her, as necessary to her existence or her efficiency, scandalizes us not a little. The phrase itself offends us ; for it is impossible to use it so that, to large numbers, at least, it shall not convey a false and mischievous meaning. We can readily believe, that, in Padre Ventura's mind, and in the minds of his Roman hearers and readers, it conveys, under existing circumstances, only a sense which is sound and worthy of all acceptance; but in France, in England, and in this country, it inevitably bears a meaning which it seems to us no good Catholic can accept, as may easily be gathered from the misconstructions which have almost universally been put upon the conduct of the Holy Father in the salutary reforms which he has introduced into his more immediate temporal dominions. The Church we have been accustomed to regard as sufficient for herself, and as under no necessity, for her own preservation or efficiency, to make common cause with any

power outside of her. Whatever is good and worthy to be sought she includes in herself ; and we cannot understand what there is outside of her with which she can form an alliance, without proving herself in some measure unfaithful to her celestial Spouse. Her energy, the only energy she needs, which comes from Him who said, *Ego vobiscum sum omnibus diebus*, appears to us to be fully equal to her necessities, and therefore the infusion of popular energy contended for we cannot but regard as quite superfluous.

Moreover, we are at some loss to understand what is meant by forming an *alliance* between religion and liberty. To call for the forming of such an alliance seems to us to imply, what is not true, that religion has heretofore been divorced from liberty, and has remained alone, or formed an adulterous union with tyranny and oppression. An alliance presupposes, also, that the allies are separate and independent powers ; but we are not aware of any such power as liberty, separate from religion, and independent of it. Religion is the origin, ground, and condition of liberty. Where religion is, there is liberty ; where religion is not, whatever of license there may be, there is not liberty, and cannot be. The two are in their nature inseparable, and indistinguishable even, save as the effect is distinguishable from the cause, the property from the essence, the stream from the fountain. How, then, form an alliance between them, since they are already in their very nature so intimately united ? How form an alliance between the sun and its rays, or the rainbow and its tints ?

That there has been, and is, a party throughout most European nations clamoring for liberty as separated from religion, we are not ignorant ; but they clamor for what has and can have no real existence, under that sacred name. That this party has made and still makes war on the Church, that it has believed and still believes, or pretends to believe, that the Church is the enemy of liberty, and that to become free it is necessary to overturn the altar as well as the throne, is lamentably true ; but who that loves religion, and is imbued with the lessons of the Gospel, can advocate an alliance of the Church with these, or pretend that to accept and support, not, indeed, their means, but the end they are really seeking, would be to accept and support the cause of liberty ? That which the enemies of the Church, the desecrators of all holy things, and the blasphemers of God clamor for, is not liberty, and can by no ecclesiastical alchemy be transmuted into liberty. There is

with these not merely a mistake as to the means, agencies, or influences by which the end is to be gained, but a mistake as to the end itself. With what in them is religion to form an alliance? Or what energy have they from which she could profit?

Perhaps, however, we take the word *liberty* in too refined a sense, in a sense too metaphysical or too spiritual; perhaps Padre Ventura uses the word in a more outward sense, and means by it simply popular institutions. There is throughout the greater part of Europe a deep disaffection on the part of the people towards their civil rulers, a demand for change, and especially for the introduction and establishment of popular forms of government, as the only efficient means of protecting themselves against the oppressions of their governors, and of securing their social well-being. Does the eloquent and enthusiastic Théatin mean by the policy he contends for, that the Church should refuse to sustain the actual governments in their measures of repression, often essential to their very existence, side with the populations, and encourage and direct the movements for the realization of the end they are seeking?

This, we own, has a specious appearance and a plausible sound, but, republicans as we are, we are not prepared to accept it. We have here the same difficulty we began by suggesting. Where the end proposed is distinctly religious, and is sought from religious motives, the Church may, undoubtedly, side with those who are seeking it, bless their efforts, and make common cause with them; for their cause is hers, and she does but use them for the accomplishment of her own purposes. But where the end is not itself distinctly religious, and is not referred to a distinctly religious end,—is not to secure the freedom and independence of the Church, and to enable her to pursue freely, without let or hindrance, her divine mission of teaching, saving, succouring, and solacing mankind, but to procure a merely temporal or earthly good,—we see not how she can make common cause with those who are in pursuit of it, without implying that heaven makes a compact with earth. The Church may, and assuredly does, promote men's earthly well-being, but never save as incidental to her promotion of their spiritual and eternal interests. The temporal follows the eternal, but does not precede it, and is not sought by it. "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be *added* unto you" (St. Matt. vi. 33), is the principle on which the Church proceeds,

and the invariable law which she prescribes to her children. The heavenly is gained only by being the direct and sole object of pursuit ; but the earthly only by not being so sought, and, indeed, only by not being sought at all. "He that will save his life shall lose it, and he that will lose his life for my sake shall find it" (St. Matt. xvi. 25). We know no exceptions to this rule.

Now these European populations seeking popular forms of government are not seeking these as a religious end, nor, indeed, for a religious end ; but solely with a view to their own social or temporal well-being. They have not in view the interests of religion ; they are not disposed to struggle for the freedom and independence of the Church, or to remove a single obstacle in the way of her fulfilling in them, or for them, her divine mission ; they have in view only their own earthly interests. These they may, — in so far as they violate no law of God, omit no moral or religious duty, — no doubt, lawfully seek ; but the Church cannot, while they seek them only in reference to an earthly end, make common cause with them, without an abandonment of her own principle of action, and in some measure compromising her divine mission. Moreover, it is not a sound view to identify even civil liberty with popular forms of government. Freedom is possible under any and every form of government ; and so is tyranny. Republics can tyrannize and oppress as well as monarchies, and we see among ourselves, that, under the most democratic institutions on earth, three millions of the population out of twenty can be held in abject slavery. Wherever the government is wisely and justly administered, whatever its form, there is civil freedom, and wherever it is not so administered, there is not civil freedom ; and the chances of a wise and just administration are not in proportion to the more or less popular form of the government, but to the more or less influence which religion has over the nation. Wherever the Church is free, and is able to exert her legitimate influence, the government will be as wisely administered as with human frailty can be expected ; but where she is not free, or where her influence is not exerted, there is and can be no guaranty of such administration, whatever the contrivances of statesmen, or in whose hands soever may be placed the reins of government.

As long as the European populations place their temporal well-being before their spiritual and eternal, not even the Church can emancipate them, and secure them the blessings of civil

liberty. Political changes will prove unavailing, and the evil which is now concentrated in the court would only be diffused through the mass, and for one tyrant give a hundred. No siding with the people, no consecration of their banner and blessing of their cause, will deliver them from oppression, unless they in themselves seek liberty, not for an earthly, but for a heavenly end, — unless they place the Church first in their affections and obedience, and seek freedom for her sake, instead of their own.

Undoubtedly, if the Church were to proclaim common cause with the movement for popular institutions, the great body of those who are seeking them would applaud her, and rally under her banner, because they could rally under hers without deserting their own. She and they would certainly come together ; not by their going to her, but by her coming to them. They would, no doubt, hail her as a welcome ally, and drink many a toast to her health, so long as she claimed to be *only* an ally ; but the moment she should seek to restrain their lawlessness, to compel them to observe discipline, or claim the right to command their forces, they would raise the cry, *À bas l'Église, vive la République !* and she would find herself under the disadvantage of seeming to them to oppose the very cause she had sanctified and the very banner she had blessed. The alliance would secure her an infusion of popular energy, while she obeyed the popular passion, and exerted herself only to carry out the popular will ; but no longer. For a moment, she would seem to be strengthened by the alliance ; but having by it made a concession to the people, and told them that they were justifiable in their cause, she would in reality only be weakened by it.

But it is said, the populations have become hostile to the Church in consequence of their belief that she is unfriendly to civil liberty, and unless she espouses the cause they have so much at heart, they will neither submit nor listen to her. There may be some truth in this, but we cannot accept the conclusion, that therefore she must disabuse them by espousing that cause. An astute politician in old pagan times might have reasoned with equal justice, — The bulk of the pagan people believe the Church is opposed to what they hold to be religion, and will not submit or listen to her teaching ; it is necessary, therefore, that she disabuse them by offering incense to the idols. No matter whether the idol be Jupiter, Venus, or civil liberty, an alliance with its worship is alike inadmissible. It is not for those without to propose conditions to the Church, nor

is it for her to make concessions to them. She proposes the conditions ; if we abuse our free-will and reject them, and destroy our own souls, the responsibility rests on us, not on her.

It is, undoubtedly, desirable to disabuse the populations of their error ; but it cannot be done in the way proposed. The Church cannot, in order to disabuse them, consent to take the law from them. The policy recommended would procure, not their submission to her, but hers to them. They who submit to the Church for the sake of any temporal good do not submit to her at all, nor do they become in reality any more or better Catholics than they were before. The European populations, to a considerable extent, no doubt, place the melioration of society and the establishment of political liberty before every other object. But this is a grave error on their part, — an error to be corrected, not sanctioned. For the Church to make common cause with them were only to confirm them in it. Nay, this very error is one of the chief obstacles to the realization of the social improvement and civil liberty they demand. Their eagerness overleaps itself, and fails of its aim. The Church can do nothing for them, save in proportion as she is able to disabuse them of this error, and bring them to place God and heaven before all things else. As long as they entertain their present false view, the Church cannot rely on them, — cannot work with them, without falling herself into error, — and they are out of the condition of either effecting or receiving their emancipation. The Church can really aid only those who love and obey her, — submit themselves to her instructions and authority.

Padre Ventura appears to hold that the evil in the present dispositions of the European populations is, not in their overweening attachment to a merely temporal good, but in their mistake as to the methods of gaining it. He approves the end aimed at, and only dreads the attempt to obtain it without religion, and by violence. The error of Jacobinism was, then, it would seem, not inherent in itself, but in its attempt to gain its object under the banner of philosophism, and by war and bloodshed. But we are inclined to believe that Jacobinism could not march under any other banner, or reach its end by any other means. It would, we must believe, be the same thing, though divested of its red cap and sea-green coat, and decked out in the drab-colored suit and broad-brimmed hat of the Quaker. It is not alone the horrors of the revolution that is to be dreaded, but also the revolutionary spirit ; for if the

spirit itself be fostered, the horrors sooner or later will inevitably follow. We have never heard of a *peaceful* subversion of an old government, and institution of a new one in its place. "Peaceful agitation" may suffice to carry a specific measure, when nothing is necessary for carrying it but to collect and concentrate the scattered rays of opinion already existing ; but it will prove impotent, where fundamental or organic changes are demanded, unless backed by a threat of force in the last resort ; and even then rarely, if ever, without an actual collision of forces. A whole people, wrought up by agitators to the highest pitch of enthusiasm for political changes, will soon begin, let leaders and chiefs say what they will, to sharpen their pikes, if obliged to wait longer than their impatience judges to be necessary. It is too late to think of controlling a people when once so wrought up, and if so wrought up for an object which is merely temporal, in vain will you talk to them of God and religion. Not in the moment of passion or debauch does the voice of the preacher reach the heart, and startle the conscience from its slumber. None but a religious people can be controlled by religious motives ; and no truly religious people can be wrought up to a pitch of enthusiasm for a temporal object adequate to the purpose of the *peaceful*, any more than of the *violent*, revolutionist. Whenever, then, you agitate for civil liberty as such, prepare to fail, or prepare for the horrors of rebellion and bloodshed, the reign of terror, ay, and the military despotism which is to supplant it.

Finally, we cannot understand how the Church can raise the banner of Democracy, and call upon the faithful to rally under it. She prescribes no particular form of government ; in her view, all forms of government, when and where legitimately established or legally existing, are alike sacred and obligatory. She commands the administrators of governments, whether they be kings, nobles, or the people, to administer the government wisely and justly, in subjection to the law of God, for the public good. This is as far as she ever goes. How, then, can she side with the people in their movements for popular forms of government ? Is she to change her policy, pursued without deviation for eighteen hundred years, and at this late day propose a particular form of government as an article of faith ? Or because kings now are tyrants, is she to preach up democracy, and when democracy becomes a tyrant, to be obliged to preach up monarchy ? There is in the demand, it strikes us, quite too much of short-sighted human policy, pur-

suing a course to-day which it must retrace to-morrow, or which seeks to gain a temporary object at the expense of an eternal principle.

But if we oppose the policy which seems to us to be recommended in the Oration before us, it is not because we oppose liberty, or are the friends and apologists of the crowned tyrants or imbeciles of Europe. We have no sympathy with the policy of the principal European courts. That policy is opposed to the freedom and independence of the Church, without which no people can be free, and no government wisely and justly administered. We abhor and detest it, because it is hostile to freedom of conscience, and would enchain the word of God, — because it would subject the spiritual to the temporal, and rob Almighty God of his own. Let there be a crusade preached against them in behalf of the freedom and independence of the Church, — let the populations be summoned to break the cords with which these infidel governments bind the Lord's Anointed, and we will be first among the foremost to bind on the cross, and march to the battlefield, to victory or immortality. In securing this, the highest of all liberties, and the source and guaranty of all liberty worthy of the name, the people would be emancipated from their tyrants, to the full extent compatible with human infirmity. Civil freedom would be secured for all. "If the Son make you free, you shall be free indeed." It is, therefore, the freedom of the Son, the freedom wherewith he makes free, that we should first of all — nay, alone — seek, and all other freedom shall be added thereto. Seek God alone, and you find what you seek, and, over and above all, the good you did not seek. Give all to God, and he gives all back to you in a hundred fold.

We wish the Church to go as far against the governments of Europe as Padre Ventura does ; but for her own emancipation, which includes every other emancipation. We would have her go, as she always does, to the extent of her power, for her own liberty ; but not for Liberalism, whether conspiring in secret with Free-masons and Carbonari, marching openly with Swiss Radicals to the destruction of states and the desecration of temples, or assuming the Quaker garb of peaceful agitation. Then the end proposed would be distinctively religious, and the Church might well consecrate the banner and bless the armies of the warriors enlisted ; for they would be her own soldiers, her own sons, not foreign allies or mer-

cenaries. In a work of this kind every Catholic could sympathize, and would give at least his prayers for its success.

We admire our great and good Father Pius IX. for the administrative reforms he has introduced into the immediate patrimony of St. Peter; but we admire him still more for the free, bold, and commanding attitude which he assumes before the lay lords of the earth, — recalling the sainted Hildebrand, the heroic third Alexander, and the third Innocent, who made crowned heads feel and acknowledge that the Church is paramount to the state, and that, when she speaks, kings as well as the meanest of their servants must bare the head and listen. Thanks, devout thanks, be to Almighty God, who has sent us a successor of St. Peter, that brings back the heroic ages, and, in face of an infidel, and scoffing, and time-serving generation, renews the chivalry of the cross, and speaks in the tone that becomes the viceregent of God on earth! Let the faithful rally at his bidding; let them glory in his reassertion of the independence of the spiritual power, that as Pontiff, as well as prince, he spurns the dictation of the Austrian, the wiles of the Gaul, and the cajoleries of the Briton; let them support him by their prayers, and, if need be, by their deeds; and be assured that the tyranny which now weighs so heavily upon the European populations will be lightened, the chains which bind the souls of the toiling and starving millions will be broken, Christian civilization, so fatally interrupted by the Protestant rebellion in behalf of heathenism, will resume its march, and effect for man as full a measure of earthly well-being as it can be for his interest to possess.

In conclusion, we say, though we have criticized with some severity Padre Ventura's Oration, we have done so only in the sense in which we think his language likely to be understood here among our own countrymen. We are far from supposing that he has put forth any thing really unsound, as he himself understands it. He looks, as we question not, solely to the glory of religion, to the freedom and prosperity of the Church. He finds the governments everywhere seeking to render the spiritual power the slave of the temporal, and he would defeat their efforts; he sees, also, the people everywhere bent on political reforms, and reforms, he would tell them, they may have, should have, only they must seek them in a peaceful manner, and from religion, and under her direction; and he believes that the Church, by aiding the peo-

ple in effecting those reforms, in emancipating them from the tyranny under which they groan, may emancipate herself from the secular power, and secure her freedom and independence. Therefore he would urge upon all Catholics who are afraid of revolutions not to oppose the popular movements, but to seek to bring them under the influence and direction of religion. This we suppose is his real thought, and this in the main is sound and just. We wish, however, that for our sakes here, where our greatest danger is from radicalism, from an exaggerated democracy, he had been a little more careful to mark the place of religion as that of sovereign, and not have presented her in the character of an ally. The error, in this view of his meaning, into which Padre Ventura falls, if he errs at all, is in supposing that popular governments will be more favorable to the freedom and independence of the Church than are the existing governments of Europe. For ourselves, we have full confidence in the Church; but we have as little in the intelligence and virtue of a people bent only upon the acquisition of temporal goods, as we have in infidel and licentious kings, and half-mad and imbecile emperors. The government in the hands of the people, unless they are profoundly religious, will be hardly less hostile to the real freedom and independence of the Church, than in the hands of royal tyrants and their minions. We have seen enough of popular governments to be aware that the people, as well as the king, need a master, and a master, too, that is under the special protection of Almighty God, and able at all times and in all places to command with Divine authority.

ART. VII. — *The Dublin Review*, No. XLVI., Art. VI. London: Richardson & Son. January, 1848.

THIS is the first part of an attempted reply to the papers we have published against Mr. Newman's theory, especially to the article in this journal for last October, entitled *The Dublin Review on Developments*. We have read it, as far as it goes, with attention, and as little prejudice as possible; but we have found it exceedingly unsatisfactory. It is written after the manner of an Oxford student or an Anglican controversialist, rather than after the manner we are accustomed to in Catholic theologians. The author evades the real questions in debate, and seeks to make up a foreign issue, not necessarily involving either the truth or the falsehood of the theory to which we have objected. He evidently wishes to abandon the defence of the theory to itself, and to make the whole controver-

ny turn on the exactness or inexactness of our statement of Catholic teaching; in other words, to abandon the defensive and assume the offensive. This undoubtedly is creditable to him as a strategist, but it can be of little avail. It is not difficult either to see through his manœuvring, or to meet and thwart it. Too much art sometimes defeats itself, and fails, when a simple and natural method would lead on to victory.

As far as proving us to have been inexact is proving the truth of the theory of development, the method of the Reviewer is legitimate enough, but no farther. Perhaps we might be inexact in our statement of Catholic teaching, and yet that theory not be true; and if so, proving us in the wrong would not be proving the Reviewer in the right. If we are right in our statement of that teaching, the theory is most unquestionably false; but we are much mistaken, if we may not be decidedly in the wrong on the points on which the Reviewer labors to prove us so, and yet the theory be wholly inadmissible. To all he alleges against us, possibly we could reply, *Concedo, quid inde?*

But it is necessary to bear in mind that the doctrine which the Reviewer ascribes to us, and against which alone he brings his heavy artillery to bear, does not happen to be ours or any body's we ever heard of. It is his own invention, and he has the exclusive right to it. If we understand him, he asserts that we maintain, or would persuade his readers that we maintain, that the whole Christian doctrine has been *explicitly* believed from the first, not only by the Church, but also by all the faithful, and that nothing can be defined of faith which has not been so believed from the beginning by every one, whether simple or learned, a rustic or a doctor. But this is a grave mistake. We hold no such doctrine; we have said nothing, fairly interpreted, to authorize the supposition that we do, but enough to warrant the assertion that we do not, as the Reviewer cannot be unaware, if he has done us the honor to read the articles on which he professes to comment. We are exceedingly humbled that any one should suppose us either so ignorant or so disingenuous as to deny, what every Catholic of ordinary intelligence knows, that large portions of Christian doctrine are believed by the rude and simple only *implicitly*, or that there are many things not explicitly believed at all times and in all places, by every one of the learned even. To say that we do not deny this would seem to us very much like saying that we do not deny that a triangle is not a circle.

The doctrine we have opposed to the theory of developments is, that the revelation made to and through the Apostles was an explicit and perfect revelation of the whole Christian faith, — save, as Suarez maintains, certain things which in the times of the Apostles had not yet happened, and which were formally revealed in the explicit revelation, as the particular in the universal, or the part in the whole, — and that this revelation was explicitly and completely delivered over by the Apostles to their successors, and has been at all times explicitly held and believed by the Church. This is the doctrine we have set forth as that of all our theologians, and this is the precise doctrine to be disproved, before we can be convicted of inexactness in our statement of Catholic teaching. But, thus far, the Reviewer has not disproved this doctrine, nor has he succeeded in adducing a single authority, respectable or otherwise, against it. Some of the authorities he cites, undoubtedly, disprove the doctrine he is pleased to tell his readers is ours; but to disprove what we do not hold is not precisely to disprove what we do hold. Neverthe-

less, the Reviewer must disprove this doctrine before his offensive operations can begin to avail him any thing. Not as yet having done this, he has as yet made no advance in the argument, either against us or for himself.

It is clear now what the Reviewer must do in order to place us in the wrong; let us see what he must do in order to place himself in the right, or to defend the theory of development in the sense in which we have set it forth and objected to it. He must maintain,— 1. The original revelation committed to the Apostles, and through them to the Church, was imperfect, inchoate, containing gaps to be filled up in the process of time by the uninspired action of the human mind; 2. It is impossible to make a revelation which the uninspired human mind can take in or apprehend, except through long and laborious processes of thought, which can go on only successively, and be completed only after a considerable lapse of time; 3. Christian doctrine, or the object embraced in the act of believing, is not the revealed fact, but the mind's idea of it, always more or less inadequate, or the form which the mind by its own uninspired action imposes upon it; 4. It is no objection to a theory, that it degrades Christianity to the level of sects and human philosophy; 5. No provision was made in the Apostolic revelation, as originally delivered to the Church, for Infant Baptism, or post-baptismal sins; 6. The Sacrament of Penance was not an original Apostolic institution, but a development effected after the establishment of the Church, and after the faithful had become corrupt; 7. Purgatory was a development effected subsequently to the first ages, as a form of Penance due for sins committed after Baptism; 8. The doctrine of the Trinity was only imperfectly understood by the Ante-Nicene Fathers, and not fully *formed* till the fourth century, and that of the Incarnation remained imperfect till the sixth; 9. Excepting some of the elements of the principal mysteries, nothing is formally of faith till controverted, and judicially defined and declared by the Church. These and many other propositions hardly less startling to the Christian are contained in that theory of development which we have opposed, and these, or the theory in the sense of these, the Reviewer must defend, or he does not defend that to which we have objected. To defend developments in some other sense, or some other theory of developments, is nothing to the purpose; for it is only this theory, or developments in the sense of this theory, that we have opposed.

We regret to perceive that the Reviewer overlooks this fact, and proceeds as if the question turned on developments in general, and as if he could conclude against us in case he should prove developments anywhere, in any sense, and on no matter what ground. But this is a grave error. We object to developments in a specific subject, in a specific sense, asserted on a specific ground, and to certain particular developments. If he shows that we misapprehend the theory, that it does not assert the particular developments to which we object, nor developments in the subject, in the sense, and on the ground to which we take exceptions, well and good; we have nothing more to say; for then he shows that the theory contended for is something which we have not opposed, and to prove it is to prove nothing against us. He must take one of two courses. He may disavow the theory in the sense in which we oppose it, or he may attempt to defend it from the objections we bring against it; but he must do the one or the other. He cannot prove it in one sense, and conclude its truth in another. If he will not disavow it in the sense object-

ed to, he must defend it in that sense. No evasion, no manœuvring, will avail him. He must come at last to one or the other, or forfeit all claims to be considered a fair and honest controversialist.

And why should he hesitate to do it? He either holds the theory in the sense of the propositions we have given, or he does not. If he does, is it necessary to tell him that he must defend it in that sense, and that to defend it, as he seeks to do, in some other sense is nothing to his purpose? If he does not, can he not say so, and tell us precisely what it is he does mean to defend under the head of developments? Why not meet the question directly, fairly, honestly, like a good Christian? Is not truth his object? Would it be just to conclude that he loves his theory more than truth, or that he would rather play the sophist than acknowledge that he has erred? Is there any hardship or humiliation in saying that we have been in the wrong? Who is there that has not erred? and what more manly, when convinced that we have erred, than to say so, frankly, and without a wry face? Out upon the contemptible pride that would make us blush to confess our errors! It is a privilege, a precious privilege, to be allowed to confess our errors; for by doing so we may make some reparation for the injury they may have done.

In looking over the Reviewer's article, we cannot perceive that he has made the least advance, either in proving what we objected to, or in disproving what we asserted to be the Catholic doctrine. He remains where we placed him last October. He introduces no additional authorities, adduces no new arguments, and fails utterly to vindicate to himself those of his own authorities which we turned against him. In the very few instances in which he may appear to some of his readers who are not also our readers to have done something, his apparent success is due solely to his keeping the true issue out of sight, to his misrepresenting our doctrine, and his representing what we adduced to prove one point as adduced to prove another, to prove which we did not adduce it or rely on it. This is especially true of his reply to our exposition of the long extract from Suarez. Some of his assertions are so extraordinary as to transcend the bounds of sophistry, and, unless he retains the old Tractarian habit of using words in "a non-natural sense," are downright — misstatements. His boldness, not to say unscrupulousness, surprises us not a little. If he believes he has truth on his side, how can he believe it necessary to resort to sophistry, to misrepresentation, and misstatement? All men of ordinary morality prefer, when they can, to maintain their cause by fair and honorable means; and whenever one resorts to other means, he raises a suspicion that his cause is weak, and that he feels it to be so.

Thus far we have simply stated what the Reviewer must do in order either to refute what we maintain or to defend what we oppose, and given our estimate of the character and value of his reply as far as it has proceeded. A more particular examination we reserve till we receive the concluding portion of his article, in which we shall rejoice to find something definite and to the purpose. We hope in that we shall find what it is he really wishes to defend, and be relieved of our present uncertainty, whether it is the theory we oppose, or something else, to which we may or may not object.

There are, however, a few incidental topics introduced by the Reviewer, of no great importance in themselves, indeed, which we wish to dispose of now, that we may have nothing to divert our attention hereafter

from the main issue. The Reviewer represents us as mistaken in regarding his former article as intended to be a reply to us. He did not profess, he says, to reply to us. That he did not profess to do so in just so many words is true; that he did substantially, we thought, and we still think, we had reason for supposing. He placed our article at the head of his, and gave as his reason for doing so his "wish to offer a few comments on" it, which, according to our understanding of editorial usage, is equivalent to expressing an intention "to offer a reply." Moreover, he assigned as his reason for commenting on our article at all, the fact that we had included in the censure we bestowed certain gentlemen besides Mr. Newman, and "these had a right to be heard in their own defence." This either was a reason, or it was not. It would not be respectful to say it was not. If it was, the purpose of the Reviewer was to defend these gentlemen from the censure in which we had included them. But we had included them in no censure except that which we bestowed upon Mr. Newman's theory, and in that only so far as they embraced it. The only possible way of defending them from that censure was either to show that they did not embrace the theory in the sense in which we censured it, or by defending the theory itself against us. The Reviewer did not defend or attempt to defend them in the former way, and therefore must have attempted to do it in the latter way; which was to attempt a reply to us. That he waived Mr. Newman's Essay and Mr. Newman's name is true, but this amounted to nothing; because what we objected to in Mr. Newman was not his name or his book, as a mere book, but the theory we found in a book bearing his name. That he did not undertake to defend that theory as Mr. Newman's, we grant; but he either did undertake to defend it against us as the theory of certain other gentlemen, and therefore to reply to us, or he made an unwarrantable use of our name. If he proposed simply to defend some other theory, a theory we had not assailed, and against other opponents, what in the world had we to do with the matter, and by what right did he make an article of ours the subject of his comments?

The Reviewer complains that we expressed a regret that the task of replying to us had not been committed to some learned Catholic doctor, and adds, rather tartly, — "Surely, what a layman and a recent convert is at liberty to write, a layman and a recent convert is at liberty to answer." Unquestionably; yet a certain layman and recent convert may be *competent* to write what another may not be competent to answer. The question is not as to the liberty, but as to the competency. But the Reviewer mistakes the source of our regret. We did not wish for a Catholic doctor because we thought ourselves entitled to an opponent of a higher grade than the Reviewer; we did not dream of instituting a comparison between him and ourselves, for we have long been of Dogberry's opinion, that "comparisons are odorous." We wished the doctor in the place of the recent convert, because we wished the truth to be elicited and the controversy brought to a speedy and satisfactory termination; because the learned Catholic doctor would have studied, not to darken, but to elucidate, the subject; because he would have understood his authorities, perceived the precise points on which the controversy turns, and have spoken to them directly and logically; because it was error, not defeat, we dreaded, — truth, not victory, we desired. The Reviewer's second article, we are sorry to say, has served only to justify and increase the regret we expressed.

The Reviewer complains, also, of the tone in which we wrote, and thinks we too frequently and too severely referred to his various disqualifications for the task he had undertaken. He may be right in this. We are subject to infirmity as well as other men, and are neither infallible nor impeccable. But we speak plainly, without reticence or circumlocution, on principle. We write usually with earnestness, but if with severity, it is the severity of truth and argument, never that of passion. We may have expressed too frequently our conviction of the Reviewer's disqualification for his task, but we certainly expressed it far less frequently than we felt it. The Reviewer, we can believe, is an amiable, and in some respects a learned, man; but, if we may judge from his articles against us, he is a stranger to severe mental discipline, and has failed to digest the materials collected from his various reading. He has looked over, perhaps through, some valuable tracts on Catholic theology, but he does not appear to have mastered them. As a writer, he seems to us to retain the principle said to have been avowed by the Tractarian school to which he formerly belonged, of seeing how much one may say in a given direction, so plainly that every reader shall be morally certain of his meaning, yet so adroitly as never, in express words, to commit himself, or render it possible to reproduce his meaning without changing his phraseology, — a principle of writing very necessary to men occupying the position of Tractarians, seeking to reform or essentially modify a church whose authority they acknowledge, but as unnecessary as disingenuous in a Catholic. We had no unkind feelings towards him, and we aimed to be respectful; but we could not always feel respect, and we are poorly skilled in the art of expressing what we do not feel. Moreover, we regarded ourselves as defending Catholicity against a novel theory, which, if admitted, would subvert it, and we did not and could not treat him as we would and should have done, if the subject in dispute had been only one of those scholastic questions on which Catholics are free to differ. When the foundations of the faith are attacked, we cannot stop to consult the delicate sensibilities of those who attack them, however unconscious they may be of what they are doing.

The Reviewer, again, accuses us of unfairness; but as we are not conscious of having treated him unfairly, and as he points out, as we can see, no instance of unfairness on our part, we must consider this charge — a development. We aimed to be fair, and we had no motive for being otherwise. We did, indeed, take the liberty of giving to the points he made a little more precision than he had given them, and of holding him to the strict logic of the case; but in this there was no unfairness, and we did it for his sake much more than for our own. We thought then, and we still think, that if he and his friends would define their views to themselves, study to give precision to their statements, and adhere to the strict rules of logic in developing them, or, in other words, if they would adopt the rigid scholastic method of our theologians, instead of retaining the loose rhetorical method they learned at Oxford, they would immediately abjure their theory, and wonder how they could ever have entertained it. But a charge of unfairness from the Reviewer is rather amusing. He has himself no fairness; he does not treat us, in a single instance, with common justice. We have discovered no instance in which he states our doctrine correctly, no instance in which he reproduces one of our arguments without perverting it, none in which he has treated with ordinary civility a single authority we have introduced. He meets

fairly not a single point we have made, treats all our arguments with contempt or with silence, and his own citations are frequently made with an unfairness which would surprise us even in a Protestant controversialist. Yet he talks of our unfairness, and takes great credit to himself because he presumes it to be *unintentional* unfairness.

The Reviewer thinks he has detected a contradiction in our assertions with regard to the Developmentists. We denominate them a school, and yet represent them as disagreeing among themselves. Therefore we assert them to be a school and not a school,—a flat contradiction. We deny the consequence. A school is where a certain number of persons adopt the peculiar principles of some master, and is not destroyed by their disagreeing among themselves as to certain matters which do not involve the truth or falsity of those principles. We call the Developmentists a school because they adopt the principles as to development set forth by Mr. Newman. And this they can be, we should suppose, although they may differ among themselves as to the fact whether this or that particular dogma is to be considered a development, or as a dogma explicitly contained in the Apostolic revelation. If the Reviewer thinks otherwise, he is welcome to his opinion; the matter is not worth disputing about.

We were not quite exact, it seems, in our references. The Reviewer complains of two of them,—one to Tournely, the other to Melchior Cano. The one to Tournely is correct. The Reviewer will find it *De Locis Theologicis, De Censuris*, Art. 2, where we referred him. The edition is that of Paris and Venice, Pezzana, 1765. The reference to Cano, the Reviewer says, is wrong as to the chapter, and omits the book. The first part of the charge is not true, according to our edition of the *De Locis Theologicis*. The second part is true. By an inexcusable blunder in transcribing for the press, we omitted to specify the book, and did not discover it till it was too late to rectify it. We of course were mortified, but our regret was not so great as it might have been, for we had given the title of the chapter, and so accurately marked the position of the passage cited, that the Reviewer could have had no serious difficulty in finding it, if he knew where to look for his own citations from the same author.

But the Reviewer himself is not immaculate in this matter of references. He referred us to Moehler, Vol. I. pp. 66, 67, Robertson's Translation, without specifying the edition: and having only the American edition, in one volume, we had no little difficulty in verifying the citation. He referred us to Bellarmine, *De Purgatorio*, I. 15, meaning, we suppose, Book I. and chapter 15; but, unhappily, that book, in our edition of Bellarmine, contains only eleven chapters in all! Of his references to Cano, more than one half were incorrect, according to our edition of the work referred to, and he did not name the edition he used. These errors will offset our blunder. They were all in his former article, yet we did not think it worth our while to point them out. Part of them, we presumed, came from his using a different edition of the works cited from the one we used, and the remainder were pardonable oversights in a periodical writer. In such matters it is well for every one to practise generosity, for every one in turn may need it. After all, these are small matters. We have never doubted the ability of our contemporary to make quotations, and we always presume that he makes them at first hand, unless he informs us to the contrary. Whether he can or cannot say as much of us is a matter of no moment. Having never set up to be a scholar,

making no pretensions to learning in any department whatever, we are free from the ambition of acquiring, and from the fear of losing, the reputation of scholarship. Indeed, all these incidental topics we have touched upon look to us as mere trifles, and unfit to engage the attention of two grave Reviews, and we assure the Dublin Reviewer that we can waste no more time upon similar topics, and if he continues to introduce them, he must pardon us if we pass them over in silence.

* * * Our notices of recent publications sent us by our friends, the booksellers, are again crowded out for the want of room. But we cannot refrain from recommending, in the warmest and most unqualified terms possible, *The Lives of the Modern Saints*, now in course of publication in England, of which Edward Dunigan, of New York, is the American publisher. They are got up in a neat and even elegant style, and furnish the very kind of reading we have long been anxious to see placed within the reach of the faithful generally. We trust the Catholic public will appreciate the enterprise of the publishers, and give it a cordial and a liberal support.